(13:42, STERNENKO, HIGH): Continued kinetic strikes on the Mayaki bridge (Dniester entrance); RF forces are persistently targeting this infrastructure for the second consecutive day to ensure the total severance of the M-15 GLOC.
(13:36, 13:39, Повітряні Сили/Николаевский Ванёк, HIGH): Launch of Shahed-type UAVs and "foam" decoys from the Black Sea towards Odesa.
(13:45, Дневник Десантника, LOW): Reports of localized RF offensive successes in the "Dobropillian salient" (UNCONFIRMED; potential expansion of the Pokrovsk axis).
(14:00, Воин DV, MEDIUM): Successful RF drone strike on a UAF strongpoint in the Ternovatye area (Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk border).
(13:44, 13:47, Операция Z/Colonelcassad, HIGH): Putin concludes "Direct Line" with a conditional threat/offer: RF may pause deep strikes during Ukrainian elections but warns that using elections to "stop the RF army" is the "wrong choice."
(13:45, ЦАПЛІЄНКО, HIGH): Recovery of a downed Orlan-10 UAV in Turkey; cited as likely Russian origin by Turkish media (Yeni Şafak).
IPB ANALYSIS SUMMARY
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW
The operational tempo remains high in the Southern Sector (Odesa/Mykolaiv), with RF forces transitioning from isolated strikes to a sustained interdiction campaign against the Dniester Estuary crossings. In the Eastern Sector, RF is attempting to exploit localized salients (Dobropillya) while maintaining pressure on Pokrovsk. The informational domain is currently dominated by the conclusion of Putin’s 4.5-hour "Direct Line," which established a clear coercive framework linking kinetic strikes to Ukrainian internal political processes.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS
Tactical Maneuver & Strikes:
Odesa Interdiction: The repeat strike on the Mayaki bridge (STERNENKO, 13:42) confirms an operational intent to deny UAF the use of the M-15 highway permanently. The use of "foam" decoys (Vanyok, 13:36) alongside Shahed UAVs is intended to saturate and deplete Air Defense (AD) interceptors protecting the Odesa port infrastructure.
Dobropillian Salient: RF claims of success in this sector (Dnevnik Desantnika, 13:45) suggest a widening of the offensive front north of the Vuhledar-Kurakhove axis, likely aiming to bypass the main Pokrovsk defensive belt.
ISR Activity: A Russian reconnaissance UAV was detected over Mykolaiv (Air Force, 13:41), likely performing Battle Damage Assessment (BDA) for previous ballistic strikes or spotting for upcoming sorties.
Command & Strategy:
Hybrid Blackmail: Putin's closing remarks (13:44, 13:47) indicate a shift toward "election-based coercion." By offering a localized ceasefire in exchange for political concessions (elections and inclusion of RF-controlled voters), the Kremlin is attempting to manufacture a domestic crisis within Ukraine.
Force Sustainment: In the RF domestic rear, the Duma is moving to double overtime limits (from 120 to 240 hours) (TASS, 13:59), indicating a transition to a more aggressive war-footing in the industrial sector to sustain current attrition rates.
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)
Defensive Posture: UAF AD is actively engaged in the Odesa/Black Sea corridor against a multi-vector UAV/decoy attack (Air Force, 13:39).
Tactical Setbacks: Video evidence confirms heavy damage to residential/defensive interiors in Pokrovsk (Shef Hayabusa, 13:44), consistent with intensified RF artillery/KAB pressure.
Logistical Constraints: The continued strikes on the Mayaki bridge represent a significant threat to the sustainment of the Bessarabia region. Alternative routes via Moldova are likely seeing immediate congestion.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT
Strategic IO: Putin's "Direct Line" ended with a focus on paternalistic stability (housing, utility prices) for the RF domestic audience, while projecting a "ready to negotiate" but "victorious" image to the West.
International Complications: The downing of an Orlan-10 in Turkey (13:45) introduces a potential diplomatic friction point between Ankara and Moscow, though it is currently assessed as a technical/navigational error by an RF asset rather than a deliberate provocation.
Financial Narrative: Bloomberg reports on the EU's "failure" to confiscate Russian assets are being amplified (Operativnyi ZSU, 13:55) to undermine Ukrainian confidence in Western long-term financial support.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS
Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will continue the "decoy + Shahed" saturation of Odesa to facilitate a follow-on missile strike on the Zatoka bridge, completing the isolation of the Odesa-Reni route. Ground forces will intensify pressure on the Dobropillian salient to force UAF to reallocate reserves from the Pokrovsk city center.
Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF utilizes the current UAV saturation to mask the deployment of sea-launched Kalibr or Crimean-based Iskanders against the Mykolaiv port/bridge infrastructure, effectively isolating the entire Southwestern coastal region from the central logistics hubs.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
(URGENT) Dobropillya Verification: Confirm the extent of RF advances in the Dobropillian salient. Are these tactical probes or a brigade-level shift in the axis of advance?
(TACTICAL) Foam Decoy Technical Specs: Determine if the "foam" decoys (13:36) possess any EW capabilities (RWR stimulation) or if they are purely passive radar reflectors.
(STRATEGIC) Turkey-RF Coordination: Monitor diplomatic channels for Turkey's response to the Orlan-10 downing. Does this affect Black Sea maritime security coordination?
(LOGISTICAL) M-15 Bypass Capacity: Assess the throughput capacity of the Palanca (Moldova) bypass route for heavy military transport following the repeat strikes on the Mayaki bridge.
