Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-14T18:45Z

Key updates since last sitrep

• (18:26Z, STERNENKO, HIGH): UAF FPV unit "Flying Skull" confirmed high-attrition kinetic engagements against RF forces in the Pokrovsk Direction, utilizing FPV and optical drones.
• (18:32Z, WarGonzo, MEDIUM): RF forces reported utilizing BM-27 Uragan MLRS in the Krasnoarmeysky Direction (Pokrovsk sector near Dimitrov), indicating high-intensity saturation fire is already being deployed, possibly pre-positioning for the anticipated 260th GRAU surge.
• (18:26Z, БУТУСОВ ПЛЮС, MEDIUM): UNCONFIRMED reports from an alleged captured RF 27th Motor Rifle Brigade serviceman detailing a catastrophic defeat near Kupyansk, citing near-total destruction of the company largely due to UAF drone attacks.
• (18:31Z, Оперативний ЗСУ, HIGH): The Latvian Saeima approved the reallocation of €5 million from the state budget specifically for the procurement of drones for Ukraine, directly addressing a critical UAF capability requirement.
• (18:15Z, Рыбарь / 18:20Z, Colonelcassad, HIGH): RF information sources are actively engaged in narrative shaping regarding the UAF SEAD successes in Crimea and the Zelenskyy-US meetings in Berlin, attempting to mitigate negative impacts on domestic morale.

Operational picture (by sector)

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: HIGH (Rising)

1. Maneuver / Attrition: RF is maintaining high attrition rates in the Pokrovsk sector, using heavy MLRS fire to suppress UAF defenses ahead of anticipated ground operations. The heavy losses attributed to the 27th Motor Rifle Brigade near Kupyansk, if verified, confirm a vulnerability to UAF drone interdiction, especially against poorly supported RF assault forces.
2. Logistics / Sustainment: The previous critical assessment regarding the 260th GRAU arsenal surge remains the paramount kinetic threat. The observed RF MLRS activity near Pokrovsk supports the analytical judgment that RF is actively pre-positioning assets and fires in preparation for this surge, estimated arrival within 24-48 hours.
3. Counter-UAF SEAD Operations: RF messaging discussing the "fight against enemy AD" (Рыбарь, 18:15Z) indicates two things: (1) internal acknowledgment of the recent UAF deep-strike success in Crimea, and (2) a likely preparation of the information space for an aggressive retaliatory kinetic effort, consistent with the projected MLCOA (Retaliatory Saturation).

Friendly activity (UAF)

• Tactical Successes: UAF FPV teams are achieving significant local success, evidenced by the combat footage (Pokrovsk) and the alleged RF testimony (Kupyansk). This validates the UAF doctrine of distributed ISR and kinetic precision fire via drones.
• Strategic Sustainment: Latvia’s commitment of €5 million for drone procurement (Оперативний ЗСУ, 18:31Z) is a direct, timely injection of strategic support into a high-priority UAF capability area. (Confidence: HIGH)
• IO/Morale: UAF operations (Оперативний ЗСУ, 18:17Z) continue to use captured personnel for targeted information warfare aimed at degrading RF troop morale. The MURAMASA Group's public support for a key volunteer (MURAMASA, 10:37Z) reinforces UAF civil-military cohesion.

Information environment / disinformation

• RF Framing of Diplomatic Meetings: Pro-Russian sources are actively generating narratives around the Zelenskyy-US meeting in Berlin, focusing on visual cues ("amusing picture" behind the Ukrainian delegation) to push themes of disagreement, external control, or lack of significant progress (Colonelcassad, 18:20Z).
  • Analytic Judgment: This is an attempt to preemptively dilute the impact of any potential security guarantees or aid announcements resulting from the Berlin talks, reinforcing the prior assessment of diplomatic coercion IO (Dempster-Shafer belief: 0.046).
• External Support Focus: Russian IO is also attempting to portray the EU as politically weak or struggling to prove relevance (Операция Z, 18:20Z), likely in anticipation of further EU support decisions.
• Supply Chain Friction: Reports on the EU increasing scrutiny on Chinese e-commerce platforms (РБК-Україна, 18:18Z), while not overtly military, points to increased global friction that could indirectly affect the COTS components crucial for both UAF and RF drone production.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (Most Likely Course of Action): Pre-Surge Consolidation & Retaliation RF forces will likely continue intense saturation shelling, primarily with MLRS (observed near Dimitrov) and high-caliber artillery in the Eastern Axis, focusing on shaping the battlefield for the incoming 260th GRAU munitions surge (within the next 24 hours). Concurrently, expect a retaliatory complex air attack (utilizing KABs and the new 100kg Shahed variant) aimed at high-value rear area assets, capitalizing on the temporary IADS gap created by the UAF SEAD strikes (Prior Daily Report, MLCOA).

MDCOA (Most Dangerous Course of Action): IADS Repair and Deep Strike RF prioritizes the rapid repair or replacement of the destroyed S-400 and Kasta-2E2 radar nodes in Crimea, quickly negating the UAF deep strike advantage. Coupled with the anticipated artillery surge, RF attempts deep-strike interdiction of the Donetsk-Dnipro GLOCs using the new Shahed variant, aiming to isolate the frontline forces receiving support (e.g., 7 KShDV).

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements