UAV Vector Expansion: Drone swarms have entered eastern Kirovohrad Oblast, moving west, and are approaching Zaporizhzhia from the south (2202Z, 2221Z, Air Force UA, HIGH).
Concentrated Threat to Odesa: Approximately 8 Shahed-type UAVs are actively targeting the Chornomorske/Pivdenne area (2205Z, 2208Z, Nikolaevskiy Vanyek/Air Force UA, HIGH).
Strategic Diplomatic Engagement: President Zelenskyy confirmed high-level discussions with members of the incoming US administration (Witkoff, Kushner) regarding security "backstops," ceasefire monitoring, and reconstruction (2213Z, Zelenskyy, HIGH).
RF Tactical Success: Russian drone operators successfully engaged and destroyed a UAF 152-mm 2S3 "Akatsiya" self-propelled gun (SPG) in the "West" Group of Forces' operational zone (2211Z, Colonelcassad, MEDIUM).
Kremlin Narrative Peak: Putin utilized an Orthodox Christmas service to frame the war as a "holy mission" and a "common victory" for all Russian faiths, signaling zero intent for a holiday de-escalation (2217Z, 2223Z, TASS, HIGH).
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Axis (Odesa/Zaporizhzhia/Kirovohrad): A multi-pronged UAV attack is underway. The concentration of 8 drones near Chornomorske suggests a focused attempt to strike port infrastructure or local Air Defense (AD). The new vector into Kirovohrad indicates the RF is widening the search area for UAF reserves or logistics hubs.
Western Sector (Kupiansk/Lyman): RF forces are maintaining pressure on UAF artillery. The loss of a 2S3 "Akatsiya" (2211Z) confirms active RF counter-battery/FPV operations targeting UAF indirect fire assets in this sector.
Rear Stability: In Kryvyi Rih, local authorities report continued focus on cultural resilience and civil defense, despite the kinetic strikes reported earlier (2210Z, Vilkul).
Enemy activity / threat assessment
UAV Saturation: The RF continues to use "moped" (Shahed) swarms to probe gaps in the AD network. The shift to Zaporizhzhia and Kirovohrad late in the evening suggests an effort to keep AD units mobile and prevent them from settling before a potential missile phase.
Religious/Psychological Mobilization: Putin's rhetoric (2217Z) has shifted toward extreme nationalist-religious legitimization. By framing the conflict as a "holy mission," the Kremlin is preparing the domestic audience for a prolonged war of attrition, potentially ignoring any Turkish-led mediation efforts (2215Z).
Tactical Reconnaissance-Strike: The use of video-monitored drone strikes on SPGs indicates high-functioning RF ISR-strike loops in the "West" sector.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Strategic Hedging: The UAF leadership and Presidential Office are actively engaging with the Trump team to secure future "backstops" (2213Z). This is a critical move to ensure continuity of support regardless of US political shifts.
AD Engagement: UAF AD remains active across Odesa and the southern interior. The "remainder of mopeds" (2226Z) implies that the initial wave is being whittled down, though threats persist.
Information environment / disinformation
"Greenland" Diversion: Russian state media (TASS) and pro-war channels continue to amplify reports about US interest in Greenland (2205Z, 2211Z) to distract from the intensification of strikes on Ukrainian civilians during the Orthodox holiday.
Mediation Noise: Turkish claims of being at the "closest point to peace" (2215Z) are currently uncorroborated by battlefield reality or Kremlin rhetoric.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA (Most Likely): The current UAV swarms (approx. 10-15 remaining across all sectors) will likely attempt to impact energy or port infrastructure in Odesa and Kirovohrad by 0100Z. A follow-up missile strike (Kalibr or Kh-101) between 0400Z and 0600Z remains highly probable based on the Voronezh aviation surge (Daily Report).
MDCOA (Most Dangerous): RF utilizes the "holy mission" narrative to launch a high-intensity missile/KAB barrage against Kyiv during the Jan 7 morning services to maximize psychological trauma and symbolic impact.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
West Sector Attrition: Need confirmation of the specific location of the 2S3 Akatsiya loss to determine if RF drone operators have penetrated deeper behind UAF lines.
UAV Interception Rate: Request BDA from Odesa/Chornomorske to confirm how many of the 8 "mopeds" successfully reached their targets.
Diplomatic Backchannel: Clarify the specific "security guarantees" discussed with the Trump team to assess long-term operational sustainability.
Recommendations
Artillery Survival: SPG units in the West/Lyman sector must increase frequency of displacement and utilize additional netting/EW to counter the demonstrated RF FPV threat.
Port Protection: Move mobile fire groups in the Odesa region to the Chornomorske/Pivdenne perimeter immediately to intercept the remaining UAV wave.
IO Pre-emption: Release footage of any Jan 6/7 strikes on residential areas immediately to counter Putin's "holy mission" propaganda and Turkish "peace" narratives.
