KINETIC (SUMY): Repelled Combined Assault (1404Z, DshV UAF, HIGH): The 71st Separate Air Assault Brigade successfully repelled a "massive and combined" Russian assault between Andriivka and Oleksiivka. This indicates a potential reactivation of the Northern axis or a localized effort to seize cross-border tactical advantages.
KINETIC (ODESA): Maritime KAB Launches (1420Z, Mykolaiv Vanek/UAF Air Force, HIGH): Russian tactical aviation has shifted KAB launch envelopes to the Black Sea, targeting Zatoka, Karolino-Buhaz, and Sanzhiika. This complicates AD detection compared to land-based launches.
LOGISTICS: Drone Production Shift (1408Z, Operatsiya Z, MEDIUM): Reports indicate Ukraine is relocating portions of its UAV production to Poland. This strategic move aims to mitigate the risk of infrastructure strikes on domestic facilities.
STRATEGIC SIGNALING: Western Deployment Constraints (1420Z, TASS, MEDIUM): German politician Friedrich Merz stated that deployment of multinational forces to Ukraine is "impossible without Russian consent." This is being heavily amplified by RU channels to suggest a lack of NATO consensus.
LOGISTICS: "Vostok" Group Supply Deficiencies (1359Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH): Pro-Russian sources are crowdfunding civilian UAZ "Patriot" and "Bukhanka" vehicles for the Vostok Group in Buryatia, indicating persistent shortfalls in standard military transport (MTZ).
Operational picture (by sector)
Northern Axis (Sumy): RU forces attempted a multi-vector assault near Andriivka. The involvement of "combined" forces suggests a mix of infantry and light armor, though the 71st Brigade's successful defense indicates UAF remains well-entrenched in this sector despite previous bridge destructions.
Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk/Konstantinivka): Heavy mechanized pressure continues. The destruction of "Bukhanka" vans during a mechanized probe (1413Z) suggests RU is using non-standard transport to supplement armored losses in "last-mile" logistics. In the Konstantinivka sector, UAF drone units ("Cursed Empire") are successfully interdicting RU motorcycle scouts, a common RU tactic for rapid reconnaissance-in-force (1419Z).
Southern Axis (Kherson/Odesa): Kherson city center sustained a lethal artillery strike resulting in three civilian deaths (1403Z). Simultaneously, RU aviation is intensifying pressure on the Odesa coastline using KABs launched from the maritime domain, likely aiming to degrade coastal defenses and port infrastructure.
Rear AOR (Russia): A Russian Boeing 767 on a Dubai-Moscow route declared an emergency (1415Z), likely due to maintenance issues stemming from long-term sanctions on aviation components. UAF intelligence also claims an accelerating "communal collapse" (water/heat) in Russian cities due to war-related resource diversion (1409Z).
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Adaptation: RU is increasingly employing sea-based launch points for KABs (1422Z) to bypass land-based early warning systems. This requires a shift in UAF radar orientation and patrol patterns.
Sustainment Gaps: The Vostok Group's reliance on volunteer-funded civilian SUVs and quads (1359Z) confirms that RU logistics at the tactical level remain brittle and dependent on non-military supply chains.
Information Operations: RU is exploiting the "Venezuela CIA Asset" narrative (1407Z) to draw parallels between alleged domestic "traitors" (Gerasimov) and foreign coup attempts, likely to justify future internal purges or explain military failures.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Defense-in-Depth: UAF paratroopers and air assault units (71st, 59th) continue to hold critical junctions in Pokrovsk and Sumy, maintaining high attrition rates against RU mechanized and infantry probes.
Strategic Resilience: The move to produce drones in Poland (1408Z) provides a "hardened" supply chain that is immune to RU cruise missile and KAB strikes, ensuring a steady flow of FPV and reconnaissance assets.
Interdiction: Drone units are effectively neutralizing RU high-mobility assets (motorcycles/ATVs) in the Konstantinivka sector (1419Z), preventing RU from establishing observation posts.
Information environment / disinformation
"Foreign Intervention" Rhetoric: The RU MFA has officially designated Western military presence as "intervention" (1411Z). This is a clear escalatory signal intended to deter the UK/French peacekeeping proposals mentioned in previous reports.
German Political Friction: The amplification of Friedrich Merz's comments (1420Z) is designed to project an image of German reluctance to support UA without RU involvement, targeting UA morale.
Satire/Black Ops IO: Politically charged satire regarding US leadership and drug use (1417Z) is being used to distract from the maritime interdictions of the "Shadow Fleet."
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA: Continued KAB strikes on Odesa coastal settlements (Zatoka/Sanzhiika) from maritime launch points. RU will likely follow up the failed Sumy assault with increased artillery prep to test for gaps in the 71st Brigade’s line.
MDCOA: A concerted "double-tap" strike on Kherson or Kryvyi Rih infrastructure to exploit the ongoing "communal collapse" narrative and maximize humanitarian pressure during winter.
Aviation: High probability of another tactical aviation surge in the South, given the recent drone reconnaissance toward Chornomorske (1423Z).
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Polish Production Specs: Confirm the scale and specific UAV models being shifted to Polish facilities (P1).
Maritime KAB Platforms: Identify the specific airframes (Su-34/Su-30SM) and launch altitudes for the new sea-based KAB strikes toward Odesa (P1).
Vostok Group Attrition: Assess if the shift to civilian vehicle procurement indicates a critical failure in the RU military industrial complex's ability to provide light tactical transport (P2).
IPB ANALYSIS
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational geometry is shifting toward coastal attrition and cross-border harassment. RU is attempting to open or simulate new fronts (Sumy) while maintaining high-intensity mechanized pressure on Pokrovsk. The environment is characterized by winter-induced logistical strain on both sides, but RU appears to be more severely impacted by civilian infrastructure failures.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Course of Action: Russia is utilizing a "probing and saturation" strategy. By launching KABs from the sea, they are forcing UAF to reallocate AD assets from the Donbas to the coast.
Logistics Status:DEGRADED. The need for "UAZ Patriots" for front-line drone units in the Vostok Group indicates that RU organic military logistics are unable to sustain small-unit mobility.
C2: Signs of internal friction; pro-war milbloggers (Parker) are openly suggesting high-level treason within the RU General Staff, which may lead to erratic command decisions.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Successes: Exceptional tactical performance by the 71st and air assault units in repelling high-mass assaults with minimal loss of ground.
Adaptation: The internationalization of the defense industry (Poland drone production) is a significant maturation of UAF's long-term sustainability strategy.
4. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Short-term (Tactical): Expect RU to increase drone-led reconnaissance in the Odesa/Mykolaiv sectors to identify AD gaps created by the shift in KAB launch vectors.
Strategic: The "foreign intervention" warnings from the RU MFA suggest that any official Western deployment—even for training—will be met with immediate long-range kinetic strikes to test Western resolve.
//ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS//
AD Realignment: Deploy mobile "Zhenit" or similar SHORAD units to the Odesa coastline to counter maritime KAB launch envelopes (Priority: HIGH).
Logistical Targeting: Prioritize the interdiction of civilian-sourced vehicle convoys (UAZ/Bukhankas) in the Vostok Group's AOR, as these now represent a critical vulnerability in RU reconnaissance mobility (Priority: MEDIUM).
Counter-IO: StratCom should highlight the RU dependence on civilian crowdfunding for basic military transport to counter the narrative of RU's "inexhaustible" industrial capacity (Priority: LOW).
