Air Force Nuclear Weapons Storage Bases
Identification
This record resolves best as a distributed set of Russian 12th Main Directorate base-level aviation nuclear weapons storage and handling sites, not one single installation. Open-source mapping by Pavel Podvig and UNIDIR places such base-level facilities under the 12th Main Directorate and associates them with operational air or naval aviation bases. ([russianforces.org](https://russianforces.org/blog/2017/08/where_the_weapons_are.shtml))
Matched sites
Eight placemarks correspond closely to UNIDIR-listed sites at Vozdvizhenka (unit 23477), Tver (19089), Engels (77910), Shatalovo (23476), Morozovsk (55796), Soltsy (75365), Mongokhto (40689), and Shaykovka (26219). The remaining placemark at 50.4264N, 136.8503E aligns by coordinate with Khurba, but the metadata’s unit number 77922 is not corroborated in the consulted sources, which list Khurba as unit 77944. UNIDIR also classifies Mongokhto as a naval-aviation site, so the set is aviation-associated rather than strictly Air Force-only. ([unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf))
Role
Open-source analysis describes these sites as 12th Main Directorate facilities for custody, storage, service, maintenance, and delivery of nuclear weapons. Russia has publicly maintained that non-strategic nuclear weapons are kept at centralized storage bases in peacetime; in higher-readiness scenarios, 12th Main Directorate crews move warheads from storage, perform any final assembly at designated airbase areas, and retain custody until loading onto the aircraft. For bomber bases, UNIDIR assesses the assigned warheads are probably held at the affiliated base-level site. ([unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf))
Infrastructure
The identified aviation storage sites share recognizable 12th Main Directorate signatures in satellite imagery: covered bunker areas, ventilation outlets, fortified perimeters, and heavier security than nearby conventional-munitions storage. UNIDIR notes Engels’s storage is about 7 km from the airfield, while Soltsy’s storage area is directly connected to the airfield; it also identified a new probable storage bunker at Morozovsk after 2005. Separately, FAS reported that the Tver site was upgraded from late 2017 to late 2018 with a new internal security fence, guard post, and support vehicles. ([unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf))
Operational relevance
The matched sites span western Russia—Tver, Soltsy, Shaykovka, Shatalovo, Morozovsk, and Engels—and the Far East—Vozdvizhenka, likely Khurba, and Mongokhto—next to long-range bomber, tactical aviation, and one naval-aviation base. This distribution indicates a regional support network for aviation nuclear logistics rather than a single central depot. Tver is somewhat atypical: UNIDIR could not identify its associated strike airfield, and FAS assessed the nearby Migalovo base might serve a transport or distribution role, but that function is not publicly confirmed. ([unidir.org](https://unidir.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/05/lock-them-up-zero-deployed-non-strategic-nuclear-weapons-in-europe-en-675.pdf))
Confidence limits
Open sources do not publicly confirm the exact current warhead load at each listed site. FAS specifically stated that satellite imagery could not determine whether the Tver site stores weapons at present, only that it is active; the Khurba unit-number mismatch remains unresolved in the consulted material. ([fas.org](https://fas.org/publication/russia-upgrades-western-nuclear-weapons-storage-sites/))