Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

Key updates since last sitrep

• 14:40Z, UAF Air Force: Enemy UAV activity (likely Shahed variants) detected approaching Zatoka and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi from the Black Sea direction, confirming sustained RF focus on deep logistics interdiction in Odesa Oblast following yesterday's bridge strike. (HIGH Confidence)
• 14:59Z, BUTUSOV PLUS: UAF 24th Mechanized Brigade reported successfully destroying an RF assault group composed of dozens of infantry near Chasiv Yar. This indicates localized defensive effectiveness. (MEDIUM Confidence, UAF claim)
• 14:40Z, Tsapliyenko: United Kingdom announced the delivery of a significant Air Defense (AD) package to Ukraine. Germany also committed to delivering Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in 2026, confirming long-term commitment to UAF air superiority efforts. (HIGH Confidence)
• 14:47Z, Operatyvnyi ZSU: Captured RF serviceman claims preferential treatment for North Korean military personnel operating alongside RF forces on the Sumy axis. This claim is UNCONFIRMED, but suggests potential changes in RF hybrid force composition. (LOW Confidence, Propaganda risk)
• 14:54Z, Sever.Realii: RF authorities designated the German media company Deutsche Welle as an "undesirable" organization, marking an escalation in RF information control and censorship measures. (HIGH Confidence)

Operational picture (by sector)

The primary kinetic threat observed during this reporting period is centered on logistics and critical infrastructure defense in the South-West, while the status of key ground maneuver areas (Peschanoye and Siversk) remains unverified, reflecting critical intelligence gaps.

SOUTHERN AXIS (Odesa / Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi):

• RF kinetic activity has resumed targeting logistical hubs on the Odesa coast. UAVs were detected targeting both Zatoka and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi (14:40Z, 14:47Z), confirming the RF main effort to sever coastal supply routes remains active following the confirmed strike on the Zatoka Bridge yesterday. AD assets are advised to maintain maximum alert status for cruise missile and UAV saturation tactics.

EASTERN AXIS (Donetsk):

• Chasiv Yar: UAF elements (24th Mech BDE) report a successful counter-engagement, resulting in the destruction of an RF infantry assault group. This indicates UAF continues to hold the immediate defensive perimeter despite sustained pressure. (MEDIUM Confidence)
• NOTE: No new information regarding the status of Siversk (previously reported as "rapidly deteriorating") or the urban combat in Pokrovsk.

DNIPROPETROVSK AXIS:

• NOTE: No new information on the depth or stability of the RF bridgehead seized at Peschanoye across the Gaychur River. This highly critical breach point remains a top priority intelligence gap, as it threatens the operational rear of the Zaporizhzhia/Donetsk grouping.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Kinetic Threat (Logistics Interdiction): RF forces are executing the anticipated second wave of attack against the Odesa Oblast logistics network, utilizing UAVs against targets near the Zatoka and Bilhorod-Dnistrovskyi area. This confirms the previously assessed MLCOA of coordinated strangulation.

2. Ground Force Composition (UNCONFIRMED): A POW statement suggested that Russian forces operating on the Sumy axis may include integrated North Korean personnel, who are allegedly receiving preferential treatment. If this holds true, it represents a significant, previously unconfirmed Hybrid Force integration, complicating Rules of Engagement (ROE) and OOB analysis in the Northern Operational Zone. (LOW Confidence, High Impact if confirmed)

3. Strategic Infrastructure: RF state media confirmed large-scale repair efforts (130 personnel) at the Baikonur Cosmodrome Launch Pad 31 following a malfunction of a Soyuz-2.1a rocket. While not an immediate military threat, this suggests recurring technical issues affecting RF high-value strategic space assets and launch cadence.

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Combat Success: UAF 24th Mech BDE successfully degraded an RF assault force near Chasiv Yar.
• Logistical Strain: The Ukrainian Hryvnia (UAH) reached a historic low against the Euro (€), indicating continued economic pressure impacting national stability and defense funding capacity.
• Personnel Transfer: UAF conducted a transfer of 15 individuals to Russia, likely part of an ongoing PoW exchange protocol.

Information environment / disinformation

The Information Environment is characterized by concurrent streams of positive Western aid announcements and intense RF disinformation campaigns coupled with increasing domestic censorship.

• Support & Aid: UK confirmed a large AD package. Germany committed long-term (2026) to providing Sidewinder air-to-air missiles. This counters RF IO narratives regarding the failure of Western support. Furthermore, EU is pressing Belgium regarding the release of frozen RF assets for Ukrainian funding, indicating progress on long-term reparations/funding mechanisms.
• Disinformation/IO: RF MoD published propaganda utilizing a captured UAF serviceman to promote narratives of mass UAF desertion (HIGH Confidence that the effort exists, LOW Confidence in the claim). Pro-Russian media amplified reports of Polish presidential criticism of Zelensky to drive a wedge in the Warsaw-Kyiv relationship.
• Censorship: RF declared Deutsche Welle "undesirable." This tactical move increases state control over information streams and reduces the cognitive space for external narratives among the Russian populace.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Exploitation of Gaps and Interdiction): (HIGH Confidence) RF will continue to exploit the lack of definitive UAF information regarding the stability of the Siversk and Peschanoye axes. The immediate operational priority for RF will be to maintain kinetic pressure on the Odesa region GLOCs using UAVs and potentially cruise missiles to ensure the crippling effect of the previous bridge strike is maximized.

MDCOA (Breakthrough Confirmation): (MEDIUM Confidence) If ISR assets confirm significant RF heavy armor or reserve forces have been committed to either the Peschanoye bridgehead or the Siversk sector, this would validate the previous assessment of a synchronized operational pincer movement intended to fix or encircle UAF forces in the Donetsk operational area. The next 6-12 hours are critical for determining the true depth of the Peschanoye breach.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The absence of new tactical updates on the core operational threats from the previous report means the priority intelligence requirements (PIRs) remain largely unmet.