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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-28 16:51:52Z
6 hours ago
Previous (2026-02-28 16:21:53Z)

Situation Update (18:51:30 UTC Feb 28, 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • Massive Strike Campaign on Dnipropetrovsk (1630Z, Dnipro OVA, HIGH): Nearly 50 Russian drone, artillery, and air attacks recorded in a single day. Two casualties confirmed; emergency services actively mitigating damage to civilian infrastructure and vehicles.
  • Precision Israeli Counter-Strikes in Western Iran (1627Z-1633Z, multiple, HIGH): IDF has released visual evidence (Thermal/EO) of precision strikes against Iranian surface-to-surface missile launch facilities and personnel preparing ballistic launches.
  • Targeting of Bushehr Nuclear Site (1642Z, TASS/Iranian State TV, MEDIUM): Reports indicate a missile strike on the city of Bushehr, the location of Iran's only operational Nuclear Power Plant. Damage extent unknown.
  • UAF Strategic Drone Expansion (1642Z, Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH): Minister Fedorov announced the scaling of the "Drone Army" program with Dutch support, specifically the formation of dedicated "drone regiments."
  • Disputed Closure of Strait of Hormuz (1645Z-1650Z, multiple, MEDIUM): IRGC has reiterated orders to close the Strait, threatening to "neutralize" violators. However, current MarineTraffic data (as of 1645Z) shows active maritime transit, contradicting Iranian state claims.
  • Internal Russian Kinetic Incidents (1627Z-1643Z, ASTRA/Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): A bomb explosion confirmed in a residential building on Kadyrov Street, Moscow (FSB responding). Separately, two students were detained for arson attacks on gas stations in Novosibirsk and Berdsk.
  • UAV Threat to Mykolaiv (1637Z, UA Air Force, HIGH): Inbound Shahed-type UAVs detected approaching Mykolaiv from the southeast.

Operational picture (by sector)

1. Northern Sector (Kharkiv/Sumy/Dnipropetrovsk):

  • Dnipropetrovsk: This sector has become a focal point of Russian kinetic saturation. The 50+ attacks indicate a concerted effort to degrade logistical hubs and regional morale.
  • Kharkiv/Sumy: Previous UAV waves continue to impact the area. Atmospheric conditions (0.5°C, 79% cloud cover) remain optimal for low-altitude UAV ingress while masking launch signatures from satellite IR.
  • Friendly Posture: UAF is transitioning toward more structured unmanned units (regimental level) to counter Russian massed drone tactics.

2. Southern Sector (Mykolaiv/Zaporizhzhia/Kherson):

  • Mykolaiv: Immediate threat from SE-approaching UAVs.
  • Zaporizhzhia/Kherson: Weather remains mainly clear (2.7°C - 4.1°C, <30% cloud cover), facilitating UAF aerial reconnaissance but also exposing friendly positions to Russian KAB strikes and ISR.

3. Strategic Theater (Middle East Escalation):

  • Iran Internal: Kinetic activity expanded to Tehran, Karaj, and Bushehr. This represents a significant broadening of the conflict beyond border/maritime skirmishes.
  • Impact on Ukraine: The diversion of Global Air Defense and ISR assets to the Persian Gulf is critical. Zelenskyy has explicitly linked the 57,000+ Shaheds supplied to Russia as the justification for UAF support of strikes on Iran (1647Z).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Tactical Shift: Russia is leveraging the Middle East crisis to intensify strikes on Dnipropetrovsk, likely attempting to disrupt the flow of Western materiel from southern ports/depots toward the Donbas.
  • Internal Instability: The bomb in Moscow and gas station arsons in Siberia suggest a deterioration of domestic security or the presence of active partisan/insurgent cells within the Russian Federation.
  • Course of Action (COA): Russia will likely maintain the "saturation" tempo of 50+ strikes per day on key rear-area hubs (Dnipro, Kharkiv) to force the UAF to expend dwindling AD interceptor stocks.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Logistical/Technical Scaling: The partnership with the Netherlands to form "drone regiments" indicates a shift from ad-hoc UAV teams to a formal, multi-domain branch of service. This is a critical adaptation to counteract Russian numerical superiority.
  • Morale Management: Leadership is actively tying the Ukrainian struggle to the global fight against the "Shahed threat," positioning Ukraine as a central player in the broader Middle East-European security architecture.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Khamenei Status (LOW Confidence): Unverified claims of the death of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei are circulating (1628Z). Likely a psychological operation aimed at destabilizing Iranian command and control during the ongoing strikes.
  • Fake "E3" Statements: Pro-Russian channels are disseminating a potentially falsified joint statement from the UK, France, and Germany to create the appearance of a NATO schism regarding US/Israeli actions (1626Z).
  • Narrative Framing: Russian "WarGonzo" and "Rybar" channels are increasingly using emotional and fictional narratives (comics) to maintain domestic support as the conflict expands globally.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely COA: Continued UAV and missile saturation of Mykolaiv and Dnipropetrovsk. Expect Russian forces to exploit the "clear" weather in the south for localized tactical probes.
  • Most Dangerous COA: Potential Russian "False Flag" or retaliatory strike against Ukrainian energy infrastructure following the strike near the Bushehr NPP, citing "asymmetric response."
  • Middle East: High probability of further IRGC strikes on US assets in Bahrain and Iraq throughout the night (1647Z).

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [BATTLE DAMAGE]: Assess the operational status of the Bushehr NPP following reported strikes.
  2. [LOGISTICS]: Verify MarineTraffic data versus IRGC claims to determine if the Hormuz blockade is physically enforced or merely a psychological "paper blockade."
  3. [INTERNAL SECURITY]: Determine the affiliation of the individuals involved in the Moscow bomb incident to assess if it represents a new domestic threat vector for the Kremlin.
  4. [TECHNICAL]: Monitor the arrival of Dutch drone components and identify the proposed locations for the new "drone regiments."
Previous (2026-02-28 16:21:53Z)

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