Escalation in Zaporizhzhia Sector (0313Z, UA Air Force, HIGH): Launch of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) against targets in the Zaporizhzhia region.
Sustained Aviation Activity (0326Z, UA Air Force, HIGH): Confirmed repeated KAB launches targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast, indicating a persistent suppression operation.
ZNPP Personnel Narrative (0326Z, TASS, MEDIUM): RF state media reporting alleged leaks of Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) employee data on Ukrainian social media; assessed as a localized Information Operation (IO).
Geopolitical Distraction Narrative (0312Z, TASS, LOW): Continued amplification of US-Venezuela relations by RF state media to saturate the information environment and distract from kinetic operations.
IPB Framework Analysis
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The focus of kinetic activity has expanded to the Southern Axis. While the Kyiv Metropolitan area remains under the ballistic threat established in the 0258Z report, the RF has surged tactical aviation assets against the Zaporizhzhia sector.
Battlefield Geometry: Kinetic strikes are now occurring simultaneously on the Northern (Kyiv), Eastern (Kharkiv/Kupyansk), and Southern (Zaporizhzhia) axes.
Weather/Environmental Factors: Pre-dawn conditions persist, facilitating RF tactical aviation's use of stand-off KAB strikes with reduced visual detection.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Capabilities & Intentions:
Aviation Surge (Zaporizhzhia): The shift to repeated KAB strikes in Zaporizhzhia (0313Z, 0326Z) suggests the RF is attempting to fix UAF units or suppress defensive positions near the Stepnohirsk breach (Ref: Daily Report).
Coordinated IO: The ZNPP "data leak" narrative (0326Z) likely aims to justify increased security/repressive measures at the plant or frame UAF as a threat to nuclear safety personnel. This aligns with D-S beliefs regarding RF Disinformation (0.29) and Propaganda (0.21).
Tactical Persistence: Repeated sorties within a 13-minute window (0313Z–0326Z) indicate a high sortie rate and localized coordination between ISR and tactical aviation.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES
Air Defense Posture: UA Air Force is actively tracking and reporting KAB release points. However, the high volume of KABs—which are difficult to intercept compared to cruise missiles—requires immediate passive defense measures (sheltering/dispersal) for ground units.
Counter-IO: UAF strategic communications are currently focused on threat warnings; however, a response to the ZNPP personnel targeting claims will be required to mitigate international pressure.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Cognitive Saturation: RF media (TASS) is utilizing "white noise" (Trump/Venezuela, 0312Z) alongside "black" propaganda (ZNPP leaks, 0326Z) to overwhelm analysts and the public, masking the tactical objectives of the Zaporizhzhia strikes.
Targeted Hostility: The focus on ZNPP personnel suggests a shift toward targeting the human infrastructure of critical energy nodes.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue KAB strikes in the Zaporizhzhia sector through dawn to create a "fire vacuum" for a localized mechanized push toward Stepnohirsk or the OREKHOV axis.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF utilizes the ZNPP "security threat" narrative as a pretext for a kinetic provocation or a "false flag" at the facility while UAF air defenses are saturated by the ongoing KAB and ballistic strikes.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Zaporizhzhia Impact Assessment: Immediate BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) required to determine if KABs are targeting UAF artillery positions or logistical crossroads.
ZNPP Internal Status: Verify the validity of the "data leak" claims. Are these genuine personnel lists, or fabricated documents used for an IO?
Aviation Base of Origin: Identify if Zaporizhzhia KAB strikes are originating from Crimea (Belbek/Saki) or Rostov-on-Don to assess potential for UAF long-range ATACMS/UAV counter-strikes.
Recommendations:
Tactical Dispersal: Units in the Zaporizhzhia region must transition to maximum dispersal; repeated KAB strikes indicate "walking fire" tactics targeting suspected concentrations.
Hardening ZNPP Information: Advise personnel associated with ZNPP on cybersecurity hygiene to counter the "data leak" narrative and minimize genuine exposure.
Kyiv/Zaporizhzhia AD Coordination: Prioritize mobile AD assets for the Southern axis if the ballistic threat to Kyiv subsides, as KAB persistence indicates a potential ground offensive precursor.
