Archived operational intelligence briefing
DTG: 2025-12-16T06:05Z PRIORITY: CRITICAL – RF forces are sustaining kinetic pressure in the South (Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk) as a shaping operation preceding the anticipated massed artillery engagement in the Eastern Axis. The primary threat remains the impending 260th GRAU synchronization.
The operational picture remains dominated by the RF attrition strategy, using localized breakthroughs (Peschanoye) and interdiction (Zaporizhzhia strike) to distract from the strategic artillery preparations in the East.
| Sector | Current Status & Geometry | Key Threat/Activity | Analyst Judgment (Confidence) |
|---|---|---|---|
| Zaporizhzhia/Dnipropetrovsk | Containment of the Peschanoye breach ongoing. Kinetic strikes are targeting the Zaporizhzhia district (06:02Z) in addition to Nikopol (05:30Z sitrep). | Sustained RF missile/bomb/UAV strikes are aimed at disrupting UAF C2 or logistics lines running south/east to supply the Pokrovsk axis. | RF aims to pin Southern reserves (HIGH) |
| Eastern Axis (Siversk/Pokrovsk) | Deterioration continues (Unchanged baseline). Focus remains on preparing for the 260th GRAU synchronization event. No new kinetic reporting in this timeframe. | Imminent risk of massed artillery engagement. The failure of Siversk containment remains the MDCOA trigger. | RF readiness for massive fires phase is confirmed. (HIGH) |
| RF Deep Rear / Strategic | UAF deep strike attempts continue to target high-value RF strategic assets (Naval/Logistics). | RF BSF posture remains passive; however, its AD effectiveness near Novorossiysk appears functional against the most recent attempt. | UAF deep strike capability is sustained (HIGH) |
Kinetic Operations (Zaporizhzhia/South): The missile/high-speed target strike on the Zaporizhzhia district (06:02Z) confirms the continuation of the RF shaping operation. This operation, along with the Nikopol shelling reported previously, suggests RF intent to: 1) Test UAF AD response in the region; 2) Degrade UAF supply routes feeding the Eastern Axis from the rear; or 3) Interdict UAF command/staging areas required for counter-attacking the Peschanoye breach.
Logistical/Personnel Adaptation: The shift of RF assault personnel to specialized UAV operator roles (06:03Z) indicates that RF doctrine is formally adapting to the demands of multi-domain warfare, prioritizing human capital with direct combat experience for specialized high-tech roles. This will likely improve the quality and tactical coordination of future RF UAV strikes.
Naval Posture: RF Black Sea Fleet (BSF) operational readiness remains low, characterized by passive defense within anchorages (Novorossiysk). The continued UAF attempts on Novorossiysk suggest UAF intelligence has identified exploitable vulnerabilities in base defense.
Threat Assessment Conclusion: The immediate tactical threat has momentarily shifted back to the Southern Axis with the Zaporizhzhia strike, likely fixing UAF attention away from the looming strategic threat in the East. RF operational intent remains consistent: use attrition and logistical interdiction (South) to enable a critical breakthrough (East) facilitated by the 260th GRAU firepower.
Strategic Communication and Morale: UAF components (DShV) continue highly effective Information Operations (IO) targeting RF morale, broadcasting confirmed demoralization transcripts ("everything is in corpses," 05:59Z). This supports attrition efforts in the cognitive domain.
Diplomatic Engagement: UAF continues to press the diplomatic offensive, seeking assurance and preparation for post-conflict security (Starmer comments) and financial support (asset confiscation debate).
US-EU Asset Disagreement: The commentary from PM Tusk (06:01Z) highlights a strategic dissonance between the US and EU regarding the use of frozen RF assets. This divergence could be exploited by RF IO to sow distrust or delay critical funding mechanisms for Ukraine. Analyst Judgment: This is a key indicator of underlying pressure points in the Western coalition strategy.
RF Internal Security Narrative: The FSB detention of a minor in Mariupol (05:51Z) is a clear instance of RF internal security IO, aimed at demonstrating control over occupied territories and justifying harsh repression against suspected Ukrainian partisans or sympathizers.
MLCOA (Shaping Fire and Containment): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF forces will continue localized kinetic pressure using high-speed assets and artillery against Zaporizhzhia District and Nikopol to fix UAF operational reserves. This is a deliberate attempt to distract from final preparations for the 260th GRAU synchronization. Tactical ground attacks may accompany localized heavy preparatory fire near Siversk/Pokrovsk.
MDCOA (Pre-Emptive Breakthrough Attempt): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF command, concerned about the exposure of the 260th GRAU assets during synchronization, attempts a limited, high-tempo ground breakthrough at Siversk before the full artillery barrage is prepared, aiming to collapse the northern defensive shoulder while UAF is fixed in the South.
The RF strategic intent (GRAU destination) remains the highest priority gap. A new requirement is added to locate the source of the recent high-speed kinetic strike in Zaporizhzhia.
| Priority | Gap/Requirement | Rationale | Status |
|---|---|---|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | 260th GRAU Destination. | Confirm the rail outflow vector (South vs. East) to predict the main RF operational effort over the next 72 hours. This remains the primary indicator of RF strategic intent. | UNCHANGED |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Siversk Disposition. | Urgent clarity is needed on the specific composition and intent of RF assault forces driving the "rapid deterioration" to inform defensive strategy and reserve allocation. | UNCHANGED |
| P3 (URGENT) | Zaporizhzhia Strike Origin (New P3). | Identify the launching platform/source unit for the high-speed target/missile strike in the Zaporizhzhia District (06:02Z) to enable immediate SEAD/CBF response and counter-targeting. | UPDATED (Now covers Zaporizhzhia/Nikopol fire) |
| P4 (PRIORITY) | RF UAV Adaptation Impact. | Assess the real-world combat performance impact of the newly deployed specialized UAV operators (transferred assault personnel) on RF targeting accuracy and C2 effectiveness in the Southern theater. | NEW (Based on IO/Doctrine update) |
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