KAB STRIKE VECTOR (2021Z, UA Air Force, HIGH): Confirmed launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) from the Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia border region, tracking toward the southern districts of Dnipropetrovsk Oblast.
ISR PENETRATION - CHERNIHIV (2015Z, UA Air Force, HIGH): An enemy reconnaissance UAV is active north of Chernihiv; UAF assessment identifies this as a "spotter" for incoming kinetic strikes. Counter-UAV measures are engaged.
SIVERSK OFFENSIVE OPERATIONS (2017Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): Russian sources report a coordinated offensive push "from Siversk," supported by operational maps. This indicates an attempt to expand the eastern salient.
ZNPP LOCAL CEASEFIRE (2029Z, TASS/Grossi, HIGH): IAEA’s Grossi reports an agreement for a localized ceasefire at the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) to facilitate repairs to the critical backup power line.
INFRASTRUCTURE CASCADING FAILURE (2002Z, Tsaplienko, HIGH): Prolonged blackouts and extreme low temperatures have resulted in internal plumbing ruptures and flooding in Kyiv residential buildings, further straining emergency services.
GERMAN EMERGENCY AID (2018Z, Tsaplienko, HIGH): Germany has pledged an additional €60M for winter/energy support, specifically prioritizing front-line heating systems.
UKRAINIAN STRATEGIC REAR STRIKES (2014Z, TASS/RU MoD, MEDIUM): The RF MoD claims to have intercepted 23 Ukrainian UAVs over Russian territory and the Black Sea between 1500Z and 2000Z.
HIGH-PRIORITY MEDEVAC - GROZNY (2025Z, Alex Parker Returns, UNCONFIRMED/LOW): Reports of a "secret" high-priority medical evacuation flight from Grozny to Moscow carrying an individual with severe head/chest trauma.
Operational picture (by sector)
1. Northern Axis (Chernihiv / Kharkiv / Sumy):
Chernihiv: The presence of an ISR UAV (2015Z) suggests the RF is maintaining target acquisition for long-range fires or assessing the effects of previous strikes.
Kharkiv: New UAV incursions from the north (2007Z) continue the pattern of harassing the city’s air defense envelope.
2. Eastern Axis (Siversk / Donetsk):
Siversk Sector: RF sources claim an offensive move (2017Z). If confirmed, this suggests the RF is attempting to collapse the Siversk pocket to straighten the line toward Slovyansk/Kramatorsk.
Donetsk Border: KAB launches (2021Z) are now being used to project power into the Dnipropetrovsk rear, likely targeting logistics nodes supporting the Southern Front.
3. Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia / Dnipropetrovsk):
Dnipropetrovsk: The southern region is under immediate threat from KABs launched from the Donetsk/Zaporizhzhia border (2021Z). This expands the threat zone beyond the immediate FLOT.
ZNPP: The localized ceasefire (2029Z) is a rare diplomatic exception, likely aimed at preventing a total loss of cooling capacity which would affect both occupied and free territories.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Shift: The transition from Shahed "swarms" to specific ISR UAVs north of Chernihiv (2015Z) indicates a move toward "observed fire" for precision strikes (Iskander or KAB).
Aviation: The use of KABs targeting southern Dnipropetrovsk (2021Z) confirms that RF aviation is operating with increasing impunity near the Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk border, likely due to suppressed or relocated UAF medium-range AD.
C2/Personnel: The deployment of officer cadres to forward areas (Dva Mayora, 2022Z; DS Belief 0.09) suggests the RF is hardening its command structure for the anticipated exploit through the Zhovtneve breach.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Defensive AD: UAF is actively engaging ISR assets in the north.
Strategic Rear Operations: Sustained UAV operations into the RU strategic rear (23 drones reported by RU MoD, 2014Z) indicate UAF is maintaining its "asymmetric pressure" strategy despite front-line deterioration.
Logistics/Sustainability: Successful negotiation of €60M in German aid (2018Z) provides a critical lifeline for maintaining front-line troop warmth and preventing further morale degradation due to infrastructure collapse.
Information environment / disinformation
PSYOPS (MEDIUM): RF channels are circulating "captured soldier" interviews (2003Z) to amplify narratives of poor UAF command. This coincides with reports of infrastructure failure in Kyiv to maximize the "state collapse" narrative.
Strategic Distraction (LOW): Continued dissemination of US-centric political "deepfakes" or manipulated audio (Trump/Iran, 2013Z) is assessed as background noise to dilute western focus on the Kupyansk and Zaporizhzhia crises.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA: Continued KAB and missile strikes on Dnipropetrovsk and Zaporizhzhia logistics hubs, timed to coincide with a mechanized push from the Zhovtneve foothold.
MDCOA: A rapid RF breakthrough in the Siversk sector, utilizing the new offensive momentum (2017Z) to encircle UAF units before reinforcements can be diverted from the Northern fixing theater.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
[HIGH] Siversk FLOT: Verify the extent of the RF push "from Siversk" (2017Z). Determine if UAF has lost key high ground.
[CRITICAL] KAB Launch Points: Identify the specific airfields or launch zones for the KABs targeting Dnipropetrovsk to enable counter-battery or deep-strike planning.
[MEDIUM] Grozny MEDEVAC: Cross-reference flight tracking (ADSB-Exchange) to verify the "secret" flight from Grozny; identification of the high-value passenger may indicate internal RF/Chechen power shifts.
IPB ANALYSIS (IPB 2.2)
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The conflict is expanding into the deep rear of the Dnipropetrovsk region via stand-off KAB strikes. The battlefield geometry is shifting from static defense to a dynamic RF exploitation phase in the South and East.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
The RF is effectively using "fixing" missions in Chernihiv/Kharkiv (via UAVs) to mask the concentration of aviation assets for the Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia strikes. The Siversk offensive reports suggest a high degree of confidence in their current Eastern momentum.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
UAF is facing a dual crisis: maintaining a crumbling front line while managing a domestic infrastructure collapse (Kyiv plumbing/heating). The reliance on international aid (Germany) is now a tactical necessity for infantry survival in the 0°C to -10°C range.
4. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
MLCOA: Kinetic impacts in Southern Dnipropetrovsk are imminent. Expect 3-5 KAB impacts on rail or road bridges NLT 0200Z.
MDCOA: The ZNPP ceasefire is used as a "masking" event for RF movements near the plant, allowing for the repositioning of heavy equipment under the guise of repair security.
