POLITICAL CONTINUITY: Official date set for the first working group meeting on wartime/post-war election frameworks. (RBK-UA, 2014Z, HIGH).
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational tempo has intensified significantly in the last hour, transitioning from localized ground skirmishes to a coordinated, multi-vector aerial assault across Ukraine. Concurrent UAV threats are now active in the North (Kyiv Reservoir), South (Odesa), and Central-West (Zolotonosha vector from previous sitrep). The inclusion of KAB strikes on Zaporizhzhia city indicates a shift in RF targeting toward major urban centers near the front lines. Weather conditions in the RF rear (Moscow blizzard) continue to hamper RF ground logistics, potentially explaining the heavy reliance on standoff aerial munitions.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Tactical Operations:
Zaporizhzhia/Huliaipole Axis: The reported capture of a UAF command post in Huliaipole (2028Z) is highly concerning. If verified, it suggests a tactical breach in a sector that has been relatively stable. The use of KABs on Zaporizhzhia city (2020Z) is likely intended to suppress UAF reserves and C2 infrastructure to support this ground push.
Air Campaign: The RF is executing a "pincer" drone strategy, utilizing the Kyiv Reservoir (North) and Black Sea (South) vectors to overstretch UAF air defense (AD) geometry.
Assault Tactics: RF "Zapad" Group is emphasizing "speed and pressure" in small-group infantry assaults (2023Z), confirming the shift away from mechanized "banzai" charges noted in the 1500Z report.
Logistics and Sustainment:
Moscow Rear: Festive displays in Moscow (2023Z) contrast with the reported severe blizzard, suggesting a Kremlin effort to maintain domestic normalcy despite logistics disruptions for the "Unmanned Systems Regiment."
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue force tracking)
Operational Posture:
Pokrovsk Defense: The 425th Regiment is successfully leveraging FPV drones to counter the RF shift to small-group infantry tactics. High-quality optics and "faster" drones are proving decisive in urban and peri-urban combat (2010Z).
Strategic Governance: The formalization of the election working group (2014Z) reinforces the "state-in-being" narrative, countering RF psychological operations aimed at portraying the Ukrainian government as illegitimate or unstable.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive domain)
ZNPP Sovereignty: RF continues to push the narrative of bilateral RU-US management of the Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant, explicitly aiming to exclude Ukraine from the diplomatic loop (2030Z). This remains a primary RF hybrid effort to cause friction between Kyiv and its Western allies.
NATO/Poland Border Tension: The report of UAVs on the Polish border (2025Z) is likely a deliberate provocation or an attempt to trigger NATO monitoring sensors, potentially masking other movements or testing response times during the holiday period.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue the multi-vector UAV/KAB assault through the night, targeting energy substations and rail hubs in Kyiv and Odesa Oblasts. In the next 6 hours, expect confirmed ground assaults in the Huliaipole sector to capitalize on the reported CP capture.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF leverages the Belarus-Poland border UAV movement as a feint for a larger kinetic or cyber-electronic warfare (EW) strike against Western Ukrainian logistics hubs (Lviv/Volyn), attempting to sever GLOCs while AD assets are focused on the Kyiv/Zaporizhzhia vectors.
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS
(P1) Huliaipole Verification: Urgent requirement for BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) and unit status reports from Huliaipole. Confirm if the command post was occupied or a decoy.
(P2) Belarus-Poland Border: Identify the type of UAVs (Recon vs. OWA) moving along the Polish border. Monitor for Polish/NATO scrambled response.
(P3) Odesa Vector Depth: Determine if the UAVs launched from the Black Sea are targeting the port infrastructure or the previously reported damaged bridge near Odesa (from 1500Z report).
