(01:00, UAF AF, HIGH): A new group of loitering munitions (UAVs) detected over the Black Sea, vectoring toward Tatarbunary (Odesa Oblast).
(00:45, TASS/RBK-UA, HIGH): Confirmed drone strike on Russian infrastructure in Volna, Krasnodar Krai. Damage reported to a pipeline, two piers, and two vessels.
(00:41–00:58, UAF AF, HIGH): Multi-vector UAV activity across Mykolaiv and Odesa Oblasts, with specific threats toward Ochakiv, Dobroslav, and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi.
(00:42, UAF AF, HIGH): UAV detected incursion toward Kryvyi Rih from the southern vector.
(00:37, TASS, LOW): Russian state media shifting focus to domestic social issues (gift limits for teachers), likely a filler or distraction from the Volna infrastructure strike.
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Sector (Odesa/Mykolaiv/Kherson):
The threat to the Odesa region has escalated from a single-axis probe to a coordinated multi-vector saturation effort.
Tatarbunary/M-15 Axis: The detection of a new group of UAVs (01:00) following the initial probe (00:28) confirms the M-15 highway and Mayaki Bridge are the primary targets. The enemy is seeking to exploit the recently restored two-way traffic on this critical GLOC.
Odesa Encirclement: Simultaneous threats toward Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (00:47) and Dobroslav/Buyalyk (00:58) suggest an attempt to fix Air Defense (AD) assets on the periphery of Odesa city to create a "corridor" for subsequent strikes.
Mykolaiv/Ochakiv: UAVs moving west from Ochakiv (00:41) are likely acting as "beaters" to trigger AD radars and map current battery dispositions.
Central Sector (Kryvyi Rih):
The southern approach of a UAV toward Kryvyi Rih (00:42) indicates the RF is widening the strike zone to include industrial/logistics hubs in the rear, potentially targeting power generation or rail nodes.
Rear Areas / RF Territory (Krasnodar Krai):
The strike on Volna (00:45) is a significant counter-logistics development. Volna is a critical terminal for oil and ammonia near the Kerch Bridge. Damage to two ships and two piers indicates a high-precision strike or a successful saturation of local Russian EW/AD.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Aviation/UAV Tactics: The RF is currently employing a "pulsed" saturation tactic—sending small groups of UAVs from different vectors (Black Sea, TOT, and Mykolaiv) at 15-20 minute intervals. This forces UAF Mobile Fire Groups (MFGs) into continuous repositioning, inducing fatigue and depleting short-range munitions.
Strategic Intent: The focus on the Odesa region's southern districts (Tatarbunary/Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi) directly correlates with the objective of severing the restored logistics link to Romania.
Counter-Logistics Vulnerability: The strike in Volna (Krasnodar) demonstrates that RF port infrastructure in the Black Sea remains vulnerable to Ukrainian long-range systems, which may force the RF to divert naval assets for coastal protection.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense Operations: UAF Air Force and MFGs are currently engaged across four oblasts. No confirmed intercepts have been reported in the last 30 minutes, suggesting targets are still in transit or operating at extremely low altitudes.
Deep Strike Capability: (Judgment) The Volna strike indicates UAF's continued ability to project power into the Russian rear, likely utilizing one-way attack (OWA) UAVs to disrupt the "Shadow Fleet" and fuel logistics supporting the southern grouping of RF forces.
Information environment / disinformation
Russian Narrative Pivot: TASS (00:37, 01:01) is noticeably avoiding immediate heavy reporting on the Volna strike, instead prioritizing mundane domestic news and Western celebrity gossip. This is a common tactic to "bury" news of successful Ukrainian strikes on sensitive Russian infrastructure.
Hybrid Distraction: (00:16 - Previous Sitrep context) The "Florida talks" narrative remains uncorroborated and is assessed as a psychological operation to distract from the ongoing air campaign.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
MLCOA (Most Likely): UAV impacts in the Odesa/Kryvyi Rih sectors within 30-60 minutes. RF will likely launch a secondary wave of "Gerber" decoys to identify the locations of the MFGs that engage the current wave.
MDCOA (Most Dangerous): A synchronized "Kalibr" cruise missile strike from the Black Sea, timed to arrive as the current UAV wave reaches its terminal phase, specifically targeting the Mayaki Bridge or the port of Chornomorsk.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Volna BDA: Need high-resolution satellite imagery or ELINT to confirm the types of vessels damaged in Volna (00:45). If these were tankers, the impact on RF fuel logistics will be high.
UAV Type Identification: Confirm if the UAVs heading to Kryvyi Rih are the same camera-equipped "Gerber" variants identified in the previous daily report.
AD Expenditure: Monitor the rate of UAF AD munition expenditure in the Odesa sector to assess sustainment needs if the "pulsed" attacks continue past 0400Z.
ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS:
Tactical (Odesa/M-15): Maintain MAXIMUM ALERT at the Mayaki Bridge and M-15 corridor. Even if UAVs are intercepted, the threat of a follow-on missile strike remains HIGH.
Tactical (Kryvyi Rih): Alert industrial sector security for potential low-altitude strikes. Ensure all personnel are in shelters; the southern vector is a known "blind spot" for certain radar configurations.
Strategic (Logistics): Despite the M-15 restoration, consider a 4-hour "hold" on new heavy freight convoys departing from Reni/Izmail until the current air threat is neutralized to prevent clustering at the bridge.
Operational (Counter-Logistics): Capitalize on the Volna strike by monitoring for RF vessel movements; they may attempt to relocate remaining ships to Novorossiysk, presenting further target opportunities.
