Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 20:20Z

Key updates since last sitrep

• (20:04Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): Repeated launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KAB) confirmed targeting Donetsk Oblast and extending into eastern Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This marks a westward expansion of the aerial fixation campaign.
• (20:01Z, STERNENKO, HIGH): "Flying Skull" drone unit confirmed interdicting Russian Federation (RF) maneuver elements in the Pokrovsk direction. High-intensity FPV operations are actively blunting RF assault groups in this sector.
• (19:50Z, Butusov Plus/Suspilne, HIGH): NGU "Khartia" Commander reports significant Command and Control (C2) failures among RF forces in Kupyansk, citing a lack of situational awareness and false reporting by RF tactical commanders.
• (19:52Z, ASTRA, HIGH): Confirmed accidental release of an RF FAB-500 on a kindergarten in Belgorod. This indicates continued technical failures or pilot error within the VKS (Russian Aerospace Forces) during high-tempo KAB sorties.
• (20:03Z, Operativno ZSU, HIGH): Combined operations between "Baba Yaga" heavy drone units and the UAF Marine Corps (KMP) successfully struck RF temporary deployment points (PVDs).
• (19:45Z, Tsaplienko, HIGH): President Zelenskyy arrived in Poland for a meeting with Nawrocki, likely focusing on immediate logistical support or security guarantees following the "Oreshnik" escalation.
• (20:00Z, Voin DV, MEDIUM): Pro-Russian sources dispute the current frontline geometry near Huliaipole, suggesting active contesting of terrain previously assessed as stable.

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

The operational tempo has intensified across three primary axes: Kupyansk, Pokrovsk, and the Southern border of Dnipropetrovsk. The expansion of KAB strikes into eastern Dnipropetrovsk (20:04Z) suggests the RF is attempting to isolate the southern Donetsk frontline from its primary logistical hubs. While the Herasymivka bridgehead remains the most critical threat (per the 15:00Z daily report), RF is using high-volume drone and air pressure in Pokrovsk to fix UAF reserves.

Weather conditions remain favorable for the anticipated night-time armored breakout, though technical failures (Belgorod incident) suggest the RF air wing is operating near its limit.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

Capabilities and Intentions:

• C2 Degradation (MEDIUM): Reports from the Kupyansk sector (19:50Z) indicate a breakdown in RF tactical reporting. This suggests that while RF is capable of localized assaults, their ability to coordinate multi-unit maneuvers in the Northeast is currently compromised.
• Aerial Pressure (HIGH): The transition of KAB strikes to include Dnipropetrovsk (20:04Z) indicates an intent to strike deeper into the UAF "rear-of-front" area, likely targeting assembly areas for the UAF operational reserve.
• Logistical Fragility (MEDIUM): Continued fundraising by pro-RF groups like "Dva Majora" for basic vehicle protection (19:50Z) highlights a persistent gap in the RF's ability to provide factory-standard survivability kits to frontline units.

Recent Adaptations:

• Increased reliance on "temporary deployment points" (PVDs) which are increasingly vulnerable to UAF night-operable heavy drones ("Baba Yaga").

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

Posture and Readiness:

• NGU "Khartia" (Kupyansk): Demonstrating high combat effectiveness and superior situational awareness compared to opposing RF units.
• Drone Maneuver Units: "Flying Skull" and "Baba Yaga" units are serving as the primary kinetic inhibitors to RF armor and infantry consolidation in the Pokrovsk and Southern sectors.
• Strategic Movement: Zelenskyy’s trip to Poland (19:45Z) confirms that UAF is prioritizing the strengthening of the western logistical pipeline in response to the Belarusian strategic missile threat.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

Propaganda and Disinformation:

• US Policy Framing (MEDIUM): Both Ukrainian and RF channels are heavily amplifying Donald Trump’s comments regarding a "fast peace" (19:39Z, 19:58Z). RF sources are specifically emphasizing the claim that "Russia is taking too much land" to demoralize Ukrainian defenders and suggest the inevitability of territorial loss.
• Internal RF Instability: Reports of cell tower sabotage in Altai Krai (19:44Z) and the Belgorod "friendly fire" incident (19:52Z) provide opportunities for UAF psychological operations to highlight RF internal fragility.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

Most Likely Course of Action (MLCOA): RF will maintain KAB pressure on Dnipropetrovsk through the night to prevent UAF reserve movement. Under this cover, the 5th Tank Brigade will initiate its primary breach attempt at the Herasymivka bridgehead before 0400Z.

Most Dangerous Course of Action (MDCOA): RF exploits the reported C2 confusion in Kupyansk as a "feint," suddenly committing fresh reserves to the Pokrovsk axis to achieve an operational breakthrough while UAF is distracted by the Southern armored thrust and the strategic signaling in Belarus.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS & COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Actionable Recommendations:

1. J3 (Ops): Pre-delegate strike authority to "Baba Yaga" units for any detected RF concentration in the Dnipropetrovsk border region to counteract the fixation effect of KAB strikes.
2. J2 (Intel): Cross-reference Trump’s rhetoric with RF movement patterns to see if RF "land grab" activity spikes following specific political statements.
3. Air Defense: Prioritize mobile AD assets to the Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk border to intercept KAB carriers before they reach the release point.

//END OF REPORT//