Archived operational intelligence briefing
DTG: 2025-12-14T17:10Z
| Sector | Summary of Activity | UAF Activity/Posture | RF Activity/Posture |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eastern Axis (Pokrovsk/Donetsk) | Localized, high-intensity ground action continues, despite the anticipated artillery pause. | 31 OMBR secured a tactical gain by clearing an RF strongpoint. The city of Kostiantynivka remains under heavy attrition fire damage (visual confirmation). | Sustained pressure, high volume of fire, and continued use of small-scale assaults. |
| Southern Axis (Zaporizhzhia/Kherson) | RF continues deep strikes into civilian centers. IO claims suggest local kinetic actions. | Successful Air Defense operations noted in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (16:58Z). Emergency response underway in Zaporizhzhia following the strike that injured 14. | RF MoD awarded BARS-37 detachment for operations near Orekhov. RF claims UAF depot hit near Nikolske (UNCONFIRMED, LOW). RF claims clearing Varvarivka (UNCONFIRMED, LOW). |
| Northern Axis / Deep Rear | UAV activity registered near Kyiv, reflecting RF intent to stress multiple AD sectors simultaneously. | UAF AD forces tracking and engaging high-altitude threats. | Continued use of multi-vector UAV attacks intended to penetrate or saturate Kyiv defenses, likely targeting high-value infrastructure or command nodes. |
Kinetic Threat (CRITICAL): The observed UAV flight paths (Odesa, Kyiv, Dnipropetrovsk) align perfectly with the MLCOA predicted in the previous report (complex air attacks targeting rear areas). The confirmation of widespread scheduled power outages (Dec 15) proves the efficacy of recent RF strike packages (including the newly identified 100kg Shahed variant).
Ground Intentions: RF focus on rewarding units (BARS-37) near Orekhov (Zaporizhzhia) suggests continued, albeit slow, grinding operations in that sector. RF claims regarding the clearance of Varvarivka (17:04Z) remain UNCONFIRMED, but suggest the RF is attempting to exploit local weaknesses in the Eastern Zaporizhzhia direction.
Sustainment and Personnel: RF is escalating its internal recruitment efforts, offering high financial incentives and direct contracts from the MoD (17:01Z). This aggressive policy suggests that volunteer and mobilization streams are insufficient to meet current operational demands, particularly for assault units requiring direct contracts. This initiative indicates RF aims for sustained long-term force generation, not a temporary surge.
UAF continues to balance defensive resilience with localized offensive action (31 OMBR success). The key friendly activity is focused on damage control and energy stabilization following RF attacks. The necessity for Ukrenergo to enforce widespread power rationing is a direct result of successful RF kinetic strikes, placing significant strain on both civilian morale and industrial output capacity. UAF AD performance remains high, as evidenced by official reports of successful engagements in Dnipropetrovsk.
RF Information Objectives:
UAF Diplomatic Schedule: The confirmed meeting between President Zelenskyy and a representative of the Polish President's office on December 19 (16:43Z) indicates continued efforts to shore up crucial bilateral logistics and political relationships, potentially addressing recent border or economic tensions.
MLCOA (Continued Energy Degradation): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue focused UAV and missile attacks through the night, prioritizing energy distribution nodes (substations, transformers) and critical logistical hubs in the Central and Southern Oblasts (Dnipropetrovsk, Odesa). This objective is confirmed by the current widespread UAV activity and the resulting need for national power rationing. The aim is to increase the duration and severity of the Dec 15 outages.
MDCOA (Localized Penetration Attempt): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) RF ground forces, particularly in the Eastern Zaporizhzhia direction (e.g., Varvarivka/Orekhov), may attempt localized spoiling attacks or low-level ground assaults, utilizing recent equipment flows (if any have departed the 260th GRAU arsenal early) to test UAF defenses while AD assets are diverted by the ongoing deep strikes.
| Priority | Gap / Request | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | 260th GRAU Rail Destination Tracking. (P2 from previous report) Immediate confirmation of the direction (North/South) of rolling stock departing the arsenal. | Essential for 48-hour prediction of where the incoming artillery saturation fire will be concentrated (Pokrovsk vs. Kupyansk/Siversk). |
| P2 (URGENT) | Huliaipole/Varvarivka LOC Status. (P3 from previous report) Visual or SIGINT confirmation of whether RF claims of clearing Varvarivka are accurate and whether the LOC around Huliaipole is compromised. | RF IO is active here; requires validation of any tactical change in the Eastern Zaporizhzhia sector. |
| P3 (PRIORITY) | Zatoka Bridge / Naftogaz Damage Assessment. Independent BDA (Battle Damage Assessment) of the claimed strikes on the Zatoka Bridge and the Naftogaz facility. | To counter RF disinformation and accurately assess the operational impact on UAF GLOCs and energy resilience. |
| P4 (ROUTINE) | Technical Analysis of New Shahed Fuse/Guidance. (P1 from previous report) Continued forensic analysis of recovered wreckage. | Necessary to finalize adjustment of AD engagement protocols against the new 100kg variant. |
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