Nightwatch logo
'Nightwatch' text with white and gray letters
Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-12 22:37:40Z
12 days ago
Previous (2026-02-12 22:07:41Z)

Situation Update (2237 UTC, Feb 12, 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • Tactical Shift in Chasiv Yar: (2237Z, DS Belief, HIGH) Confirmed enemy advance within the Chasiv Yar sector. This indicates a breach or successful flanking maneuver in a critical high-ground area.
  • DeepState Map Update: (2220Z, DeepState, HIGH) Frontline geometry has been officially adjusted, likely reflecting the Russian gains in the Chasiv Yar/Donetsk sectors.
  • UAV Penetration (Kyiv/North): (2228Z, AFU Air Force, HIGH) One or more UAVs (likely Shahed-type) detected in NW Kyiv region, currently on a western heading.
  • Energy Recovery Efforts: (Continuation from 2153Z, MEDIUM) Maintenance remains ongoing at the Khadzhybeivka substation (Odesa) under extreme cold conditions (-27°C).

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Eastern Sector (Chasiv Yar/Bakhmut Axis): The situation has deteriorated. Russian forces have successfully advanced in Chasiv Yar. Utilizing the frozen terrain (documented in the daily report), enemy infantry have likely bypassed UAF strongpoints. This elevation is critical; its partial loss threatens UAF fire control over the surrounding lowlands.
  • Northern Sector (Kyiv/Zhytomyr Axis): A westward-moving UAV (2228Z) suggests the enemy is probing the depth of the Ukrainian air defense corridor or targeting logistics hubs in the Zhytomyr/Rivne direction.
  • Southern Sector (Odesa): Kinetic activity has slowed following the earlier missile/UAV wave, but the region remains vulnerable as the grid struggles to stabilize post-Khadzhybeivka strike.

Enemy analysis (threat assessment)

  • Tactical Adaptation: Russian forces are capitalizing on the "bridge" created by the -27°C freeze. The advance in Chasiv Yar suggests they are prioritizing high-ground capture to offset the difficulties of maneuvering armored columns in deep winter.
  • Aerial Course of Action: The western heading of the UAV over Kyiv region indicates a potential "shuttle" tactic, where drones are used to map the location of mobile fire groups (MFGs) before a larger missile wave is launched from Russian rear areas.
  • Logistics Status: Despite reported pressure on domestic Russian recruitment (debtors/homeless), the Russian "Vostok" grouping maintains sufficient combat power to conduct offensive operations in multiple sub-sectors simultaneously.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Defensive Realignments: UAF units in the Chasiv Yar sector are likely transitioning to secondary fallback positions or preparing local counter-attacks to prevent the stabilization of the new Russian line.
  • Air Defense Management: Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) are active in the NW Kyiv region to intercept the westbound UAV.
  • Asset Preservation: Use of specialized drone units (e.g., 412th "Nemesis") continues to be the primary method for counter-battery fire, preserving high-value Western-supplied artillery from Russian Lancet/FPV saturation.

Information environment (cognitive domain)

  • Narrative Exploitation: The DeepState map update (2220Z) will likely be amplified by Russian milbloggers to reinforce the "collapse of the Donbas front" narrative, coinciding with the "energy despair" PSYOPS previously identified.
  • Operational Security (OPSEC): UAF official sources are maintaining silence on the specifics of the Chasiv Yar situation, leading to a temporary information vacuum being filled by OSINT mappers.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Continued westward movement of UAVs toward the Dubrovytsia/Rivne axis to trigger air defense radars and identify gaps. Russian forces in Chasiv Yar will attempt to consolidate their new positions and bring up mortars for fire control over UAF supply lines.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A night-time localized breakthrough in the Chasiv Yar sector supported by thermobaric systems (TOS-1A) while UAF air defense is preoccupied with deep-penetration UAVs.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [CRITICAL] Precise boundaries of the Russian advance in Chasiv Yar; determine if the enemy has secured any of the canal crossings.
  2. [HIGH] Identify if the UAV over NW Kyiv is a "Geran" (loitering munition) or a specialized electronic intelligence (ELINT) platform.
  3. [MEDIUM] Assessment of UAF ammunition reserves in the Chasiv Yar sector following the loss of terrain.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-12 22:07:41Z)

We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.

Learn more in our Privacy Policy.