AIR THREAT: HIGH-SPEED TARGET (1932Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Warning issued for a high-speed aerial target (likely ballistic or supersonic cruise missile) over Donetsk Oblast.
ENERGY CRISIS: ZAPORIZHZHIA GRID FAILURE (1935Z, Mash na Donbasse, HIGH): 47,000 residents in Zaporizhzhia Oblast have lost power due to severe weather; represents a 5x increase in regional outages since the 1900Z report.
NORTHERN UAV AXIS (1942Z, UAF Air Force, MEDIUM): New UAV ingress detected heading toward Sumy from the North; expands the multi-directional drone threat beyond the Chernihiv/Zhytomyr vectors previously identified.
TACTICAL KUPYANSK EVACUATIONS (1936Z, ASTRA, HIGH): Civil-military authorities have initiated emergency evacuations near Kupyansk due to intensifying close-quarters combat and sub-zero conditions.
RF OFFENSIVE PREPARATIONS (1950Z, Two Majors, MEDIUM): Coordinated fundraising for quadcopters specifically for "storm groups" in the Krasnolymansk direction indicates imminent or ongoing high-intensity assault operations in the Lyman sector.
SNAKE ISLAND STATUS (1930Z, DPSU, HIGH): Visual evidence confirms UAF State Border Guard Service (DPSU) continues to hold and garrison Snake Island despite extreme winter conditions.
AD INTERCEPTION SUCCESS (1932Z, Sternenko, MEDIUM): Claims of 5 "Shahed" and 2 "Gerbera" (decoy/low-cost) UAVs downed; confirms the presence of decoy assets meant to deplete AD magazines.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational environment has deteriorated since 1900Z due to a convergence of high-speed kinetic strikes in the East and a expanding power grid collapse in the South. The Zaporizhzhia sector is now facing a humanitarian emergency with 47,000 civilians without power amidst active combat. Battlefield geometry remains strained in the Kupyansk and Krasnolymansk sectors, where RF is prioritizing localized breakthrough attempts. Weather continues to be a primary force multiplier for both sides, hindering logistics but providing concealment for drone deployments.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities & Intentions
Strike Profile: The detection of a "high-speed target" in Donetsk (1932Z) suggests the RF is following up its UAV saturation wave with high-precision assets (Iskander-M or Kinzhal) targeting tactical command nodes or high-value infrastructure.
Drone Tactics: The confirmed use of "Gerbera" drones (1932Z) indicates a sophisticated saturation strategy designed to force UAF to expend expensive interceptors on low-cost plywood decoys before the arrival of primary strike packages.
Offensive Focus: Heavy emphasis on "eyes for storm groups" in the Krasnolymansk direction (1950Z) suggests RF is preparing for mechanized or "meat" assaults to exploit the current weather-induced visibility gaps.
Logistics and Sustainment
Volunteer Reliance: RF reliance on Telegram-based fundraising for basic tactical reconnaissance (quadcopters) continues to highlight internal supply chain friction for low-tier tactical units despite high-level strategic production (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.121 for Krasnolymansk recon).
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Posture & Readiness
Rear Resilience: President Zelenskyy and PM Sviridenko are shifting focus to regional restoration (1939Z), likely moving mobile power units to Zaporizhzhia to stabilize the 47,000-person outage.
Maritime Sovereignty: DPSU presence on Snake Island (1930Z) remains a critical sensor node and psychological symbol, preventing RF from re-establishing a presence in the Western Black Sea.
Civil Defense: Intensified evacuation efforts in Kupyansk (1936Z) indicate UAF is prioritizing civil preservation in anticipation of increased urban combat or heavy thermal/artillery bombardment.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Cognitive Domain
Crowdsourcing Attrition: Both sides are leveraging social media for tactical fundraising (1932Z, 1938Z, 1950Z), indicating that "public logistics" are now a structural part of the 2026 war economy.
Strategic Distraction: RF channels are amplifying global political shifts (Trump/Germany-Arctic Guardian) to dilute focus on the humanitarian impact of the current energy strikes in Ukraine.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA)
In the next 6 hours, the RF will likely launch a secondary wave of drones from the Sumy axis (1942Z) to fix UAF air defenses in the North while executing a ground-level "storm" operation in the Lyman/Krasnolymansk sector. High-speed strikes in Donetsk will likely target rail junctions to further paralyze the 60+ stalled trains identified in previous reports.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA)
The RF utilizes the 47,000-person power outage in Zaporizhzhia to launch a multi-axis ground assault toward Huliaipole while UAF communications and electronic warfare assets are degraded by the regional blackout and lack of local power for signal repeaters.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
High-Speed Target BDA: Determine the impact point and weapon type of the 1932Z Donetsk target. (Priority: CRITICAL).
Zaporizhzhia Blackout Cause: Confirm if the 47k outage is purely weather-induced or if kinetic strikes on sub-stations (analogous to Kramatorsk) accelerated the failure.
Krasnolymansk Force Disposition: Identify specific RF units (e.g., elements of the 752nd Regiment) receiving the new drone shipments to predict the exact assault vector.
Gerbera Volume: Monitor the ratio of "Gerbera" decoys to "Shahed" strike drones in the Sumy wave to assess RF decoy stockpiles.
