Situation Update (UTC)
DTG: 2025-12-13T17:10Z
Key updates since last sitrep
- RF MoD C2/IO Consolidation (16:51Z, 17:02Z, Alex Parker/WarGonzo, HIGH): Russian Minister of Defence Andrei Belousov conducted a formal, publicized meeting with influential military correspondents (milbloggers). Reports indicate Belousov specifically addressed and implicitly criticized previous inaccurate military reports regarding Kupyansk, attributed to official sources (Konashenkov). This confirms an effort by the new MoD leadership to centralize and improve the credibility of the RF information space.
- Sustained Aerial Threat Confirmed (16:53Z, 17:02Z, UAF Air Force, HIGH): UAF AD detected two distinct groups of RF UAVs: one transiting Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (near Shakhtarske, moving west) and another group tracked over Chernihiv Oblast (moving south). This validates the previously assessed high-tempo, multi-vector kinetic threat.
- RF Specialized Force Recruitment (16:43Z, Военкор Котенок, MEDIUM): RF channels are openly advertising for UAV (Drone) Operators for the "BARS-Rubicon" military/paramilitary unit. This underscores the structural shift toward specialized, drone-centric assault formations and the sustained demand for FPV/recce operators.
- Widespread Energy Disruption (16:54Z, 17:01Z, РБК-Україна/Укренерго, HIGH): Ukrenergo confirmed that scheduled power outages (rolling blackouts) will be implemented across the majority of Ukrainian regions tomorrow. This confirms the systemic impact of the recent RF kinetic strikes on critical energy infrastructure.
- RF Denies Maritime Strike (17:04Z, Военкор Котенок, HIGH): RF propaganda channels are actively dismissing UAF reports of the UAV attack on the M/V VIVA commercial vessel, framing the incident as "Ukrainian complaints." This confirms the immediate application of denial and deflection IO strategy following kinetic escalation.
Operational picture (by sector)
Eastern Operational Command (Donetsk/Kharkiv Axis)
Status: Highly Contested / RF C2 Improvement Focus
The internal RF information dynamic (Belousov meeting, 16:51Z) indicates that the operational situation in the Kupyansk sector is highly contested, potentially contradicting previous RF official claims of control. This internal transparency, while potentially destabilizing for the RF information apparatus, could lead to more realistic RF force allocation in the near future. The previous UAF tactical success (Skelya 425) near Pokrovsk remains a critical data point that RF forces will attempt to negate using newly recruited specialized units (BARS-Rubicon).
Northern Operational Command (Kyiv/Chernihiv/Sumy)
Status: Elevated Aerial Threat
The detection of a group of UAVs moving South over Chernihiv Oblast (17:02Z) signals a renewed kinetic threat toward central or northern logistical hubs, potentially leveraging the recent strain on UAF AD resources documented in the previous kinetic wave.
Deep Rear / Infrastructure
The confirmation of nationwide rolling blackouts (16:54Z, 17:01Z) underscores the operational environment of severe energy scarcity. This materially affects military logistics, C2 infrastructure, industrial capacity, and civil resilience across the country, increasing vulnerability to follow-on RF kinetic and hybrid operations.
Enemy activity / threat assessment
Threat Assessment: CRITICAL – Infrastructure Degradation & Adaptive Force Structure
- Adaptive Force Structure (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The explicit recruitment drive for specialized BARS-Rubicon UAV operators (16:43Z) confirms the RF shift towards professionalizing and expanding Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) capabilities. This poses an immediate, highly adaptive tactical threat on the front line, especially in the suppression of UAF counter-battery and reconnaissance efforts.
- C2/IO Adjustments (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE): Defence Minister Belousov’s intervention in the milblogger information domain (16:51Z) is a strategic move to address internal friction and likely prepare the RF populace and forces for potentially less optimistic, but more accurate, official reporting. This suggests the RF leadership is preparing for a sustained, grinding campaign rather than seeking quick, propagandized victories.
- Sustained UAV Saturation (HIGH CONFIDENCE): The simultaneous tracking of UAVs in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts (16:53Z, 17:02Z) indicates RF forces are maintaining kinetic pressure across multiple operational fronts, utilizing drones for both reconnaissance (target acquisition for KAB/Missiles) and kinetic strike roles.
Friendly activity (UAF)
- Air Domain Awareness (HIGH CONFIDENCE): UAF Air Force provided timely and accurate detection and tracking of new UAV groups in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk (16:53Z, 17:02Z), demonstrating maintained domain awareness despite the high volume of kinetic activity.
- Infrastructure Resilience Challenge: While Ukrenergo’s communication regarding scheduled blackouts is transparent (16:54Z), the necessity of widespread rolling blackouts indicates UAF and civil defense efforts are now heavily constrained by power scarcity, impacting industrial output and repair timelines.
Information environment / disinformation
- RF IO Centralization and Credibility Push (HIGH CONFIDENCE): Belousov's meeting with milbloggers signals an attempt to co-opt and integrate the traditionally independent and sometimes critical military blogging community. The explicit correction regarding Kupyansk reporting attempts to improve official MoD credibility compared to the previous leadership (16:51Z).
- External IO: Anti-Western Narrative (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF channels are pushing narratives framing Western support as a policy of "War until the last Ukrainian" (16:47Z). This narrative is designed to erode international support and increase internal Ukrainian skepticism regarding the conflict's cost and purpose.
- Propaganda of Atrocity (LOW CONFIDENCE / HIGH INTENT): The TASS report detailing the death of a zoo lion wounded by a UAF drone (16:57Z) is a classic 'propaganda of atrocity' technique, designed to dehumanize UAF forces and appeal to emotional Western audiences by focusing on non-military targets.
Outlook (next 6-12h)
The immediate outlook suggests continued high-tempo aerial activity, exploiting the widespread electrical grid weakness confirmed by Ukrenergo. RF forces will likely attempt to use the UAV tracks in Dnipropetrovsk and Chernihiv to cue larger KAB or missile strikes targeting critical logistics nodes or C2 centers within the operational rear.
Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)
Coordinated Aerial Strike Targeting Logistics Nodes (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF will utilize the UAV paths identified in Dnipropetrovsk and Chernihiv to conduct follow-on kinetic strikes using KABs or Kalibr missiles within the next 6 hours, prioritizing railheads, fuel storage, or electrical transmission facilities that support the Eastern Axis defense, maximizing the operational impact of the existing power grid degradation.
Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)
Hybrid Destabilization Amplification (MEDIUM Confidence): RF hybrid assets, leveraging the severe power outages and resulting public stress, launch coordinated attacks against Territorial Recruitment Centers (TCCs) or police stations in Odesa/Dnipro/Kharkiv, coupled with increased drone surveillance and kinetic threats (UAV BARS-Rubicon units) aimed at breaking the morale and physical security of the UAF rear areas simultaneously.
Intelligence gaps & collection requirements
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) | Confidence Assessment |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Identification of the specific targets/intent of UAV groups tracked in Chernihiv and Dnipropetrovsk Oblasts. | IMMEDIATE ISR/IMINT (OC North/East): Prioritize SIGINT/ELINT and SAR/UAV surveillance along the confirmed flight paths to identify potential high-value targets being surveilled. | HIGH |
| P2 (CRITICAL) | Verification of BARS-Rubicon's current deployment, size, and specific operational focus (e.g., FPV attack, counter-battery, or high-altitude recce). | IMMEDIATE HUMINT/OSINT (J2): Monitor RF milblogger channels and recruitment sources for details on unit deployment and reported mission sets. | MEDIUM |
| P3 (URGENT) | Assessment of the internal operational impact of the widespread rolling blackouts on UAF C2 infrastructure and reserve mobilization capability. | IMMEDIATE J3/J4 Assessment: Report on degradation levels for key communication relays and logistical distribution centers in affected Oblasts. | HIGH |
| P4 (PRIORITY) | Specific content and outcome of the Belousov/milblogger meeting concerning the Kupyansk sector. | IMMEDIATE OSINT/HUMINT (J2): Deep dive into milblogger channels for specific tactical details or RF force disposition changes hinted at during the meeting. | MEDIUM |
Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)
- AIR DEFENSE (J3/UAF Air Force): INTERDICT UAV TRACKS.
- Action A (CRITICAL): Re-task mobile AD assets (especially Gepard/Stinger/SHORAD) to establish dynamic engagement zones along the confirmed UAV trajectories (Dnipropetrovsk Westward, Chernihiv Southward) to interdict reconnaissance efforts before they cue larger missile strikes (CR P1).
- FORCE PROTECTION (SBU/National Guard): MITIGATE BLACKOUT VULNERABILITY.
- Action A (URGENT): Deploy generator redundancy and enhanced security details to all critical logistical nodes and UAF C2 centers (especially those relying on vulnerable commercial power grids) ahead of the scheduled rolling blackouts tomorrow (CR P3).
- COUNTER-UAS CAPABILITY (OC East/South): COUNTER BARS-RUBICON.
- Action A (PRIORITY): Initiate localized intelligence dissemination regarding the BARS-Rubicon unit (CR P2) and prioritize the deployment of electronic warfare (EW) systems capable of disrupting low-frequency FPV drone C2 in sectors currently under heavy RF pressure (Pokrovsk, Lyman).
