(06:38, RBK-Ukraine/Air Force, HIGH): Total of 97 Russian strike drones (various types) were launched overnight. This updates the previous report of 75 interceptions, indicating an approximate 77% neutralization rate.
(07:03, Arkhangel Spetsnaza, MEDIUM): Heavy fighting reported in the center of Huliaipole (Zaporizhzhia sector). RF forces are attempting to consolidate gains in the town.
(06:50, Zvizdeț Mangustu, MEDIUM): RF 20th and 25th Combined Arms Armies (CAA) are intensifying assaults southeast of Lyman, aiming for the Dibrova–Ozerne line.
(07:03, Zvizdeț Mangustu, MEDIUM): RF 3rd CAA is executing a tactical maneuver along the southern bank of the Siverskyi Donets (Siversk to the river) to enable troop movement across the river without UAF fire exposure.
(06:58, Butusov Plus, MEDIUM): UAF successfully interdicted a 50-man Russian infiltration group (including foreign mercenaries) in a "natural sacrifice" scenario (high-attrition ambush).
(06:58, 06:52, Air Force, HIGH): New drone waves detected inbound from the Black Sea toward Pivdenne and toward Sumy.
(07:00, MoD Russia, MEDIUM): Assault detachments of the Ulyanovsk Airborne (VDV) formation are conducting active training/staging in the Zaporizhzhia region, suggesting imminent reinforcement of the Huliaipole/Stepnohirsk axes.
Operational picture (by sector)
Lyman/Siversk Sector: Significant tactical evolution. The RF 3rd CAA is attempting to bypass UAF fire control by moving along the Siverskyi Donets riverbank. This maneuver is designed to facilitate a pincer or flanking movement on Lyman, supported by the 20th and 25th CAAs. Small infantry groups are reportedly "infiltrating" the SE outskirts of Lyman.
Zaporizhzhia Sector: The focus has shifted to Huliaipole, where "heavy fighting" in the town center is reported. Russian VDV units (Ulyanovsk formation) are active near Primorske and in staging areas, likely to exploit any breach in the Huliaipole fortifications.
Southern Sector (Odesa/Pivdenne): Continued drone pressure from the Black Sea indicates a persistent effort to saturate air defenses in the Odesa/Pivdenne logistics hub.
Northeastern Sector (Sumy): Renewed drone activity suggests a possible reconnaissance-in-force or targeting of regional energy/logistics nodes.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Tactical Maneuver: The RF transition toward utilizing riverbanks for "masked" maneuver (Siverskyi Donets) suggests an adaptation to UAF's superior drone-based ISR over open fields.
VDV Presence: The deployment of VDV assault detachments in Zaporizhzhia indicates a higher tier of infantry is being committed to the Huliaipole assault, moving away from the "meat assault" tactics of the Pokrovsk sector.
Logistics/Sustainment: Fundraising by the Russian 33rd Motorized Rifle Regiment (07:04) and volunteer calls suggest localized supply shortages in communication and technical equipment despite the broad offensive tempo.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Interdiction Success: The neutralization of a 50-man storm group (06:58) confirms UAF's continued effectiveness in static defense and ambush tactics against infiltration attempts.
Air Defense: Maintaining a high interception rate (75/97) but remains under continuous pressure from sequential waves (Pivdenne, Sumy).
National Discipline: Large-scale synchronization of the "minute of silence" (09:00 local) across government and military channels (General Staff, KMVA, Zaporizhzhia ODA) indicates high internal cohesion and morale maintenance.
Information environment / disinformation
Russian Counter-Narrative: RF-affiliated channels (Operativno ZSU/Russian sources) are actively pushing a narrative that Western media is "lying" about Russian goals to capture all of Ukraine, likely to soften the diplomatic environment for the "Miami negotiations."
Diplomatic Posturing: The Kremlin (via Peskov) is signal-testing European unity by expressing readiness for dialogue with Macron, while Orbán is used as a proxy to mock EU leadership (Kallas).
Normalcy Projection: TASS continues to prioritize mundane "fact-checking" (cosmetic usage) to mask the domestic reality of the high-intensity drone/missile campaign.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will intensify small-unit infantry infiltration in SE Lyman while attempting to seize the administrative center of Huliaipole.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A coordinated river crossing at the Siverskyi Donets by the 3rd CAA to establish a bridgehead in the UAF's rear, threatening the entire Siversk-Lyman defensive line.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
Siverskyi Donets Crossing: Urgent ISR required to determine if the 3rd CAA has established pontoon staging areas or is merely using the bank for lateral movement.
Huliaipole Control Map: Confirmation of the specific buildings/quarters held by RF in the Huliaipole town center.
Inbound Drone Composition: Determination if the new waves (Sumy/Pivdenne) include the "machine vision" variants noted in the 24h report.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational tempo has increased in the Zaporizhzhia and Lyman sectors. While Pokrovsk remains a primary pressure point, the RF has escalated the assault on Huliaipole and initiated a complex flanking maneuver along the Siverskyi Donets. Drone saturation remains the primary RF tool for suppressing the UAF rear.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Force Composition: Inclusion of VDV units in Zaporizhzhia indicates a shift toward higher-quality assault groups for urban breakthroughs (Huliaipole).
Tactical Adaptation: The use of riverbanks to mask movement (3rd CAA) and small-group infiltration (Lyman) confirms the RF is attempting to bypass the "Rasputitsa" (mud) and UAF fire zones that stymied armored assaults.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Defensive Integrity: UAF is successfully identifying and destroying infiltration groups (50-man group interdicted), but the widening of the front (Huliaipole center, Siverskyi Donets bank) is stretching mobile reserves.
Resilience: Strategic messaging remains unified, focusing on national sacrifice and continued resistance.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Targeted Diplomacy: Russia is attempting to decouple France from the broader EU/NATO hardline stance while using Hungarian rhetoric to undermine Baltic/Northern European influence (Kallas).
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Timeline: Expect a decisive push in Huliaipole within the next 6 hours to secure a foothold before nightfall.
Decision Point: If the RF 3rd CAA successfully moves west along the river, UAF Southern Command must decide whether to reinforce the Siversk flank or risk a localized encirclement of Lyman.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
Tactical: Deploy additional thermal-equipped FPV teams to the Siverskyi Donets riverbank to counter "masked" RF maneuvers.
Operational: Reinforce the Huliaipole urban center with specialized MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) units to counter VDV assault detachments.
Strategic: Brief Western partners on the 97-drone wave to emphasize the continued need for kinetic interceptors (Gepard/Vampire) over purely EW-based solutions.
