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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-02-01 02:22:07Z
8 days ago
Previous (2026-02-01 01:52:08Z)

Situation Update (0221 UTC Feb 01, 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • NEW UAV VECTOR - CHERNIHIV OBLAST (0158Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Shahed-type UAVs detected in northern and western Chernihiv Oblast, maintaining a southward heading toward the interior.
  • ZAPORIZHZHIA AIR ALERT TERMINATED (0155Z, Zaporizhzhia OVA, HIGH): The air alert previously issued at 0138Z has been cleared. No immediate kinetic impacts reported during this window.
  • MLRS STRIKE - KRASNOARMIISK/POKROVSK (0206Z, TASS/MoD RF, LOW): Russian state media claims a BM-21 Grad MLRS strike destroyed a UAF strongpoint near Krasnoarmiisk (Pokrovsk). UNCONFIRMED.
  • UNIT IDENTIFICATION - SIBERIAN GROUPING (0203Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): Video evidence indicates active FPV and artillery operations by the Russian Siberian Grouping and Ural Assault Brigade against UAF command posts and drone units.

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Sector (Sumy/Chernihiv)

  • Status: Expanding Aerial Threat. The detection of UAVs in Chernihiv (0158Z) moving south indicates an expansion of the current aerial wave. This vector likely targets infrastructure in the Kyiv or Chernihiv hinterlands, adding to the pressure already observed in Sumy and Kharkiv.

Eastern Sector (Pokrovsk/Donetsk)

  • Status: High-Intensity Fire. The MoD RF claim regarding Krasnoarmiisk (0206Z) confirms that the Pokrovsk axis remains the primary focus for Russian tube and rocket artillery.
  • Tactical Focus: Evidence of the Ural Assault Brigade's involvement (0203Z) suggests a concentration of experienced assault elements supported by organic FPV "strike-reconnaissance" loops specifically targeting UAF drone operators.

Southern Sector (Zaporizhzhia)

  • Status: Tactical Reset. The "All Clear" (0155Z) suggests that the previous UAV/aviation threat has either been neutralized by air defense (AD) or has transitioned out of the sector. However, the threat remains intermittent given the broader activity in Dnipropetrovsk.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Multi-Axis Saturation: The enemy is currently managing at least four distinct UAV corridors: Chernihiv (Southbound), Kharkiv (Westbound), Sumy (Westbound), and Dnipropetrovsk (Targeting Pavlohrad). This is assessed as a deliberate attempt to fix UAF mobile fire groups and exhaust AD munitions.
  • Counter-Drone Operations: The Siberian Grouping is increasingly prioritizing the destruction of UAF "drone points" and "control hubs" (0203Z). This indicates a shift toward tactical counter-C2 operations intended to degrade UAF's primary defensive advantage: FPV-driven area denial.
  • Artillery Dominance: The use of Grad MLRS in the Pokrovsk direction (0206Z) signals a continued reliance on "scorched earth" tactics to facilitate ground advances toward Krasnoarmiisk.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Air Defense Operations: UAF Air Force is actively tracking and vectoring responses to the new Chernihiv-based threats.
  • Defensive Posture: In the Pokrovsk sector, units are likely operating under high camouflage and EMCON (emissions control) requirements due to the documented Russian focus on FPV-guided strikes against command and control nodes.

Information environment / disinformation

  • Russian Propaganda: TASS and pro-war Telegram channels (Colonelcassad) are heavily emphasizing tactical successes (MLRS strikes, FPV footage) to maintain domestic support and project an image of technical proficiency, particularly targeting UAF drone capabilities.
  • Strategic Deflection: Brief mentions of international legal news (Epstein/Trump via TASS) serve as standard filler to diversify news feeds and mask the singular focus on the kinetic war.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): UAVs currently in the Chernihiv/Sumy corridors will converge on regional hubs (Kyiv/Chernihiv/Poltava) while the 62nd Missile Division maintains launch readiness.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A massed missile strike (Kalibr/Iskander) timed to coincide with the arrival of the UAV wave at its targets (estimated 0330Z-0500Z), aimed at the fragile energy grid and the Pavlohrad logistics node.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [CRITICAL] Verification of the Siberian Grouping’s exact location. Determining if they have moved from the central front to the Pokrovsk axis is vital for identifying the Russian "main effort."
  2. [HIGH] Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for the Krasnoarmiisk area following reported MLRS strikes.
  3. [MEDIUM] Tracking the altitude and speed of UAVs in Chernihiv to determine if "Geran-4" jet variants are being utilized for rapid penetration.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2026-02-01 01:52:08Z)