GPS DISRUPTIONS IN PERSIAN GULF (2333Z, Военкор Котенок, MEDIUM): Significant GPS signal interference reported over the Persian Gulf. This follows the conclusion of trilateral talks in Abu Dhabi and may indicate defensive Electronic Warfare (EW) deployment for VVIP transit or broader regional signaling.
FPV TACTICAL CLEARING (2335Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): Russian forces are utilizing FPV drones to flush Ukrainian personnel from fortified positions ("skhrons"). Reports indicate UAF small arms fire is proving insufficient against high-speed FPV terminal runs in these localized engagements.
CULTURAL NARRATIVE ATTACK (2359Z, TASS, HIGH): Russian MFA Spokesperson Maria Zakharova has weaponized local Odesa proposals to replace a Pushkin monument, framing it as evidence of Ukrainian cultural decay. This aligns with the "failed state" strategic narrative.
Operational picture (by sector)
Northern/Central Vector (Kyiv/Rear):
Air Defense: Baseline UAV (Shahed-type) activity continues. Mobile Fire Groups remain the primary interceptor for these low-cost threats to preserve high-tier missiles for the anticipated sunrise strike.
Critical Infrastructure: Energy grid remains at high attrition levels. No change in the 14-day survival window; Czech energy aid remains in the transit/deployment phase.
Eastern/Southern Vectors:
Tactical Combat: Increased use of "smoking out" tactics in the Donbas sectors. Russian forces are integrating FPV drones with thermal/specialized optics to neutralize UAF infantry in covered positions without requiring direct assault waves.
Odesa: Targeted by increased Russian diplomatic/information pressure regarding de-Russification efforts, likely intended to provoke internal friction in the southern administrative center.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
1. Capabilities and Intentions:
Electronic Warfare (Global/Regional): The GPS interference in the Persian Gulf (2333Z) suggests Russia or its regional partners are actively employing high-power jamming, likely cued to the movement of diplomatic delegations post-Abu Dhabi.
Tactical Adaptation: Russian FPV units are shifting from opportunistic strikes to systematic "clearing" operations, using drones as a substitute for high-risk close-quarters infantry combat.
2. Courses of Action:
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): A major coordinated missile and loitering munition strike between 0200Z and 0600Z. The "zeroed" activity score at the 59.97, 29.31 arsenal and the lack of VKS activity at Voronezh Malshevo suggest munitions are already uploaded and platforms are staged.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A multi-domain strike targeting both energy infrastructure and command centers in Kyiv, synchronized with a localized mechanized push in the Novopavlivka sector to exploit grid-induced C2 delays.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Defensive Posture: UAF units are struggling with FPV saturation in the East. Current small arms-based Counter-UAS (C-UAS) is proving inadequate for terminal-phase FPV defense (2335Z).
Logistics: Priority remains the integration of Czech-funded heavy power equipment. Protection of these assets during offloading is a critical vulnerability.
Information environment / disinformation
Strategic Narrative: The Russian MFA is pivoting from purely military messaging to "civilizational" critiques, using the Odesa monument issue to appeal to conservative global audiences and domestic Russian sentiment (2359Z).
Kyiv Utility Exploitation: Influence operations continue to focus on municipal failures (sewage/water) in Kyiv to degrade trust in local governance.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Kinetic:CRITICAL THREAT. The 48-hour reload cycle for Russian strategic bombers and missile units is concluding. Satellite signatures of empty depots strongly correlate with an imminent mass-launch event.
Electronic Warfare: Expect localized GPS/Comms degradation across Ukraine to intensify 30-60 minutes prior to any missile arrivals to disrupt UAF AD radar integration.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Immediate SIGINT/ELINT focus on VKS long-range aviation (Tu-95/Tu-160) communication nets for "take-off" indicators.
[HIGH] Assessment of UAF electronic warfare coverage at the platoon/squad level to counter the reported "FPV clearing" tactics.
[MEDIUM] Confirmation of GPS interference source in the Persian Gulf to determine if this is a localized Russian naval asset or a broader regional disruption.
