Expanded KAB Envelope: (2022Z, PS ZSU, HIGH) Russian tactical aviation has expanded guided aerial bomb (KAB) strikes to the Kharkiv sector, in addition to ongoing strikes in Zaporizhzhia.
Trans-Regional UAV Transit: (2014Z, PS ZSU, HIGH) Loitering munitions previously in Kyiv Oblast have maintained a westward vector, now entering Vinnytsia Oblast.
Mass UAF UAV Strike: (2017Z, TASS/RU MoD, MEDIUM) Russian MoD claims to have intercepted 66 Ukrainian UAVs over Russian territory within a 3-hour window; indicates a high-intensity Ukrainian deep-strike operation in progress.
Starlink Disruption & Tactical Adaptation: (2009Z, 2016Z, 2030Z, Tsaplienko/RBK-UA, HIGH) The blocking of Starlink terminals has forced Russian units to deploy vulnerable Wi-Fi bridges and repeaters on elevated structures (lattice towers), which UAF FPV units are actively interdicting.
Strategic Policy Clarification: (2012Z, Hayabusa/The Atlantic, HIGH) President Zelenskyy explicitly stated a preference for no agreement over a "bad peace," signaling a readiness to continue the conflict for another four years if necessary to ensure a "decent and lasting peace."
Operational picture (by sector)
Northern/Central Sector (Kyiv/Vinnytsia): UAV threats have shifted from Kyiv toward Vinnytsia (2014Z). This indicates a likely intent to strike transit nodes or energy infrastructure further into the Ukrainian interior.
Southern Sector (Odesa): A new wave of UAVs is currently transiting the Black Sea toward Odesa (2034Z). This follows a pattern of iterative maritime-axis attacks to saturate coastal AD.
Eastern Sector (Kharkiv): Fresh KAB strikes reported (2022Z). This suggests the VKS is increasing pressure on Kharkiv’s defensive perimeter, possibly to fix UAF forces while operations continue in the Donbas.
Southern Front (Zaporizhzhia): Continued KAB strikes and active combat operations (2015Z, 2018Z). The sector remains a primary focus for Russian tactical aviation.
Russian Rear/Occupied Territories: Ukrainian long-range UAV activity is high across Crimea, Belgorod, Rostov, Volgograd, and Kursk (2032Z).
Enemy analysis (Threat assessment)
C2 Adaptations: The Russian transition to Wi-Fi bridges due to Starlink outages (2009Z) reveals a critical vulnerability in their tactical communications. While providing localized connectivity, these "bridges" create static electronic and visual signatures on high ground, increasing the lethality of UAF FPV teams.
Aviation Tactics: The simultaneous use of KABs across Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia indicates a high sortie rate and an intent to maintain multi-axis pressure, likely intended to deplete UAF's limited tactical air defense munitions.
Internal Security: Reports of 146,000+ denunciations to the FSB (2036Z) and forced public apologies for "discrediting the army" (2031Z) highlight a transition toward a high-repression domestic environment to maintain the war effort.
Friendly forces (Blue force tracking)
Force Posture: UAF is maintaining a defensive posture against UAV/KAB threats while simultaneously executing a massed drone offensive against Russian rear assets.
Strategic Communication: Zelenskyy’s "four more years" stance (2012Z) is a significant counter-narrative to recent "abandonment" disinformation, intended to stiffen domestic resolve and manage international expectations regarding negotiations.
Information environment (Cognitive domain)
Russian Internal Friction: Pavel Durov’s public refutation of a state-mandated messenger (2012Z) indicates a degree of resistance from the Russian tech elite against total administrative control of the information space.
Disinformation/Psychological Ops: Russian channels continue to use "apology videos" (2031Z) to intimidate the domestic population and suppress dissent regarding the conduct of the "Special Military Operation."
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): UAVs currently in flight will target energy or logistics hubs in Vinnytsia and Odesa within the next 2-4 hours. Russian tactical aviation will continue KAB cycles in the Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia sectors to exploit the cover of night.
MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): A massed missile strike (Kalibr/Iskander) timed to coincide with the depletion of AD interceptors used against the current UAV waves, specifically targeting the energy grid during the ongoing cold snap.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[HIGH] Assessment of the impact of the 66-UAV strike on Russian energy/logistics targets.
[MEDIUM] Evaluation of the effectiveness of Russian "Wi-Fi bridges" compared to the previously used Starlink terminals.
[MEDIUM] Monitoring for potential VKS "A-50" or equivalent AEW&C activity to support the expanded KAB operations in Kharkiv.
