Situation Report

Situation Update (2026-02-10 22:01 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• ZAPORIZHZHIA BDA: (21:31, ЦАПЛІЄНКО_UKRAINE FIGHTS, HIGH) The previously reported Shahed strike on infrastructure has resulted in 11,000 apartments losing electricity in Zaporizhzhia city.
• KAB STRIKE ESCALATION: (21:34, Air Force UA, HIGH) Russian forces have launched Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) against targets in the Zaporizhzhia region, following up on the drone-induced power outages.
• INTENSIFIED FRONTLINE RECONNAISSANCE: (21:55, Air Force UA, HIGH) A surge in enemy reconnaissance UAV activity has been detected along the Line of Contact (LOC) in Kharkiv, Dnipropetrovsk, and Kherson regions.
• C2/HYBRID FRICTION: (21:53, TASS, MEDIUM) Kremlin spokesperson Dmitry Peskov publicly criticized Telegram for non-compliance with Russian law, signaling ongoing internal struggles with digital command-and-control and information dominance following the "MAX" app failure.
• NATO COMMAND RESTRUCTURING: (21:55, Operativnyi ZSU, HIGH) NATO has announced a shift in command structure, transferring several leadership functions from US control to European allies.
• DISINFORMATION TARGETING FRANCE: (21:36, TASS, LOW) Russian state media is circulating claims that France is falsifying technological data, likely aimed at undermining European defense-industrial prestige.

Operational picture (by sector)

• Zaporizhzhia Sector: This remains the primary focus of enemy aerial activity. The transition from Shahed loitering munitions (causing grid instability) to KAB strikes (21:34) indicates a "hammer and anvil" tactic designed to destroy fixed assets while emergency services are hampered by blackouts (11,000 apartments affected).
• Northern/Eastern LOC (Kharkiv/Dnipropetrovsk): The presence of reconnaissance UAVs (21:55) suggests the enemy is conducting active target acquisition, potentially for long-range fires or to monitor UAF movements during the "Deep Freeze."
• Southern Sector (Kherson): Concurrent recon activity in Kherson (21:55) indicates a multi-axis surveillance effort, likely to identify vulnerabilities in UAF riverbank defenses.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

• Tactical Course of Action: The enemy is successfully integrating EW and kinetic strikes in Zaporizhzhia. The use of KABs immediately following drone strikes suggests a coordinated effort to hit high-value targets while AD is saturated or blinded by regional power failures.
• Logistics and C2: The public admission by Peskov regarding Telegram (21:53) corroborates earlier intelligence that the "MAX" transition has failed. This suggests Russian tactical units may still be relying on insecure or "grey" communication channels, offering an exploit window for UAF signals intelligence.
• Reconnaissance Posture: The wide-area UAV deployment across three regions indicates a transition from localized skirmishes to a broader operational preparation phase.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Infrastructure Mitigation: Regional authorities are managing a massive utility crisis in Zaporizhzhia. 11,000 apartments without power poses a significant civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) challenge and complicates the logistics of local reserve units.
• Legal/Administrative Clarity: The Ukrainian Ombudsman (Lubinets) has clarified that there is no mandatory state mechanism for refunding funds in the case of the Daletsky family (21:34), addressing a potential point of domestic friction that could be weaponized by Russian PSYOPs.
• Readiness: UAF Air Force remains active in providing early warnings for KAB and UAV threats, maintaining a degree of situational awareness despite the "digital blackout" conditions on the enemy side.

Information environment / disinformation

• European Focus: Russia has shifted its propaganda focus toward France (21:36), attempting to label them as technologically fraudulent. This aligns with previous attempts to discredit European leadership (e.g., the Macron/Epstein narrative).
• Internal Russian Tensions: The narrative regarding Telegram's "illegality" (21:53) is likely an attempt to force the Russian population and military onto state-controlled platforms, despite their current technical unreliability.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

• MLCOA (Most Likely): Continued KAB strikes in the Zaporizhzhia sector targeting military-industrial sites and logistics hubs exposed by the 21:31 power outage.
• MDCOA (Most Dangerous): A multi-axis probing attack in the Kharkiv or Kherson sectors, utilizing the data currently being gathered by the 21:55 recon UAV surge, to exploit the "Deep Freeze" river conditions before a thaw.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

1. [CRITICAL] Determine the exact targets of the latest KAB launches in Zaporizhzhia (21:34) and assess if they struck military C2 or storage nodes.
2. [HIGH] Monitor for any SIGINT indicators of Russian units reverting to unencrypted radios due to the ongoing Telegram/MAX C2 crisis.
3. [MEDIUM] Assess the impact of the NATO command shift (21:55) on immediate tactical coordination for Western-supplied AD systems.

---

IPB 1: SITUATION OVERVIEW The battlefield geometry is being reshaped by the "Deep Freeze" and a sustained Russian aerial campaign against the Zaporizhzhia hub. 11,000 civilian outages create a "noise" environment that masks military movements.

IPB 2: ENEMY ANALYSIS The enemy is demonstrating a high degree of adaptability in their air-ground cycle—using drones to create "dark zones" and then following up with heavy aviation ordnance (KABs). Their C2 remains their greatest vulnerability due to the Telegram non-compliance issue.

IPB 3: FRIENDLY FORCES UAF remains in a defensive/reactive posture in the air domain over Zaporizhzhia. Internal domestic issues regarding soldier benefits (Daletsky case) are being managed to prevent exploitation.

IPB 4: INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT Russia is actively trying to decouple Ukraine from its European allies (France/NATO) by attacking the credibility of European technology and leadership.

IPB 5: PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS The next 6 hours will be critical for the Zaporizhzhia defense. If the grid is not stabilized, the effectiveness of local AD coordination may degrade, leading to more successful KAB strikes.

//ANALYSIS ENDS//