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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-17 00:19:08Z
8 days ago
Previous (2026-02-16 23:49:06Z)

Situation Update (0018Z 17 FEB 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • Odesa Secondary Attack: (0011Z, RBC-Ukraine, HIGH) Enemy forces have launched a renewed attack on Odesa. This follows a previous report (2321Z) that the initial maritime swarm was neutralized, indicating a multi-wave or staggered assault profile.
  • Central/Eastern UAV Incursion: (0014Z, PS ZSU, HIGH) Multiple groups of UAVs from Sumy and Kharkiv Oblasts are transiting Poltava toward Cherkasy, Kirovohrad, and Dnipro.
  • Expansion to Western Ukraine: (2358Z, RBC-Ukraine, MEDIUM) Air threat warnings have been extended to Western Ukrainian oblasts, consistent with the previous UAV track through Zhytomyr.
  • Retaliatory/Deep Strike (Krasnodar): (0009Z, RBC-Ukraine, MEDIUM) Reports of a fire and casualties from "UAV debris" in Krasnodar Krai, Russia (2356Z, TASS), suggest UAF or partisan activity targeting Russian logistics or energy infrastructure.
  • Diplomatic Information Operation: (0015Z, TASS, MEDIUM) Russian state media is circulating statements attributed to the US President-elect urging Kyiv to show "compliance" at the upcoming Geneva talks.

Operational picture (by sector)

1. Northern & Western Axis:

  • Status: UAVs previously transiting the southern Kyiv/Zhytomyr corridor have likely entered Western Ukraine airspace. This vector puts pressure on logistics hubs near the Polish border and power infrastructure in Khmelnytskyi/Rivne.
  • Weather Factor: Clear but frigid conditions in the north (-7.3°C in Kharkiv) are expected to transition into snow in the central and eastern sectors (78% probability in Pokrovsk/Zaporizhzhia). This will reduce visibility for Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) using optical sights.

2. Central & Eastern Axis (Poltava/Dnipro/Cherkasy):

  • Saturation Maneuver: A significant volume of UAVs is moving from the Sumy/Kharkiv border deeper into the central heartland. Dnipro (0009Z) is already engaging targets. This suggests a coordinated effort to fix AD assets in the east while the Western wave approaches its targets.

3. Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv):

  • Resurgent Threat: The Odesa MBA confirms a new attack (0011Z). This contradicts earlier assessments of a cleared airspace, suggesting RU is employing "loitering" tactics or secondary launch platforms (possibly maritime or from occupied Crimea) to exhaust local defense.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Course of Action: The enemy is executing a high-complexity, multi-vector aerial saturation campaign. The use of Sumy/Kharkiv as a transit corridor (0014Z) aims to overwhelm the radar cross-sections of central Ukrainian AD.
  • Tactical Shift: In the "gray zones" of the contact line, RU forces are attempting to establish forward positions without adequate reconnaissance, resulting in casualties from existing minefields (2353Z, Butusov Plus).
  • Strategic Synchronization: All current aerial activity is timed to peak prior to the Feb 17 Geneva talks. The objective is "coercive diplomacy"—using infrastructure damage to force concessions.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Defensive Posture: Active AD engagement is confirmed over Dnipro and Odesa.
  • Counter-Strikes: Apparent successful UAV penetration into Krasnodar Krai (RU) demonstrates UAF's ability to maintain symmetric pressure on Russian rear-area logistics despite the ongoing assault on the Ukrainian power grid.

Information environment / disinformation

  • "Negotiation Pressure" Narrative: RU sources (TASS, Colonelcassad) are heavily emphasizing Western military movements (USS Gerald R. Ford) and purported Western political pressure (Trump quotes) to create a sense of Ukrainian isolation.
  • Cultural/Hybrid Ops: Use of traditional holidays ("Maslenitsa") mixed with military footage (0011Z, NgP) is being used to maintain domestic Russian morale and dehumanize the conflict.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): A massive, synchronized strike involving cruise missiles (Tu-95MS) and the current UAV "pathfinders" targeting Western and Central energy distribution hubs (750kV nodes) between 0200Z and 0600Z.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Simultaneous strikes on the Odesa port infrastructure and the Kyiv energy "ring," combined with a localized mechanized push in the Pokrovsk sector as ground freezing (-3.8°C) optimizes heavy armor mobility.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [TACTICAL] Confirm the nature of the "fire" in Krasnodar—identify if the target was a fuel depot or an airfield (e.g., Krymsk or Primorsko-Akhtarsk).
  2. [OPERATIONAL] Determine the specific quantity of the Sumy/Kharkiv UAV wave to assess if AD depletion is the primary goal vs. kinetic impact.
  3. [STRATEGIC] Verify the authenticity and context of the TASS report regarding the US President-elect's "compliance" statement to gauge the level of RU disinformation targeting UAF morale.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-16 23:49:06Z)

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