Situation Update (0721Z FEB 02 2026)
Key updates since last sitrep
- AIR DEFENSE: MASSIVE UAV SATURATION ATTACK (0702Z-0706Z, AFU/RBK-UA, HIGH): Russian forces launched 171 UAVs (approx. 100 Shaheds) and 1 Iskander-M ballistic missile. UAF claims 157/171 (91%) UAVs shot down or suppressed via EW. The Iskander-M was not intercepted.
- KINETIC: CIVILIAN TRANSPORT STRUCK (0709Z, ASTRA, HIGH): Russian strike hit a civilian bus in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (Ternivka area). Footage confirms casualties/heavy damage.
- TECH: SHAHED-STARLINK INTEGRATION (0657Z, Operativno ZSU, MEDIUM): AFU's Ihnat confirms the discovery of Starlink-equipped Shahed UAVs (dating back 6 months). This confirms RF's successful integration of satellite-based terminal guidance to bypass traditional EW.
- ORGANIZATIONAL: AFU DIGITAL MODERNIZATION (0702Z, Filolog v zasade/Fedorov, HIGH): Minister of Digital Transformation Fedorov announced the creation of 7,000 "digital officer" positions within the AFU to bolster tech-integration and cyber-physical operations.
- HYBRID/INTEL: ALLEGED FSB TERROR PLOT (0652Z, TASS/FSB, LOW): FSB claims to have prevented a "suicide bombing" at its headquarters in Crimea/Sevastopol, allegedly orchestrated by Ukrainian SOU. UNCONFIRMED and likely a Russian information operation.
- DIPLOMATIC: MEDVEDEV "CONDITIONAL" RECOGNITION (0700Z-0720Z, TASS, MEDIUM): Medvedev signaled that RF recognition of future Ukrainian elections is "conditional" and reiterated calls for a one-year New START extension, shifting rhetoric toward conditional engagement.
Operational picture (by sector)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational tempo is dominated by a massive Russian aerial effort intended to saturate and deplete Ukrainian Ground-Based Air Defense (GBAD). While the interception rate remains high (91%), the penetration of an Iskander-M and the strike on civilian transport in Dnipropetrovsk highlights persistent gaps in ballistic missile defense. Ground activity remains concentrated in the Zapad (West) and Donetsk sectors.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)
- Air Operations: The shift to 170+ UAV waves suggests a "saturation-depletion" strategy. The use of an Iskander-M alongside these swarms indicates coordinated efforts to strike high-value targets while AD batteries are focused on low-slow-small (LSS) threats.
- Tactical Adaptations: RF forces are utilizing Grad MLRS (Zapad Group) for area-denial and manpower suppression (0710Z). The integration of Starlink on Shaheds (0657Z) provides the enemy with beyond-line-of-sight (BLOS) control and immunity to localized GPS spoofing.
- Crimean Internal Security: The FSB narrative regarding a "suicide bomber" in Crimea (0652Z) may be a precursor to increased domestic repressions or a false-flag justifying a renewed strike on Ukrainian decision-making centers.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)
- Air Defense Posture: Despite the "empty launcher" warnings in the previous sitrep, the UAF managed a high interception volume (157 drones). However, the failure to intercept the Iskander-M suggests either a lack of Patriot/S-300 availability in the specific vector or tactical exhaustion of crews.
- Modernization: The rollout of 7,000 "digital officers" is a critical force-multiplier initiative. This indicates a shift toward a more decentralized, tech-heavy command structure capable of managing the "fiber-optic" and "drone-on-drone" threats identified in the 24h context.
- Morale: National minute of silence (0900L) remains a key psychological anchor for civil-military cohesion (0700Z).
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)
- Russian Strategic Signaling: Medvedev's media blitz (TASS, Reuters, WarGonzo) aims to present Russia as "rational" (offering New START extensions) while maintaining hardline demands on security guarantees. This is likely intended to influence Western political debates regarding aid packages.
- Russian Internal Fragility: Reports of increased depression and anxiety in the RF population (0655Z) suggest the long-term psychological cost of the "Special Military Operation" is beginning to impact the Russian home front.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
- Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will maintain high-volume UAV harassment over the next 12 hours to prevent UAF AD from relocating or reloading. A follow-up missile strike targeting Dnipropetrovsk or Kyiv logistics hubs is likely as the "pre-negotiation" kinetic pressure continues.
- Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated multi-vector strike involving Tu-95MS bombers and Kalibr-equipped Black Sea vessels, timed to exploit the degraded GPS/HF conditions (solar flare) and the exhausted interceptor stocks following this morning’s 171-UAV wave.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Expect continued UAV "prodding" of the air defense bubble. High risk of precision strikes in Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia regions following the bus attack. Monitor Russian strategic aviation for engine start/taxi activity.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
- [CRITICAL] Determine the exact impact point and damage assessment of the Iskander-M strike; assess if the target was military or energy infrastructure.
- [HIGH] Confirm the status of Starlink terminals in Russian hands; identify if recent AFU "purges" of unverified terminals have successfully mitigated the Shahed-Starlink threat.
- [MEDIUM] Monitor Russian "Dva Mayora" fundraising for the Donetsk axis to identify specific units (e.g., 150th MRD) receiving priority equipment for the next push.
//REPORT ENDS//
