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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2026-01-15 11:30:09Z
1 month ago
Previous (2026-01-15 11:00:05Z)

Situation Update (1129Z 15 JAN 2026)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • INTERNAL SECURITY INCIDENT (1121Z-1128Z, TASS/ASTRA, HIGH): An explosion and subsequent 340 sqm fire occurred at the MVD Professional Training Center in Syktyvkar (Komi Republic); 9 personnel injured.
  • LOGISTICS INTERDICTION (1121Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): RF aviation utilized multiple FAB-500 munitions to destroy a UAF crossing/bridge in Osynovo, Kharkiv region.
  • ZAPORIZHZHIA OFFENSIVE (1101Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM): RF sources report renewed tactical advances targeting the Orikhiv (Orekhovo) axis.
  • UNIT IDENTIFICATION (1121Z, Operativniy ZSU, HIGH): Capture of a serviceman from the 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (v/c 90600) near the contact line; confirms the presence of "Peacekeeper" brigade elements in active combat zones.
  • REAR AREA RESILIENCE (1114Z, RBC-UA, HIGH): PM Shmyhal established a 24/7 operational HQ in Kyiv specifically for rapid liquidation of energy infrastructure damage.
  • AERIAL THREAT (1123Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): New UAV detection in Chernihiv Oblast moving SW toward Kholmy; represents a continuing multi-wave threat to northern corridors.
  • DIPLOMATIC COUNTER-IO (1119Z, Tsaplienko/Tusk, HIGH): Polish PM Tusk publicly corrected the "peace plan" narrative, stating Russia, not Ukraine, rejected the latest US-brokered proposal.

Operational picture (by sector)

Northern Axis (Sumy/Chernihiv): Localized kinetic engagements continue in the Sumy direction (1104Z). Pro-Russian sources (Arkhangel Spetsnaza) have released tactical maps indicating attempts to expand the "buffer zone" established at Komarovka. In Chernihiv, UAV transit (1123Z) remains the primary threat, likely serving as reconnaissance for the Chernihiv-Kyiv corridor.

Eastern Axis (Kharkiv/Lyman/Pokrovsk):

  • Kharkiv: RF has shifted to aggressive bridge interdiction. The destruction of the Osynovo crossing (1121Z) using heavy FAB-500s indicates an intent to isolate UAF forward positions and disrupt the GLOCs (Ground Lines of Communication) east of the Oskil river.
  • Lyman: Previous reports of the 752nd Regiment activity near Dibrova are corroborated by continued positional fighting.
  • Pokrovsk: High-attrition assaults persist, supported by the identified 15th Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade.

Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia): Activity is intensifying on the Orikhiv axis (1101Z). RF forces are attempting to regain initiative in sectors previously cleared during the 2023 counter-offensive. This pressure aims to fix UAF units and prevent the transfer of reserves to the Donbas.


Enemy activity / threat assessment

  • Interdiction Tactics: The use of FAB-500s on fixed infrastructure (Osynovo) suggests RF has improved its reconnaissance-strike loop for non-static targets.
  • Personnel Quality: The deployment of the 15th OMSBr (1121Z) indicates that the RF is committing higher-tier, specialized units to achieve breakthroughs in the East, rather than relying solely on mobilized reserve units.
  • Internal Instability: The Syktyvkar MVD explosion (1121Z) and the Wagner-related homicide in Chita (1126Z) suggest domestic friction. While the Syktyvkar incident is currently categorized as an "accident/investigation," the high injury count at a security training facility warrants monitoring for potential partisan sabotage.
  • Leadership Stability: Ramzan Kadyrov’s repeated health denials (1115Z) suggest persistent internal rumors or a potential C2 transition period in the Chechen Republic, which could impact the stability of "Akhmat" units on the front.

Friendly activity (UAF)

  • Infrastructure Defense: The 24/7 HQ in Kyiv (1114Z) suggests a shift toward a more aggressive "repair-under-fire" posture to maintain grid stability against ongoing UAV/missile strikes.
  • Civil Security: Internal security operations in Kharkiv (1100Z) have successfully dismantled a corrupt police network extorting civilians; this is assessed as a critical move to maintain local morale and trust in the Kharkiv garrison.
  • Resource Management: Volunteer foundations (Sternenko) continue to fill tactical gaps, raising 6.5M UAH of a 50M goal (1121Z) for unspecified equipment (likely UAVs or EW).

Information environment / disinformation

  • "Greenland Distraction" (LOW CONFIDENCE): Russian propagandists (NgP Razvedka/Poddubny) are heavily amplifying a narrative regarding NATO/EU deployments to Greenland (1123Z, 1128Z). This is assessed as a classic hybrid distraction to draw international attention away from Russian tactical gains in Sumy and Kharkiv.
  • Peace Plan Narratives: Kremlin efforts to frame President Zelensky as the obstacle to peace are being actively countered by European leaders (Tusk, 1119Z), signaling improved coordination in Western strategic communications.
  • Demoralization: Reports of Russian POWs being forced to commit atrocities (ear-biting incident, 1121Z) are circulating; while highly credible given the source (Butusov), they are also used by UAF IO to highlight the "inhumanity" of the adversary to maintain defensive resolve.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

  • MLCOA: Continued UAV harassment of Northern Ukraine (Kyiv/Chernihiv) to fix air defense assets while RF aviation conducts further strikes on crossings in the Kharkiv/Kupiansk sector.
  • MDCOA: A sudden escalation on the Orikhiv axis in Zaporizhzhia, utilizing mechanized elements to exploit perceived gaps in UAF secondary lines.
  • Weather Factor: Extreme cold forecast for the Moscow/RF region (1111Z) may impact RF logistics and equipment readiness for units rotating from the Russian rear.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. [HIGH] Determine the cause of the Syktyvkar MVD center explosion (accident vs. sabotage) to assess partisan capability in the RF rear.
  2. [MEDIUM] Verify the extent of damage at the Osynovo crossing; determine if UAF has viable pontoon alternatives in the sector.
  3. [HIGH] Monitor 15th OMSBr movements to determine the scale of their deployment in the Pokrovsk sector.
  4. [LOW] Track the origin of the "Greenland" disinformation to identify which RF IO nodes are currently prioritizing NATO-distraction narratives.

//REPORT ENDS//

Previous (2026-01-15 11:00:05Z)

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