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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-19 13:06:10Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-19 12:36:12Z)

Situation Update (2025-12-19 13:05 UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (12:53, ТАСС, MEDIUM): Putin claimed 700,000 RF personnel are currently deployed in the "SMO" zone, signaling a massive force concentration intended for long-term winter operations.
  • (12:22, РБК-Україна, HIGH): Poland confirmed readiness to exchange MiG-29 fighter jets for Ukrainian anti-drone systems, potentially augmenting UAF's tactical aviation capacity.
  • (12:27, ✙DeepState✙🇺🇦, HIGH): SBU claimed responsibility for a drone strike on a Russian shadow fleet tanker in the Mediterranean Sea, demonstrating UAF's expanded global reach for interdicting RF oil logistics.
  • (12:56, Операція Z, MEDIUM): RF forces conducted a Smerch MLRS strike on a UAF temporary deployment point (PVD) in Myrnohrad (Pokrovsk axis).
  • (12:43, АРХАНГЕЛ СПЕЦНАЗА, MEDIUM): Russian ZALA "Lancet" loitering munitions struck a UAF logistical supply object in Chernihiv Oblast.
  • (12:41, Alex Parker Returns, LOW): UNCONFIRMED: Reports suggest the Russian "Española" volunteer unit (famed for football hooligan recruits) has been disbanded following the death of its commander.
  • (12:58, Дневник Десантника, MEDIUM): Tactical escalation reported on the Konstantinovka axis, with increased RF pressure noted in forward sectors.

IPB ANALYSIS SUMMARY

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The operational environment is currently defined by a high-intensity Russian Information Operation (the "Direct Line" event) used to project force and establish non-negotiable strategic terms. Tactically, the RF has expanded kinetic pressure through long-range MLRS strikes on the Pokrovsk/Myrnohrad rear and loitering munition strikes in Chernihiv. Environmentally, traffic disruptions in central Moscow (13:00, Новости Москвы) and the transition of RF leadership to "digital sovereignty" via the "MAX" messenger (12:38, ТАСС) suggest a tightening of internal security and a pivot toward total war footing.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

Force Disposition & Capabilities:

  • Massed Personnel: The claim of 700,000 troops (12:53) represents a significant increase from previous 2024 estimates. If accurate, this indicates the RF has the mass to sustain current high-attrition rates across multiple axes simultaneously.
  • Tactical Maneuver: RF is utilizing Smerch MLRS for deep-tactical strikes in Myrnohrad, likely attempting to disrupt UAF rotations and logistics behind the Pokrovsk defensive line.
  • Volunteer Unit Instability: The possible disbanding of the "Española" unit (12:41) suggests internal friction or command failures within irregular RF formations, though this remains UNCONFIRMED.

Strategic Intent:

  • Ceasefire Posturing: Putin telegraphed a "ready to stop immediately" stance (12:28) conditioned on security guarantees that essentially demand Ukrainian capitulation on territorial and NATO issues.
  • Infrastructure Fixation: RF continues to frame the seizure of Sloviansk as the only solution to the Donbas water crisis (12:37), confirming this remains a primary operational objective for the winter.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)

  • Air Domain: The potential Polish MiG-29 swap (12:22) provides a critical lifeline for UAF's aging fighter fleet, especially as Russia continues to target airfields and CAS assets.
  • Strategic Reach: The SBU strike in the Mediterranean (12:27) indicates that Ukraine has successfully exported its "maritime drone" doctrine to theaters far beyond the Black Sea, threatening Russia’s vital "shadow fleet" revenues.
  • Defense Posture: UAF continues to weather high-intensity strikes in Zaporizhzhia, with casualties rising to seven (12:46) following persistent bombardment. Air Force warnings for UAVs (12:34) suggest a continuous cycle of aerial fixation by the RF.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

  • Russian Propaganda: The "Direct Line" is being used to humanize Putin (marriage proposals, working late) while simultaneously issuing hardline threats regarding Kaliningrad (12:48) and the shadow fleet (12:33).
  • Internal Dissent/Morale: The confirmed suicide of Russian soldier Alexei Kostrikin in a Belgorod SIZO (12:46, 12:53) highlights the severe psychological strain and criminal fallout within the RF veteran community, a narrative the Kremlin is struggling to suppress.
  • Hybrid Warfare: Putin's claim of "digital sovereignty" through the MAX messenger (12:38) suggests a move to mandate secure, state-controlled communication for all military and civilian officials, likely to mitigate Western SIGINT advantages.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

  • Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will intensify MLRS and missile strikes on Myrnohrad and Pokrovsk to capitalize on recent tactical pressure. In the Black Sea and Mediterranean, expect heightened RF naval activity or "accident" provocations against commercial shipping as "inevitable response" (per Putin) to the tanker strike.
  • Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): Utilizing the claimed 700k force, RF initiates a secondary offensive axis from Belarus or Sumy to overstretch UAF reserves while simultaneously using the "Oreshnik" system's deployment in Belarus as a nuclear-signaling shield to prevent Western intervention.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

  1. (CRITICAL): Force Verification. Corroborate the 700,000 personnel claim through satellite imagery of staging areas and mobilization data. Determine if this includes "soft" components (logistics/LDNR) or active combat units.
  2. (URGENT): "Española" Status. Verify the dissolution of this unit and identify where its remnants are being integrated (likely into Rosgvardia or the VDV).
  3. (TACTICAL): Myrnohrad BDA. Assess the damage from the Smerch strike on the UAF PVD to determine impact on Pokrovsk's defensive sustainability.
  4. (STRATEGIC): Mediterranean Drone Origin. Identify the launch platform or base of operations for the SBU tanker strike to assess future maritime threat envelopes.

//END OF REPORT//

Previous (2025-12-19 12:36:12Z)

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