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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-18 04:36:33Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-18 04:06:28Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-18 04:36Z

This report details the operational environment following the immediate commencement of the anticipated Russian Federation (RF) retaliatory strike wave against Southern Ukrainian infrastructure and population centers, coinciding with continued air alerts and the persistent, unfulfilled threat of heavy armor commitment at Herasymivka.

Key updates since last sitrep

  • (04:13Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU, HIGH): RF Retaliation Commences (Mykolaiv). RF missile/UAV strikes successfully targeted energy infrastructure in Voznesenskyi and Mykolaivskyi districts (Mykolaiv Oblast), causing confirmed power outages and disrupting local logistics stability.
  • (04:20Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU, HIGH): UAV Casualties in Odesa. UAV strikes in Odesa district resulted in 7 confirmed civilian casualties, confirming RF targeting of rear area population centers.
  • (04:26Z, UAF AF; 04:31Z, UAF AF, HIGH): Zaporizhzhia KAB Campaign Resumes. Following a brief lull, the air alert was re-activated (04:17Z) due to renewed, confirmed launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast.
  • (04:20Z, TASS; 04:26Z, AV БогомаZ, MEDIUM): High-Volume UAF Deep Strike Confirmed by RF Claims. RF sources claim intercepting 47 Ukrainian UAVs over Russia and annexed Crimea overnight, including 31 over Bryansk Oblast, partially confirming a significant UAF deep operation, though BDA remains unverified.
  • (04:35Z, Colonelcassad, LOW): RF Tactical Strike Claim (Unconfirmed). RF milblogger claims successful FPV drone strikes against Ukrainian communication nodes and NRTK (unspecified autonomous vehicle) in Nikolaipolye and Rayskoye.

Operational picture (by sector)

The immediate threat environment is characterized by high RF aerial activity across the Southern Operational Area, confirming the shift to a focused punitive strike campaign.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Dnipropetrovsk/Zaporizhzhia/Mykolaiv/Odesa)

  • Air Domain (CRITICAL): RF is utilizing KABs to fix UAF attention and AD assets in Zaporizhzhia while simultaneously using UAVs to degrade critical infrastructure and cause casualties in Mykolaiv and Odesa Oblasts. This sustained aerial pressure aims to prevent UAF C2 from stabilizing following the Rostov/Bataysk deep strikes.
  • Infrastructure Degradation: Confirmed power outages in Mykolaiv Oblast exacerbate the logistical issues created by the previous strike on Artsyz, putting increasing strain on the Southern Ground Lines of Communication (GLOC).
  • Herasymivka Bridgehead (Unchanged): No confirmed reports of heavy armor crossing the Gaychur River (PIR 74). The aerial campaign is assessed as likely cover for ongoing RF preparation to commit mechanized forces.

RF DEEP REAR (Strategic Interdiction)

  • The UAF deep strike campaign continues to generate high-volume intercepts, based on RF claims (47+ UAVs). This underscores the sustained effort to interdict RF logistics and strategic assets beyond the frontline, forcing the deployment of tactical AD systems away from the front.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Ground Maneuver (Herasymivka): The threat remains CRITICAL. The RF Vostok Group's delay in committing heavy armor is approaching the analyst-estimated breakpoint (NLT 0700Z). The current intense aerial activity provides ideal cover for logistical finalization (e.g., pontoon positioning, armored staging) necessary for the armored breakout.

2. Retaliatory Strike Coordination (HIGH Confidence): The strikes demonstrate a coordinated campaign aimed at: a. Degrading Energy Resilience: Targeting Mykolaiv energy nodes to disrupt rail traffic/industry. b. Psychological Fixation: Utilizing KABs against Zaporizhzhia to generate mass fear and fix UAF AD resources. c. Information Control: RF media continues to amplify the claimed success of their air defense (47 UAVs), minimizing the impact of the UAF deep strikes.

3. FPV Capabilities: The unconfirmed RF claim of using FPVs against UAF communications (Nikolaipolye/Rayskoye) suggests continued high tactical-level RF ISR and interdiction efforts near the main advance axis. This must be monitored for localized degradation of UAF forward communication capabilities.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF forces are primarily engaged in intense air defense operations across the Southern axis. Resources must be dynamically managed to ensure protection of key C2 nodes and reserve staging areas while prioritizing the continued surveillance and interdiction of RF activity at the Herasymivka bridgehead (PIR 74). The confirmed receipt of the UK AD package is highly timely given the current threat environment.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment is being actively manipulated by RF sources to project Western vulnerability and minimize RF losses:

  • Strategic Distraction: TASS highlights EU disputes over using RF assets for Ukrainian aid (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.149175), aiming to sow doubt about unified Western support.
  • Domestic Normalization: Focus on routine domestic political announcements (e.g., financial regulation, flu peaks) serves to maintain a facade of normalcy and stability in the RF rear, despite the successful UAF deep strikes.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

The primary decision point hinges on the timing of the RF commitment of heavy armor at Herasymivka relative to the ongoing air strike wave.

MLCOA (RF): Heavy Armor Preceded by Sustained Air Fixation (HIGH Confidence). RF forces will maintain the current tempo of KAB/UAV strikes until approximately 0700Z. This sustained pressure will be used to mask the movement and deployment of heavy armor (MBTs/IFVs) across the Gaychur River bridgehead. The breakout attempt is most likely to occur between 0700Z and 0830Z.

MDCOA (RF): Targeted AD Suppression & Decapitation Strike. RF utilizes precision long-range missiles (Kalibr/Iskander) in the next 3 hours (NLT 0730Z) to target confirmed UAF AD batteries or regional C2 nodes (e.g., near Dnipro/Zaporizhzhia) which are currently strained by the KAB/UAV defense effort. Successful AD suppression would create a high-risk environment for UAF counter-mobility operations at Herasymivka.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The immediate operational tempo necessitates increased focus on BDA for the ongoing air strikes and relentless pursuit of PIR 74.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Target Area / DTG
PIR 74 (CRITICAL)Visual confirmation of heavy armor (MBTs/IFVs) crossing the Gaychur River into the Herasymivka bridgehead. (KEY DECISION POINT)CR: ISR/FMV. Persistent drone surveillance of known crossing points.Herasymivka / IMMEDIATE (NLT 0700Z)
PIR 112 (CRITICAL - Retaliation BDA)Precise BDA on the Mykolaiv Oblast energy strikes and Odesa UAV targets. Determine asset type (missile vs. UAV) and primary target function.CR: IMINT/HUMINT. Local assessment of impact sites and debris analysis.Mykolaiv/Odesa strike sites / NLT 0900Z
PIR 114 (URGENT - KAB Source)Determine the launch platforms and base airfields responsible for the sustained KAB attacks on Zaporizhzhia.CR: ELINT/SIGINT. Track aircraft takeoffs/landings and associated radar signatures.Southern RF/Occupied Airfields / IMMEDIATE
PIR 111 (PRIORITY - Bataysk BDA)Precise BDA for the specific military target (C2, AD site, airfield element) struck in Bataysk.CR: COMINT/IMINT/OSINT. Analyze commercial/satellite imagery, local reports, and debris analysis.Bataysk / NLT 0900Z
Previous (2025-12-18 04:06:28Z)

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