Situation Report

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 2025-12-14T08:10Z PRIORITY: CRITICAL (RF continues integrated deep strike campaign, now achieving geographical expansion of KAB utilization into Northern operational rear areas. Sustained pressure on Odesa GLOCs threatens operational continuity in the South.)

Key updates since last sitrep

• KAB Campaign Expansion (North): AFU Air Force confirms new launches of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) targeting Sumy Oblast (08:02:01, AFU AF, HIGH). This expands the geographic scope of the RF air superiority/glide bomb threat beyond the Eastern Operational Zone (Donetsk/Kharkiv boundary).
• KAB Campaign Sustained (East): AFU Air Force confirms continued KAB launches targeting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (07:50:48, AFU AF, HIGH). This confirms RF intent to prosecute the operational isolation of the Eastern front logistics.
• Renewed UAV Attack (South): RF has initiated a new wave of strike UAVs from the Black Sea, targeting coastal areas near Serhiivka, Zatoka, and Chornomorske (07:57:24, AFU AF, HIGH). This indicates the RF deep strike campaign in Odesa is continuous, attempting to capitalize on previous infrastructure damage.
• UAF Asymmetric Confirmation: Russian sources confirmed the UAF strike on the Kherson high-voltage power line (LĖP) resulted in a blackout affecting over 330,000 subscribers (07:56:51, Mash, HIGH). This validates UAF rear-area pressure effectiveness.
• Tactical Action (Sofiivka): RF-aligned forces claim destruction of UAF vehicles and infantry near Sofiivka via FPV drone strikes (08:02:43, DNR Mil, MEDIUM). This confirms ongoing, localized use of tactical drone swarms in the ground combat zone.

Operational picture (by sector)

Eastern Axis (Donetsk/Dnipropetrovsk Boundary)

The primary threat remains the KAB strike campaign targeting UAF operational logistics. The confirmed, sustained KAB strikes on Dnipropetrovsk (07:50Z) indicate RF is focusing resources on achieving the operational severance predicted in the MDCOA of the previous report. The high-confidence confirmation of KAB activity underscores the critical need for P1 BDA confirmation to quantify the logistical impact. Ground combat remains intense, characterized by localized FPV drone strikes (Sofiivka sector).

Northern Axis (Sumy/Kharkiv)

The confirmation of KAB strikes targeting Sumy Oblast (08:02Z) represents a significant geographical shift in the RF air threat envelope. This area has previously faced missile/UAV strikes but not routine KAB saturation, suggesting RF is attempting to fix UAF AD assets across a wider front or to interdict Northern GLOCs supporting the Eastern front from the West/North.

Southern Axis (Odesa/Black Sea Coast)

The overnight saturation attack has transitioned into continuous pressure. The new inbound UAV threat (07:57Z) indicates RF is maintaining persistent surveillance and targeting cycles against critical maritime and logistics infrastructure (Zatoka/Chornomorske). The paralysis of municipal electric transport remains a critical vulnerability.

TOT Kherson Oblast

UAF asymmetric strikes continue to degrade RF control and infrastructure in occupied territory. The verified success of the power line strike (07:56Z) diverts RF resources to repair and internal stability operations.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

1. Logistical Interdiction Strategy: (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF intent is confirmed to achieve operational paralysis by expanding the KAB threat geographically (Dnipropetrovsk and Sumy) and maintaining persistent kinetic pressure (UAVs) on key chokepoints (Odesa). This campaign attempts to saturate UAF AD capabilities across three operational zones simultaneously.

2. KAB Vector Assessment (CRITICAL THREAT): The operational expansion into Sumy Oblast (08:02Z) increases the operational friction for UAF logistics. UAF must rapidly adjust mobile AD allocation away from the Eastern front to protect vulnerable rear-area nodes in the North. If RF successfully leverages the air superiority provided by KABs to isolate the Eastern front, the risk of a high-intensity ground breakthrough increases significantly.

3. Command and Control (C2) / Sustainment: RF rear area C2 is under asymmetric pressure from UAF deep strikes (Kherson power grid). However, RF logistics remain robust enough to sustain high-volume KAB and UAV launch operations from multiple axes (North, East, South).

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF forces are demonstrating high situational awareness, issuing immediate public alerts regarding KAB and UAV launches (07:50Z, 07:57Z, 08:02Z). The 47th Mechanized Brigade is actively contributing to the information environment, promoting the necessity and success of AD efforts (08:03Z). The UAF asymmetric strike capabilities in Kherson continue to pressure RF stability operations.

Information environment / disinformation

The primary focus of RF IO is creating cognitive dissonance and undermining international support, particularly targeting the US-European relationship.

• Transatlantic Division: RF-affiliated channels are leveraging statements by European political figures (Merz, Fico) to promote the narrative that "the era of US dominance in Europe has ended" (07:42Z, 07:43Z), aiming to disrupt military aid certainty.
• Domestic Polarization: RF IO channels are amplifying marginal Ukrainian political voices (08:07Z) that advocate political purges or criticize the electoral status, seeking to increase internal political friction and instability in Ukraine (DS belief 0.044825).
• Counter-Narrative: UAF-aligned messaging is focusing on domestic resource mobilization (e.g., spending winter aid on military needs, 08:05Z), reinforcing national resolve.

Outlook (next 6-12h)

MLCOA (AD Saturation and Logistical Severance): (HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF will continue to launch KABs against the Dnipropetrovsk GLOC, aiming for high-impact BDA confirmation before NLT 1200Z. Simultaneously, persistent UAV waves will continue targeting Odesa's surviving power and rail infrastructure. RF ground forces will maintain pressure on Pokrovsk and localize FPV/loitering munition operations (Sofiivka) to fix UAF units awaiting resupply.

MDCOA (Northern Fix & Eastern Breakthrough): (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE, increased due to Sumy KAB confirmation) RF uses the KAB strikes into Sumy Oblast to force UAF AD assets to redeploy north. This creates a critical vulnerability in AD coverage over the Eastern GLOCs (Dnipropetrovsk), allowing RF tactical aviation to achieve decisive damage to a major rail hub or bridge structure, leading to the estimated 48-hour delay in heavy resupply for the Donetsk front. This severance allows RF ground forces to execute a synchronized breakthrough operation near Pokrovsk or Toretske.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The geographic expansion of the KAB campaign necessitates an immediate review of AD coverage maps and critical infrastructure protection priorities, especially in Sumy Oblast. The critical BDA gaps remain unmet.