Situation Report

Situation Update (2026-02-11 11:57 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• EU MACRO-FINANCIAL AID: (11:34, RBC-UA; 11:54, Alex Parker, HIGH) The European Parliament has approved a €90 billion loan for Ukraine for the 2026–2027 period, funded by EU market borrowing. This provides long-term fiscal stability for continued defense operations.
• KINETIC ESCALATION (ZAPORIZHZHIA): (11:29-11:38, AFU Air Force, HIGH) Integrated strike in progress. High-speed targets (missiles), KAB glide bombs, and multi-directional UAV ingress (West, East, South) are currently targeting Zaporizhzhia.
• TACTICAL INFILTRATION FAILURE (SUMY): (11:40, Butusov/71st AABr, HIGH) Russian forces attempted a 10-man assault using snowmobiles near Korchakivka. The 71st Jaeger Brigade neutralized the unit (4 KIA, 6 POW), confirming RU adaptation to the "Ice Armor" terrain via light, high-mobility winter vehicles.
• RU TACTICAL C2 CRISIS: (11:36, Alex Parker, MEDIUM) Frontline units in Belgorod report that the Telegram block has severed real-time civilian-military drone warning networks, which previously utilized "intercepted" UA drone feeds. This confirms a degradation of localized early warning capabilities.
• ANAPA INCIDENT UPDATE: (11:48-11:54, TASS/Alex Parker/ASTRA, HIGH) The shooting at the Anapa Industrial Technical School resulted in 1 KIA and 5 wounded. While initial reports linked this to the Telegram block, current intelligence suggests the motive was a fraudulent "diploma sale" scheme involving faculty.
• RU FORCE SUSTAINMENT: (11:33, Colonelcassad, HIGH) Russian MoD announced salary increases for both conscripts and contract soldiers, likely an attempt to stem morale loss and incentivize recruitment amidst internal instability.
• UA MOBILIZATION CLARIFICATION: (11:38, Tsaplienko, HIGH) Verkhovna Rada confirmed the passage of Bill 13574; men aged 18–25 who complete a one-year contract are granted a one-year deferment from further conscription.

Operational picture (by sector)

• Zaporizhzhia Sector: The most active kinetic zone. RU 58th Combined Arms Army (CAA) has reportedly advanced 1.5km in the Stepove-Pavlovka direction (11:30, Zvizdeets Mangustu, MEDIUM). RU is attempting to fix UAF forces in Lukyanovske and Prymorske to facilitate a push toward Hryhorivka and Komyshuvakha.
• Sumy/Northern Sector: Small-scale RU infiltration attempts continue. The use of snowmobiles (11:40) indicates RU is testing "Ice Armor" mobility. UAV threats remain active from the north (11:41).
• Belgorod/Border Area: High-intensity drone and counter-drone activity. Smoke plumes confirmed near the border (11:37). RU tactical units are complaining about the loss of Telegram-based situational awareness (11:36).

Enemy activity / threat assessment

• Tactical Adaptations: RU is utilizing snowmobiles for infiltration and dirt bikes (via Wagner Legion Istra) for high-mobility roles. These assets bypass traditional ATGM/minefield focuses but are highly vulnerable to thermal-equipped UAVs.
• C2 Migration: RU official bodies (Investigative Committee) are aggressively migrating to the "MAX" messenger (11:50). However, Kremlin spokesperson Peskov continues to deny that the front line depends on any messenger (11:42), indicating a persistent lack of reality-testing at the strategic level.
• Strike Patterns: The current synchronized strike on Zaporizhzhia (KAB + UAV + Missile) suggests a concentrated effort to degrade UAF logistics hubs ahead of a rumored larger RU offensive.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Defensive Success: 71st Jaeger Brigade remains highly effective in the north, successfully transitioning from "tunnel warfare" defense to "Ice Armor" interception (snowmobile unit neutralized).
• Strategic Morale: The approval of the €90B EU loan and the formalization of the 18-25 mobilization deferment provide a counter-narrative to RU PSYOPs regarding Ukrainian exhaustion.

Information environment / disinformation

• "MAX" Promotion: RU state-aligned channels are flood-promoting "MAX" as the only source for verified social support (11:50, WarGonzo). This is a forced migration to a monitored platform.
• Strategic Denial: Peskov’s comments (11:42) regarding Telegram are being met with derision by RU milbloggers, further widening the gap between the MoD and frontline personnel.
• Belgorod SIGINT: Reports of RU units "intercepting" UA drone feeds via Telegram suggest a significant tactical vulnerability if UAF can identify and spoof these channels.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

• MLCOA: High-intensity bombardment of Zaporizhzhia continues, followed by a localized push by the RU 58th CAA to consolidate gains near Stepove.
• MDCOA: RU utilizes the current heavy fog/weather conditions to launch a larger "Ice Armor" infiltration across frozen water bodies in the Siversk/Lyman sectors, exploiting the C2 confusion caused by the "MAX" transition.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

1. [CRITICAL] Assess the impact of the €90B loan announcement on RU "peace negotiation" narratives.
2. [HIGH] Identify the technical specifications of the "MAX" app to determine if it allows for the same lateral tactical coordination (drone feed sharing) as Telegram.
3. [MEDIUM] Monitor RU 58th CAA movements for signs of mechanized exploitation following their 1.5km infantry advance.

---

IPB 1: SITUATION OVERVIEW The operational tempo has shifted to Zaporizhzhia. The "Ice Armor" environment is no longer just a defensive barrier but a maneuver space being tested by RU light infantry (snowmobiles). The digital blackout continues to degrade RU tactical early warning systems in border regions like Belgorod.

IPB 2: ENEMY ANALYSIS RU is attempting a "top-down" fix for its C2 crisis by mandating the "MAX" app while simultaneously denying that a crisis exists. Tactically, they are shifting to high-mobility, low-signature vehicles (dirt bikes/snowmobiles) to mitigate UA FPV drone dominance. The MoD salary increase suggests a need to buy loyalty as internal friction (Anapa, Telegram ban) grows.

IPB 3: FRIENDLY FORCES UAF continues to demonstrate high tactical proficiency in "search-and-destroy" missions against RU infiltration groups. The legislative clarity on mobilization (Bill 13574) and the EU financial package provide the necessary "strategic depth" to ignore Russian "negotiation" baiting.

IPB 4: INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The Russian information space is fracturing. The MoD's insistence that "all is well" contradicts the lived reality of soldiers who have lost their primary comms tool. This is a primary target for UAF psychological operations aimed at RU junior officers.

IPB 5: PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS Expect a surge in "lone wolf" or localized internal security incidents in Russia as the digital blackout interacts with existing social grievances (e.g., the Anapa shooting). On the front, the next 6 hours will determine if the RU 58th CAA can convert their 1.5km gain into a tactical breakthrough toward Hryhorivka.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//