Nightwatch logo
'Nightwatch' text with white and gray letters
Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-11 21:27:49Z
13 days ago
Previous (2026-02-11 20:57:48Z)

Situation Update (2127 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • KYIV EXPLOSION RECLASSIFIED: (2100Z, RBK-Ukraine/SES, HIGH) The vehicle explosion in Holosiivskyi district, previously assessed as potential sabotage, has been officially attributed by the State Emergency Service (SES) to the detonation of liquefied petroleum gas (LPG/ГБО) equipment. This significantly lowers the immediate assessment of active Sabotage and Reconnaissance Group (SRG) kinetic activity in the capital.
  • NEW UAV WAVE: (2100Z, UA Air Force, HIGH) Multiple groups of Russian loitering munitions (Shahed-type) have entered Dnipropetrovsk oblast from the south/east, tracking Northwest.
  • PRECISION STRIKE SUCCESS: (2102Z, Operativno ZSU, HIGH) UAF "422 Luftwaffe" unit confirmed the destruction of a Russian BM-27 Uragan MLRS and damage to high-value assets, including a Kasta-2E2 surveillance radar and an S-300V launcher.
  • HULIAIPOLE SECTOR ACTIVITY: (2102Z, Sternenko, MEDIUM) Urgent resource requests for the Huliaipole direction suggest a localized escalation or a shift in Russian pressure in a sector previously described as "quiet."
  • CROSS-BORDER PRESSURE: (2058Z, Bogomaz, HIGH) Rocket alerts and activation of warning systems reported across Bryansk Oblast, indicating sustained UAF counter-strike operations against Russian launch sites.

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Kyiv/Strategic Rear: The threat profile has shifted back to a primarily aerial/missile focus following the SES clarification on the Holosiivskyi vehicle incident. While air defense remains on high alert for incoming UAVs, the "internal sabotage" narrative has been tempered by technical findings.
  • Southern Sector (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia):
    • UAV Incursion: Current vector for loitering munitions suggests potential targeting of logistics hubs or energy infrastructure in central Ukraine.
    • Huliaipole: New indicators of tactical urgency. This sector, which has been relatively static compared to the "Ice Armor" breaches in the north, may be facing increased Russian probing or a shift in UAF defensive requirements.
  • Eastern Sector (Donbas):
    • Kostiantynivka: Russian sources are circulating archival FPV footage (callsigns "Listopad" and "Muzyka") to project momentum. The use of archival rather than real-time footage suggests a lack of recent significant gains or a pause in localized breakthroughs.
    • Counter-Battery/AD: UAF precision strikes (2102Z) against Russian S-300V and Kasta-2E2 radar significantly degrade Russian local air defense and low-altitude detection capabilities in their immediate tactical rear.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Course of Action - Aerial Saturation: Russia continues to cycle UAV groups to exhaust UAF air defense magazines and identify gaps in the radar net, specifically targeting the Northwest corridor from Dnipropetrovsk.
  • Capabilities - High-Value Asset Loss: The damage to a Kasta-2E2 radar is notable. This system is specialized for detecting low-altitude targets (like cruise missiles and UAVs); its loss creates a "blind spot" that UAF can exploit for subsequent drone or missile strikes.
  • Tactical Stagnation: The reliance on archival footage near Kostiantynivka indicates that Russian forces may be struggling to translate KAB saturation into immediate territorial gains in the sub-zero conditions.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Precision Attrition: UAF is successfully pairing drone reconnaissance with strike assets (MLRS/precision UAVs) to strip away Russian force multipliers (Radar, AD, and heavy MLRS).
  • Operational Readiness: Urgent mobilization of resources toward Huliaipole indicates a proactive stance by UAF volunteer and support networks to reinforce potential "quiet" sectors before they are exploited.
  • Counter-Offensive Deep Strikes: Ongoing rocket and UAV threats in Bryansk and Belgorod are effectively forcing the Russian MoD to maintain significant AD assets within their own borders, preventing their redeployment to the frontline.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Russian "Whataboutism": Russian state media (TASS) is pivoting to classic "culture war" and "political legitimacy" narratives (migration in the EU, Zelensky's election status) to distract from the lack of recent major battlefield breakthroughs.
  • Correction of Narrative: UAF-aligned channels and official services (SES) successfully countered potential panic regarding the Kyiv explosion by providing rapid technical evidence (LPG detonation), preventing a "sabotage panic" from taking root.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • MLCOA: Russian Shahed groups currently in Dnipropetrovsk oblast will likely target energy or C2 nodes in central Ukraine/Kyiv between 0000Z and 0400Z.
  • MDCOA: Russian forces attempt a localized "surprise" push in the Huliaipole sector to capitalize on the focus being directed toward the Siversk/Zakitne ice crossings.
  • Tactical Opportunity: UAF may leverage the "blind spot" created by the damaged Kasta-2E2 radar for a targeted deep strike in that specific sub-sector.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [HIGH] Verify current Russian troop concentrations near Huliaipole to determine if the "urgent requests" (2102Z) correspond to a specific Russian buildup.
  2. [MEDIUM] BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) on the S-300V and Kasta-2E2 to determine if the units are fully neutralized or merely degraded.
  3. [LOW] Monitor for any transition of Russian VKS strikes from KABs to stand-off missiles, following the "quiet" observed at the 260th GRAU Arsenal (from previous daily report).

//ANALYSIS ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-11 20:57:48Z)

We only use optional analytics cookies if you allow them. Necessary cookies stay on for sign-in and site security.

Learn more in our Privacy Policy.