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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-16 01:00:08Z
1 month ago
Previous (2026-01-16 00:30:08Z)

Situation Update (2026-01-16T0100Z)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • AIR-TO-AIR UAV ENGAGEMENT (0033Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): Footage indicates RF "North" Group is employing FPV drones in a kinetic interceptor role against UAF reconnaissance/strike UAVs in the Kharkiv sector.
  • UAV PENETRATION - SOUTHERN SECTOR (0041Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): A new UAV (Geran-type) has been detected over Mykolaiv Oblast near Bratske, maintaining a consistent western heading.
  • TACTICAL AVIATION ALERT - EAST (0056Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Significant activity of RF tactical aviation detected on the eastern axis; high risk of Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) or Kh-59/69 missile employment.
  • DIPLOMATIC INFO OP (0042Z, TASS, MEDIUM): RF state media is circulating narratives of potential US-RF Arctic cooperation to signal "normalization" pathways despite ongoing kinetic escalation.

Operational picture (by sector)

  • Northern/Kharkiv Axis: The sector is seeing a shift toward "counter-drone" warfare. RF forces are actively hunting UAF ISR assets using FPV drones (0033Z), likely to blind UAF artillery and counter-battery units before a potential ground push or to protect localized logistics.
  • Southern Axis (Mykolaiv/Zaporizhzhia): The UAV detected near Bratske (0041Z) suggests a southern pincer in the ongoing air campaign. This flight path potentially targets logistics hubs in Odesa Oblast or energy infrastructure in the Yuzhnoukrainsk NPP vicinity (though no direct threat to the plant is confirmed).
  • Eastern Axis: The surge in tactical aviation (0056Z) indicates a likely preparatory phase for strikes against UAF defensive positions or logistical nodes in the Donbas. This follows earlier reports of UAF CP losses in Huliaipole.
  • Kyiv/Central Axis: UAVs reported in the previous sitrep (0017Z) continue their western transit. The lack of new alerts suggests they are currently in "silent transit" over low-population density areas to evade detection.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Air Operations (Tactical): The use of FPVs as air-to-air interceptors (0033Z) represents a tactical adaptation to neutralize UAF aerial superiority in the reconnaissance domain. This reduces the lifespan of UAF short-range ISR.
  • Air Operations (Strategic): RF is maintaining a multi-vector UAV attack (Kyiv Reservoir in the north, Mykolaiv in the south). This "split-focus" tactic is designed to overstretch UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) and deplete medium-range AD interceptors.
  • Tactical Aviation Intent: The activity at 0056Z likely involves Su-34/Su-35 platforms. Given the freeze (-22°C), these strikes will likely target heating plants or hardened military positions where thermal signatures are most prominent.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • ISR Operations: UAF reconnaissance UAVs are under active pressure in the Kharkiv sector. UAF units must adapt by utilizing more frequent, shorter-duration flights or employing EW-hardened systems.
  • Air Defense: UAF Air Force is successfully tracking multiple low-RCS targets across two distinct axes (North and South). MFGs in the Mykolaiv/Odesa region are likely being placed on high alert following the 0041Z update.

Information environment / disinformation

  • "Normalization" Narratives: The TASS report on Arctic cooperation (0042Z) is assessed as a strategic distraction (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.53). By discussing post-war "joint projects" with US business interests, the RF seeks to weaken Western resolve for immediate sanctions and military aid during the current energy-infrastructure "City-Kill" campaign.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF tactical aviation will conduct KAB strikes on frontline UAF positions in the East within the next 2-4 hours. UAVs in the south (Mykolaiv) will attempt to strike energy or port infrastructure in the Odesa/Izmail region by dawn.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Simultaneous tactical aviation strikes in the East and a renewed ballistic/Oreshnik launch from Kapustin Yar (as hinted in the 15 Jan report) targeting Dnipro or Kyiv during the peak cold period (0400Z-0600Z).

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [HIGH] FPV INTERCEPTION EFFICACY: Determine the success rate of RF air-to-air FPVs. Does this represent a localized experiment or a theater-wide rollout of a new counter-UAS doctrine?
  2. [MEDIUM] SOUTHERN UAV TARGET: Identify if the UAV over Bratske is a solo scout or part of a larger, low-altitude wave following the same vector toward Western Ukraine/Moldova border.
  3. [CRITICAL] TACTICAL AVIATION LOADOUT: Confirm if the eastern aviation activity (0056Z) includes Kh-59/69 stand-off missiles, which would indicate targets in the tactical-operational depth (Pokrovsk/Pavlohrad).

Actionable Recommendations

  1. Electronic Warfare (Kharkiv): Deploy localized jammer arrays to disrupt RF FPV operator frequencies (2.4/5.8GHz and unconventional 700-900MHz bands) specifically targeting air-to-air interceptor flight paths.
  2. Southern AD Vectoring: Re-task MFGs from the Mykolaiv/Voznesensk area to intercept the UAV heading west from Bratske before it reaches the Dniester region.
  3. Strategic Communications: Counter the "Arctic cooperation" narrative by highlighting that current RF energy strikes are creating a humanitarian crisis that precludes any "normalization" or "joint projects."

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2026-01-16 00:30:08Z)

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