Situation Report

Situation Update (2026-02-11 07:00 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• OFFICIAL DENIAL OF ELECTION RUMORS: (06:31, RBK-Ukraine/Presidential Office, HIGH) The Ukrainian Presidential Administration has formally refuted the Financial Times report regarding a May 15 election, stating, "While there is no security, there will be no announcements about elections."
• RUSSIAN COMMS ADAPTATION: (06:28, Butusov Plus, HIGH) Following Starlink disruptions, Russian forces are actively laying fiber-optic lines and installing radio equipment on towers/poles to restore C2. This presents new high-priority targets for UAF FPV operators.
• PAVLOHRAD LOGISTICS THREAT: (06:46, TASS, MEDIUM) Russian state media claims that "most highways" leading into Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk region) are now under Russian UAV fire control. UNCONFIRMED; likely an exaggeration but indicates a prioritized interdiction effort against UAF GLOCs (Ground Lines of Communication).
• ZAPORIZHZHIA COUNTER-BATTERY SUCCESS: (06:48, Butusov Plus, HIGH) UAF forces identified and destroyed a Russian BM-27 "Uragan" MLRS on the Zaporizhzhia front. This unit was responsible for recent strikes on the Khortytskyi district.
• ONGOING UAV THREAT: (06:38, UAF Air Force, HIGH) New waves of Russian UAVs detected over eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast, currently tracking toward the Lozova district in Kharkiv Oblast.
• TELEGRAM DEGRADATION ADMITTED: (06:54, ASTRA/TASS, MEDIUM) Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov expressed "regret" over the necessity of slowing/blocking Telegram, confirming the state's move to enforce encryption key handovers.

Operational picture (by sector)

• Dnipropetrovsk/Pavlohrad Sector: This area is emerging as a critical focus of Russian aerial interdiction. The claim of UAV control over Pavlohrad’s transit routes suggests the enemy is attempting to isolate the Donbas front from western reinforcement hubs.
• Zaporizhzhia Sector: Relative tactical success for UAF with the destruction of the BM-27 MLRS. However, the sector remains under heavy pressure from Russian long-range fires.
• Kharkiv/Lozova Sector: Currently under active UAV threat. Russian drones are bypassing frontline AD to strike deeper logistics junctions in the Lozova district.
• Donetsk Sector (Sloviansk): Shelling intensity remains high; civilian casualties in Sloviansk rose to 3 dead and 16 wounded following Tuesday’s strikes.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

• Hardened Communications: The shift to fiber-optic and radio tower-based comms (06:28) indicates the Russian military is moving away from civilian satellite dependencies (Starlink) toward a more resilient, military-grade static infrastructure.
• Logistics Interdiction: Russian forces are pivoting toward a "drone-siege" of logistics hubs like Pavlohrad. By maintaining 24/7 UAV surveillance over highways, they aim to paralyze UAF troop rotations and supply runs without requiring a ground breakthrough.
• Tactical Terror: Continued high-casualty strikes on civilian evacuation points (Zolochiv to Bogodukhiv) suggest a deliberate effort to saturate UAF rear-area resources with humanitarian crises.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Active Counter-Battery: Successful neutralization of high-value assets (BM-27) in the Zaporizhzhia sector demonstrates effective ELINT and drone reconnaissance.
• Information Stabilization: The rapid, high-level denial of the May 15 election narrative (06:31) is a critical move to preserve domestic stability and counter Russian reflexive control operations.
• Resilience Training: UAF continues large-scale tactical medicine training (06:50) to mitigate the impact of increased Russian artillery and UAV lethality.

Information environment / disinformation

• "The Election Trap": Despite Ukrainian denials, Russian sources (TASS, Kotsnews) continue to focus on the FT report. The goal is to paint the UA administration as "anti-democratic" for refusing to hold elections during an invasion.
• Propaganda Production: The release of the "SOMALI" music video (06:29) by Russian state-aligned artists indicates a renewed push to valorize specific frontline units for domestic mobilization purposes.
• Nordic De-escalation Narrative: Reports of Norway proposing a "hotline" (06:42) are being framed by RU sources as a sign of Western fatigue and a desire to bypass Kyiv in security negotiations.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

• MLCOA: Continued UAV saturation strikes on the Lozova-Pavlohrad-Dnipropetrovsk axis. Russian forces will likely attempt to destroy the tower-mounted comms equipment UAF uses for drone relays to reciprocate the fiber-optic vulnerability.
• MDCOA: A coordinated missile strike targeting the Pavlohrad rail and road junctions to capitalize on the reported UAV "fire control" and permanently sever the southern supply route to the Donbas.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

1. [CRITICAL] Verification of Russian "fire control" over Pavlohrad highways. Need SIGINT/ELINT on drone density in the area.
2. [HIGH] Precise locations of the new Russian fiber-optic relay points for immediate FPV targeting.
3. [MEDIUM] Status of the 108+ UAF UAVs launched into Russia; BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) needed for RU airbases.

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IPB 1: SITUATION OVERVIEW The "Deep Freeze" remains a background factor, but the tactical center of gravity has shifted to GLOC interdiction. Russia is moving to isolate Pavlohrad, which would critically endanger the entire Siversk-Lyman-Pokrovsk defensive arc.

IPB 2: ENEMY ANALYSIS Russia is adapting to its own self-imposed digital blackout. The move to fiber optics (IP over glass) suggests a preparation for a long-term, static defensive posture in certain sectors, coupled with aggressive, drone-led interdiction in the rear.

IPB 3: FRIENDLY FORCES UAF is successfully managing the information domain by shutting down the election narrative. However, the reliance on highways through Pavlohrad represents a single point of failure that the enemy is now actively exploiting.

IPB 4: INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT The Kremlin is using the Telegram "necessity" narrative (Peskov, 06:54) to justify tighter control over military bloggers, potentially indicating a crackdown on dissenting RU "Voenkors."

IPB 5: PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS The sighting of UAVs heading for Lozova (06:38) suggests the enemy is mapping the depth of UAF's second-line air defenses. Decision Point: If UAF cannot clear the UAVs over the Pavlohrad highways within 12 hours, logistics to the Donbas front must be rerouted or moved strictly under cover of darkness/heavy EW.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//