Massive Aerial Assault: RU launched 112 UAVs and 1 Iskander-M ballistic missile overnight. UAF reports 91/112 UAVs intercepted/suppressed; the Iskander-M was NOT intercepted (0642Z, 0649Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH).
High-Intensity Ground Combat: GenStaff reports 56 combat engagements in the Pokrovsk sector within the last 24h, representing ~25% of all frontline activity (0655Z, Operativno ZSU, HIGH).
Ongoing UAV Threat: Active "Shahed-type" drones currently detected over Dnipropetrovsk, heading toward Kramatorsk (0701Z) and crossing from Sumy/Poltava toward Kharkiv/Krasnokutsk (0702Z, Air Force UAF, HIGH).
Critical Infrastructure: Heating restored to 400 additional residential buildings in Kyiv following recent grid stress; -27°C conditions persist (0641Z, Klitschko/RBK-UA, HIGH).
Policy Shift: Ukrainian MP Venislavskyi characterized the concept of wartime demobilization as "nonsense," signaling a hardline stance on personnel retention (0643Z, RBK-Ukraine, MEDIUM).
Civilian Casualty (RU Territory): RU sources claim one civilian killed in Bryansk region due to UAF "barbaric attacks" (0703Z, Bogomaz, UNCONFIRMED/LOW).
Operational picture (by sector)
Pokrovsk Sector (Eastern Front): Remains the primary RU effort. The density of 56 assaults in 24h indicates RU "Vostok" groups are attempting to exploit the extreme weather to overwhelm UAF forward positions through sheer mass.
Northern/Kharkiv Border: New UAV vectors (Sumy-to-Kharkiv) suggest RU is attempting to bypass established AD corridors to target Krasnokutsk/Kharkiv from the west.
Southern Sector (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia): RU Zapad Group (73rd Arty Bde) claims MLRS strikes on UAF armor concentrations (0700Z). New UAV probes are active over Dnipropetrovsk (0700Z), likely scouting for BDA from overnight strikes.
Rear Areas (Kyiv): Gradual stabilization of the heating grid. The failure to intercept the Iskander-M suggests RU is successfully using UAV saturation (112 units) to mask ballistic trajectories or deplete interceptor magazines.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Aviation/Missile: RU has transitioned from "silence" at the 260th Central Rocket Artillery Base to active execution. The 112-UAV wave serves a dual purpose: exhausting UAF AD and screening high-value ballistic assets like the Iskander-M.
Tactical Adaptation: The use of "Shahed" drones on indirect routes (e.g., crossing multiple oblast borders like Sumy-Poltava-Kharkiv) indicates RU is mapping current UAF mobile fire group (MFG) dispositions in real-time.
Logistics: RU continues to leverage MLRS (Uragan) in the Zapad Group sector to disrupt UAF tactical reserves before they can reinforce the Pokrovsk meatgrinder.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense: Maintained an 81% intercept rate against a triple-digit UAV swarm, though the leakage of 21 drones plus a ballistic missile remains a high risk to the energy grid in the current deep-freeze.
Defensive Operations: UAF continues high-intensity defensive maneuvers in Pokrovsk. The reliance on maneuver-defense (as noted in previous Intel) is being tested by the volume of RU assaults.
Strategic Communications: Official commemoration of fallen scouts (e.g., Olexiy Horynytskyi) is being used to maintain national resolve as the government signals that demobilization is off the table (0656Z).
Information environment / disinformation
RU Internal Distraction: RU-aligned channels are highlighting poor infrastructure in Yakutia (frozen water lines) to counter-narrate UAF infrastructure damage, likely to mitigate domestic discontent within Russia (0658Z).
External Narratives: RU state media (TASS) is amplifying the US government "shutdown" and alleged DHS funding issues to project a narrative of fading Western support (0656Z).
Hybrid Distraction: "Operation Z" and RU military bloggers are pushing reports of a US operation against Iran (0643Z) to divert attention from the scale of RU losses and the lack of decisive ground gains.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA: Continued UAV probes targeting the Kharkiv/Donetsk border regions to fix UAF AD assets while RU reloads ballistic platforms at GRAU depots.
MDCOA: A second Iskander or Kalibr volley targeting the energy hubs in Dnipro or Poltava, exploiting the "gaps" identified during the 112-UAV wave. The failure to intercept the overnight Iskander-M makes this highly likely if the launch site is not neutralized.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Determine the impact point and BDA for the non-intercepted Iskander-M. Identify if the target was military (C2/logistics) or civilian infrastructure.
[HIGH] Technical assessment of why the Iskander-M was not suppressed; investigate if RU utilized new decoys or EW suites.
[MEDIUM] Verify the status of the "Ivan Franko Group" near the frozen river crossing (from daily intel) to see if RU flanking maneuvers have been fully contained.
