Kotluban Evacuation Confirmed: (0557Z, TASS, HIGH) Russian authorities have opened two Temporary Accommodation Centers (PVR) for the evacuation of Kotluban (Volgograd Oblast) following the previously reported strike on the military arsenal.
Combined Strike on Kyiv/Dnipro: (0610Z, Sternenko / 0617Z, KCMA, HIGH) Russian forces conducted a combined attack targeting civil infrastructure in Kyiv (2 injured) and Dnipro (infant and 4-year-old girl injured).
Deep Strike Extension (Tambov): (0602Z, ASTRA, LOW) Unconfirmed reports and video footage suggest a Ukrainian UAV strike targeted Michurinsk, Tambov region.
Energy Infrastructure Strike (Luhansk): (0559Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU, LOW) Unconfirmed reports of an intense nighttime fire at a power substation in occupied Luhansk following a strike.
DNS Level Censorship (RU): (0604Z, Sever.Realii, MEDIUM) Russian authorities have reportedly removed the domains of over 10 web resources from DNS services, indicating a widening of digital control measures beyond the Telegram blackout.
Tactical UAV Proliferation: (0603Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM) Russian forces are highlighting the deployment of "Molniya-2" fixed-wing strike UAVs, capable of carrying several kilograms of explosives for precision strikes against fortifications.
Operational picture (by sector)
1. Northern / Deep Rear (Russian Territory):
The Ukrainian deep-strike campaign has expanded its geographical footprint. The confirmation of evacuations in Kotluban (0557Z) indicates that the fire at the Volgograd arsenal is not contained and poses a significant risk to local populations. The reported strike in Michurinsk (Tambov) (0602Z) demonstrates UA's ability to penetrate deeper into the Russian interior, likely targeting logistics or energy nodes.
2. Eastern Sector (Luhansk/Donbas):
The reported strike on a Luhansk substation (0559Z) aligns with a strategy to disrupt the occupied energy grid during the -27°C freeze. At the tactical level, the use of "Molniya-2" drones (0603Z) suggests RU is attempting to compensate for any remaining C2 friction with increased autonomous or semi-autonomous strike capabilities.
3. Central / Rear (Kyiv/Dnipro):
Russian retaliatory strikes have shifted focus back to major urban centers. The KCMA report (0617Z) confirms damage to civil infrastructure in Kyiv. This follows the pattern of "punitive" strikes typically seen after successful UA deep operations.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Capabilities/Intentions: RU continues to prioritize infrastructure strikes to maximize civilian hardship during the extreme cold. The deployment of the "Molniya-2" UAV (0603Z) indicates a focus on low-cost, high-precision tactical strikes to bypass traditional electronic warfare (EW) or air defense (AD).
Logistics and Sustainment: The Kotluban evacuation suggests a significant disruption to the 260th GRAU Arsenal's operations. If this node is offline, RU's ability to sustain artillery and missile tempo in the southern/eastern sectors will be degraded in the 48-72h window.
C2 and Hybrid Ops: The removal of domains from DNS (0604Z) suggests the RU internal information environment is under increased stress, leading to more aggressive technical censorship measures.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Deep Strike Efficacy: UAF has maintained the initiative in the deep rear, successfully hitting high-value targets (Volgograd, potentially Tambov and Luhansk). This is forcing RU to divert resources to civil evacuation and AD point defense.
Civil Defense: UA emergency services and military administrations in Kyiv and Dnipro are effectively managing the fallout of combined strikes, though civilian casualties (including children) continue to mount.
Information environment / disinformation
Russian Messaging: State media (TASS) is forced to admit evacuations (Kotluban) but frames them as a standard protective measure rather than a failure of AD. Military bloggers (Colonelcassad) are attempting to pivot the narrative back to RU technical prowess (Molniya-2).
DNS Suppression: The removal of domains from DNS is a significant escalation in RU digital hygiene, likely aimed at preventing the spread of BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) footage from the Volgograd and Tambov strikes.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Continued RU "Shahed" and missile pressure on the UA energy grid to exploit the cold. UA will likely launch a secondary wave of UAVs to exploit the AD gaps identified during the overnight mass launch.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A major Russian missile barrage (using the "quiet" inventory noted in the 24h Daily Report) synchronized with a localized breakthrough attempt on the frozen Siverskyi Donets.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Confirm the extent of damage at the Michurinsk (Tambov) site. Determine if the target was the local refinery or a military storage site.
[HIGH] Assess the status of the Luhansk power grid following the reported substation strike. Determine if this impacts RU military logistics or C2 nodes in the city.
[MEDIUM] Monitor the movement of Russian strategic aviation (Tu-95/Tu-160) for signs of the major missile strike signaled by the "Quiet Depot" signature.
[MEDIUM] Identify the specific units deploying the "Molniya-2" UAV to determine if this is a general issue or localized to specific Spetsnaz units.
