UAV PROGRESSION TOWARD NIKOPOL (0023Z, UAF AF, HIGH): Enemy loitering munitions have transitioned from Zaporizhzhia Oblast toward Nikopol, targeting critical infrastructure near the Dnipro River.
EXPANSION OF ODESA STRIKE AXIS (0005Z-0012Z, UAF AF, HIGH): UAVs are now transiting toward Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi from the north and Serhiivka (Odesa Oblast). This indicates a widening of the target set to include the southern coastal belt and potentially the Dniester Estuary bridge.
UKRAINIAN RAILWAY SYSTEMIC DISRUPTION (0027Z, RBC-UA, HIGH): Ukrzaliznytsia (UZ) has officially modified schedules starting Jan 22 due to persistent Russian shelling of rail infrastructure. This confirms the operational impact of the Tula derailment and subsequent strikes reported in the 0000Z sitrep.
RF DEPLOYMENT OF ENHANCED ENGINEERING ASSETS (0005Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): Uralvagonzavod has reportedly delivered a new batch of IRM-3M engineering vehicles (T-90 chassis) equipped with EW and anti-drone cages.
LIFTING OF UAV THREAT IN BRYANSK (0025Z, AV Bogomaz, MEDIUM): Russian authorities have declared "end of drone danger" in the Bryansk region, suggesting the conclusion of a Ukrainian counter-UAV wave or successful interception in that sector.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)
The operational environment is currently dominated by a sustained Russian UAV offensive across the Southern and Central axes, synchronized with an intensified campaign against Ukrainian rail logistics.
Battlefield Geometry:
Southwest (Odesa): The threat has moved south of Odesa city toward Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi and Serhiivka. This suggests an attempt to isolate the southern portion of the Odesa region.
Central (Nikopol/Zaporizhzhia): A dedicated UAV wave is targeting the Nikopol industrial/energy hub, likely to suppress local defense and monitoring of the Zaporizhzhia NPP area.
Logistics & Infrastructure: Ukrainian Railways (UZ) adjusting schedules indicates that Russian strikes are achieving "friction" in the movement of reserves and supplies.
Environmental Factors: Continued nighttime operations favor the use of loitering munitions (Shahed variants), as Russian forces exploit the visual gap between sunset and dawn.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)
Capabilities and Intentions:
Tactical Adaptation (Engineering): The deployment of IRM-3M vehicles (0005Z) is a significant indicator of preparation for offensive mobility operations. These vehicles are designed for clearing minefields and obstacles; the addition of specific anti-drone EW indicates adaptation to the heavy presence of Ukrainian FPV and reconnaissance drones.
Logistics Targeting: The Russian focus on rail infrastructure (confirmed by UZ schedule changes) aims to degrade the UAF’s ability to reinforce the Sloviansk/Donbas sector mentioned in the daily report.
Trade Resilience: Reported 1.27% increase in Japan-RF trade (0012Z) suggests that despite sanctions, the Russian economy maintains critical high-tech/industrial exchange nodes in the East.
Enemy Course of Action (COA):
MLCOA (Most Likely): Continued saturation of Odesa's coastal infrastructure to destroy grain storage or port facilities in Serhiivka, while simultaneously pressuring Nikopol's energy grid.
MDCOA (Most Dangerous): Use of the newly delivered IRM-3M engineering assets to spearhead a localized breakthrough on the Sloviansk axis, supported by the North Korean MLRS systems previously identified.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)
Force Posture and Readiness:
Logistical Resilience: Ukrzaliznytsia’s proactive schedule changes (0027Z) demonstrate a high degree of organizational agility in mitigating the impact of kinetic strikes on the national mobility network.
Air Defense (AD): MFGs (Mobile Fire Groups) are actively shifting focus from the Chornomorsk port toward the Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi and Serhiivka axis to counter the evolving UAV flight paths.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)
Wedge-Driving (Sino-European): The Chinese Ambassador’s statements (0002Z) and TASS’s amplification of EU-US tensions (0007Z) represent a coordinated effort to frame the US as an unreliable partner (using the Trump/Greenland narrative as a catalyst) while positioning China/Russia as stable alternatives.
Global Leftist Outreach: Reports of the KPRF supporting Venezuela (0024Z) indicate continued Russian efforts to maintain "Global South" solidarity to bypass Western diplomatic isolation.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)
Timeline (0-6h): High probability of strikes in Nikopol and Serhiivka. AD assets must be prioritized for these locations.
Timeline (6-24h): Expect the appearance of the IRM-3M engineering vehicles in the Donbas sector, specifically near Sloviansk or Vovchansk, as Russia attempts to overcome Ukrainian fortifications.
Decision Point: If UZ schedule changes result in significant troop movement delays, UAF command may need to authorize emergency use of road-based heavy haulers, increasing vulnerability to Russian tactical aviation.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[CRITICAL] Identify the exact deployment location of the IRM-3M engineering vehicles to anticipate where the next Russian offensive push will occur.
[HIGH] Determine the impact of UZ schedule changes on the delivery of Western military aid from the western borders to the eastern front.
[MEDIUM] Assess the payload of UAVs currently targeting Serhiivka—determine if they are standard Shaheds or specialized munitions for maritime/bridge infrastructure.
[LOW] Monitor Japanese trade data for specific dual-use categories (electronics/machinery) contributing to the 1.27% increase in trade volume.
CONFIDENCE ASSESSMENT:
UAV Movements (Odesa/Nikopol): HIGH (Corroborated by UAF AF)
Logistical Disruption (Rail): HIGH (Confirmed by UZ)
New Equipment Deployment (IRM-3M): MEDIUM (Single source: Colonelcassad/UVZ)
