(23:15, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Shahed-type UAVs detected approaching Kherson from the east. This expands the current aerial threat to a three-axis saturation effort (Sumy-North, Odesa-Southwest, Kherson-South).
(23:14, NgP Razvedka, MEDIUM): Russian mil-blogger sources are advertising "unique configurations" and "tuning" of tactical equipment. Contextual analysis suggests continued localized field modifications to FPVs or loitering munitions, potentially related to the "machine vision" or fiber-optic upgrades previously reported.
(23:14, NgP Razvedka, LOW): Evidence of crowdfunding/private transaction notifications for military hardware "tuning," indicating a reliance on non-standard procurement to bypass traditional supply chain delays.
Operational picture (by sector)
Southern Vector (Kherson/Odesa): The threat has metastasized. Following the earlier penetration toward Teplodar (Odesa), the new wave toward Kherson (23:15) creates a cross-sector challenge for Air Defense (AD) assets in the Southern Operational Command. The "east-to-west" trajectory toward Kherson suggests launch points from occupied Crimea or the left bank of the Dnipro.
Northern Vector (Sumy): UAVs reported at 22:38 remain active. No kinetic impacts confirmed yet, suggesting loitering or routing toward deep-rear targets.
Eastern Vector (Dnipropetrovsk Border): The situation near Mezheva-Ivanivka (reported at 22:44) remains the highest priority ground concern. Any consolidation here threatens the critical logistical spine of the Pokrovsk-Velyka Novosilka grouping.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Aerial Tactics (Saturation): The RF is executing a synchronized multi-vector UAV assault. By launching waves toward Sumy, Odesa, and now Kherson, the RF aims to force UAF to prioritize AD coverage, likely leaving secondary infrastructure or mobile units vulnerable to follow-on missile strikes.
Tactical Innovation: The "tuning" reported by NgP Razvedka (23:14) suggests that the RF is rapidly iterating drone modifications in the field. This likely includes the installation of optical seekers to defeat EW, as noted in the daily report.
Logistics & Sustainment: The use of private transactions for "tuning" indicates a "bottom-up" approach to technology integration, where frontline units are out-pacing central Russian MOD procurement for specialized electronic components.
Friendly activity (UAF)
Air Defense: Mobile fire groups are actively repositioning to intercept the Kherson-bound wave.
Counter-UAV: UAF continues to rely on kinetic interception (ManPADS/Anti-Aircraft guns) as the primary countermeasure to "machine vision" equipped Gerans.
Information environment / disinformation
Internal RF Narrative: Mil-bloggers (NgP Razvedka) are shifting focus toward "technological superiority" and internal initiative to bolster morale while the Miami talks proceed in the background.
Strategic Deception: The RF continues to use "constructive negotiation" narratives (Dmitriev) to induce a sense of strategic pause while maintaining high kinetic pressure on the ground and in the air (Dempster-Shafer Belief: 0.22 on Deception Operations).
Outlook (next 6-12h)
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): The Kherson UAV wave will converge with the Odesa-bound assets to attempt a coordinated strike on energy or port infrastructure. RF will continue to use the 58th Brigade POW footage to demoralize the Dnipropetrovsk defensive line.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): A synchronized "Kalibr" or "Iskander" strike on AD radar nodes in the South, timed precisely when AD magazines are depleted from engaging the Sumy/Kherson/Odesa UAV waves.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
TECHNICAL: Confirm if the "unique configuration" drones (NgP Razvedka, 23:14) are being deployed specifically in the Kherson sector to target mobile AD units.
GROUND: Urgent BDA or status update from the Mezheva-Ivanivka sector. Verify if the 22:44 activity was a reconnaissance-in-force or an established bridgehead.
SIGINT: Monitor RF aviation frequencies for Tu-95MS or Tu-22M3 activity that would indicate a transition from UAV saturation to a heavy missile phase.
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The battlefield geometry is currently dominated by an expanding aerial "arch" stretching from Sumy to Kherson. The ground situation is characterized by RF probes into the Dnipropetrovsk operational zone (Mezheva), occurring while weather (mud/Rasputitsa) limits heavy maneuver in the Zaporizhzhia sector.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Threat Group: Tactical Drone Units (NgP Razvedka & others)
Intent: To field-test and deploy unjammable (optical/fiber-optic) loitering munitions at scale.
Adaptation: Shift from standardized factory models to "tuned" field variants suggests a rapid OODA loop (Observe-Orient-Decide-Act) at the tactical level.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Southern Posture: UAF forces in Kherson and Odesa are now under simultaneous pressure. The ability to rapidly shift mobile fire groups between these two hubs is the critical vulnerability.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Cognitive Domain: The RF is successfully managing a "dual-track" narrative: high-level diplomacy in Miami for Western consumption, and "relentless technical innovation/victory" for the domestic and military audience.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
MLCOA: Continued UAV sorties through 210600Z DEC 25. Expect the Kherson wave to target the rail/bridge infrastructure supporting the southern GLOC (Ground Lines of Communication).
MDCOA (Night Infiltration): RF utilizes the UAV saturation as noise to mask a dismounted "storm" assault in the Mezheva sector to seize a foothold in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast before dawn.
RECOMMENDATION: Command should prioritize the deployment of visual/acoustic sensor arrays in the Kherson sector to compensate for potential EW degradation against "tuned" RF drones.
