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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-03 02:33:45Z
22 days ago
Previous (2026-02-03 02:03:45Z)

Situation Update (0233Z FEB 03 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE: KHARKIV HEAT DRAINAGE (0204Z, ASTRA, HIGH): Authorities have been forced to drain the heating coolant from 820 residential buildings following a strike on a major Combined Heat and Power Plant (CHPP).
  • KINETIC IMPACT: KYIV CASUALTIES (0213Z, KMVA, HIGH): Confirmed casualties in the capital have risen to two following the saturation strikes across five districts.
  • AERIAL THREAT: MULTI-AXIS UAV INGRESS (0205Z-0222Z, AFU/Vaněk, HIGH): New waves of Shahed-type UAVs ("Mopeds") detected heading for Kryvyi Rih (from the east), Odesa (from the sea), and a follow-on wave of three units toward Kharkiv.
  • AERIAL THREAT: MYKOLAIV VECTOR (0228Z, AFU, HIGH): A group of UAVs is transiting eastern Mykolaiv Oblast on a north-western course.
  • INTERNAL RF: DOMESTIC STABILIZATION NARRATIVE (0226Z, TASS, MEDIUM): Russian state media is prioritizing domestic crime and legal proceedings (St. Petersburg murder case), likely to project internal "normalcy" and mask the humanitarian impact of the ongoing "Energy Freeze" campaign.

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Northern Axis (Kyiv): Search and rescue operations continue. The casualty count remains low relative to the geographic spread of the damage (5 districts), suggesting successful early warning but high kinetic penetration of the AD umbrella.
  • Eastern Theater (Kharkiv): Main Effort. The situation has transitioned from a power grid crisis to a total heating system collapse. At -27°C, the decision to drain coolant from 820 houses indicates that the CHPP damage is catastrophic or that the grid cannot maintain the pumps necessary to prevent pipe bursts. This creates a secondary humanitarian displacement crisis.
  • Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv): Renewed maritime ingress. The RF is utilizing the Black Sea as a launch platform for UAVs to bypass land-based early warning, targeting Odesa.
  • Central Sector (Kryvyi Rih): New ingress from the east suggests a coordinated attempt to pressure industrial hubs in the Dnipropetrovsk region simultaneously with the southern and eastern strikes.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Weaponization of Environment: The RF is synchronization kinetic strikes on CHPPs with the -27°C deep freeze. By forcing the drainage of heating systems, they are ensuring that even if power is restored, the heating infrastructure remains offline due to the time-intensive process of refilling and reheating thousands of residential nodes.
  • Tactical Adaptation: The use of small, frequent waves (e.g., the 3-UAV wave toward Kharkiv at 0222Z) suggests a "drain-and-strike" tactic, intended to keep Ukrainian AD units active and deplete interceptor stocks while larger salvos transit other sectors.
  • C2 and Logistics: Low activity at RF arsenals (noted in previous 24h context) suggests that the current UAV waves are the "front end" of a larger coordinated effort, with heavy munitions likely already in flight or at launch positions.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Air Defense: UAF Air Force is actively tracking and engaging multiple groups across at least four oblasts (Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, Odesa, Dnipropetrovsk).
  • Emergency Response: Local authorities in Kharkiv are implementing emergency winterization protocols (coolant drainage) to save long-term infrastructure at the cost of immediate civilian comfort.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Domestic Diversion (RF): TASS is heavily saturating its feed with internal Russian criminal cases (0226Z, 0229Z). This is a classic "noise" generation tactic used to drown out reports of the winter campaign's humanitarian consequences or any potential UAF retaliatory strikes.
  • Influence Ranking: The promotion of "Top-75 Telegram channels" by military correspondents (0229Z) suggests a consolidation of the Russian pro-war information space ahead of the February 4 Abu Dhabi talks.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): Continued UAV saturation through the dawn hours to mask the approach of high-precision cruise missiles or ballistic strikes targeting the now-exposed Kharkiv and Kyiv energy repair hubs.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated "Dark Start" strike targeting the high-voltage transit lines in Central Ukraine, intended to decouple the western and eastern portions of the national grid while the -27°C freeze is at its peak.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [CRITICAL] Immediate BDA on the specific Kharkiv CHPP hit; determine if the turbine hall or the distribution substation was the primary target.
  2. [HIGH] Track the group of UAVs in Mykolaiv; identify if their NW course targets the Khmelnytskyi Nuclear Power Plant (NPP) switchyards or logistical hubs in Vinnytsia.
  3. [MEDIUM] Monitor for any transition to ballistic (Iskander-M/KN-23) launches from Belgorod to exploit the "distraction" provided by the 0222Z UAV wave in Kharkiv.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-03 02:03:45Z)

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