Situation Update (0637 UTC, Feb 13, 2026)
Key updates since last sitrep
- Massive UAV/Missile Wave: UAF Air Force reports intercepting/suppressing 111 of 155 incoming targets (1 ballistic missile, 154 drones) launched from Russia and Crimea; 18 locations sustained physical damage (0632Z, Air Force UA, HIGH).
- Critical Logistics Strike: Russian strikes targeted Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk), a vital transport and industrial hub for the Donbas front, and port/energy infrastructure in Odesa (0626Z, Poddubny, HIGH).
- Russian Counter-UAV Ops: Russian MoD claims 58 Ukrainian drones were intercepted over Russian regions overnight (0610Z, Operatsiya Z, MEDIUM).
- Russian Comms Degradation: Pro-RU channels report Telegram "glitches" and mobile internet throttling in operational zones, forcing a shift to alternative messengers ("MAX") for tactical coordination (0608Z, Dva Mayora, MEDIUM).
- Civilian Infrastructure Damage: Visual evidence confirms the destruction of a commercial site (car dealership) and energy infrastructure in Odesa, resulting in new power and water outages (0631Z, Hayabusa, HIGH).
- Hybrid/Legal Action: Russia has designated the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) as an "undesirable organization," further isolating Russian academia from Western influence (0617Z, ASTRA, HIGH).
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Sector (Odesa/Mykolaiv):
Russia conducted a heavy coordinated strike using Shahed-type UAVs and potentially Kalibr/Oniks missiles. Odesa reports significant damage to port facilities and energy infrastructure. This aligns with the RU strategy of systematic degradation of Ukrainian export capacity and winter energy resilience.
Central/Donbas Rear (Pavlohrad):
The targeting of Pavlohrad is operationally significant. As a primary rail and road junction, Pavlohrad serves as the "gateway" for reinforcements and supplies moving toward the Pokrovsk (Krasnoarmeysk) axis. Continued strikes here suggest an RU attempt to isolate the Pokrovsk operational area before a secondary push.
Northern/Western Ukraine:
UAV groups were tracked over Kyiv, Zhitomir, and Rivne regions moving west. While interception rates remain high (~72%), the volume of 154 drones indicates an RU effort to saturate air defenses and identify "blind spots" for future ballistic or cruise missile penetrations.
Russian Rear (Logistics/Internal):
Disruptions to electric train service near Tushino (MCD-2, Moscow) due to overhead power line failure (0622Z) indicate ongoing strain on Russian infrastructure, whether from maintenance neglect, weather, or localized sabotage.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
- Multi-Domain Comms Shift: The Russian military and affiliated mil-bloggers are increasingly telegraphing a move away from Telegram/Starlink toward state-controlled messengers (MAX) and organic radio. This "blackout" of Western platforms may precede a significant operational shift or a domestic crackdown on information flow ahead of the 2026 Russian elections.
- Strike Tactics: Russia is utilizing high-volume, low-cost UAV swarms (154 units) to force UAF to expend expensive AD interceptors. The focus on 18 specific locations suggests a transition from broad terror bombing to targeted interdiction of logistics (Pavlohrad) and energy (Odesa).
- Internal Stability: The removal of Adam Kadyrov's spleen following a traffic accident (0617Z) and the high-profile FSB arrests in Kaluga suggest a volatile internal security environment within the Russian Federation's elite and regional administrations.
Friendly activity (UAF)
- Air Defense Efficacy: UAF AD demonstrated high readiness by intercepting 111 UAVs during a saturation attack. However, the 18 hits indicate that the "protection umbrella" is being stretched thin by sheer volume.
- Deep Strike Capability: The reported 58-drone strike into Russia indicates UAF continues to maintain a high tempo of symmetric pressure on Russian rear-area logistics and AD assets.
- Strategic Communication: President Zelensky’s public framing of a potential peace deal as a "legacy win" for the US leadership suggests ongoing high-level diplomatic positioning to secure continued Western military aid.
Information environment / disinformation
- Messenger Control: RU state media (Solovyov) is actively priming the domestic audience for increased control over foreign messengers, framing them as tools for "color revolutions."
- EU/NATO Provocation Narrative: Pro-RU outlets are intensifying rhetoric regarding "Kyiv provocations" and "NATO proxy wars" to justify the ongoing strikes on civilian infrastructure.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
- Most Likely COA (MLCOA): Russia will conduct BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) via high-altitude UAVs over Odesa and Pavlohrad, followed by smaller "probing" drone strikes to keep AD crews fatigued.
- Most Dangerous COA (MDCOA): Exploiting the power/water outages in Odesa and the logistics friction in Pavlohrad, RU forces launch a concentrated missile strike (Oreshnik/Kalibr) while UAF recovery efforts are underway.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
- [CRITICAL] Assess the operational status of the Pavlohrad rail junction. Determine if the "accumulation of forces" mentioned by RU sources was successfully interdicted.
- [HIGH] Verify the specific technical cause of the RU "Telegram glitches"—is this a centralized RU censorship test or localized EW interference?
- [MEDIUM] Confirm the current status of the frozen Siverskyi Donets crossing points following the reported temperature shift in Moscow; determine if a thaw is beginning in the Donbas sector which would impede RU ice-crossing maneuvers.
//ANALYSIS ENDS//
