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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-12 22:38:44Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-12 22:19:57Z)

Situation Update (UTC)

DTG: 122300Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: KRYVYI RIH ADDED TO DEEP STRIKE AXIS // ODESA AD SUCCESS // SKDH ASSAULT INITIATION IMMINENT


Key updates since last sitrep

  • Deep Strike Vector Expansion: A new UAV threat track was detected heading toward Kryvyi Rih, confirming RF intent to stretch UAF Air Defense (AD) assets further into the Central operational rear. (22:24, UAF Air Force, HIGH)
  • Targeted AD Success: UAF AD units successfully intercepted and neutralized Shahed UAVs targeting the high-value Usatovo energy infrastructure in Odesa. The immediate threat wave in the South is assessed as having passed. (22:29, Vanek, HIGH)
  • Northeast Positional Fighting: Positional combat continues in the Kupyansk sector, specifically around the crucial Kupyansk Railway Station, challenging the recent operational assessment of stabilization in that area. (22:28, Milblogger, MEDIUM)
  • UAF Deep Strike (Unconfirmed): RF sources report UAF strikes targeting Saratov Oblast, indicating UAF forces maintain long-range response capabilities despite intense Eastern pressure. (22:20, Военкор Котенок, LOW)

Operational picture (by sector)

Donetsk Axis (Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub - SKDH)

The operational environment remains in the pre-assault kinetic synchronization phase. No new kinematic reports concerning the immediate mechanized push or the 260th GRAU payload initiation have surfaced in the last hour. The critical window for maximum artillery saturation (NLT 130100Z DEC) is approximately two hours away. UAF forces are on maximum readiness (Ready-5).

Southern Axis (Odesa/Mykolaiv)

RF continued high-density UAV attacks, resulting in explosions in Odesa. However, UAF AD forces demonstrated high effectiveness by mitigating the immediate threat to the specifically targeted Usatovo logistical/energy node, a positive tactical outcome that protects critical infrastructure.

Central Axis (Kryvyi Rih / Dnipro)

The confirmed UAV track toward Kryvyi Rih signifies an expansion or shift in RF deep strike targeting. This maintains pressure on UAF IADS by forcing asset distribution away from the decisive point in Donbas and targets industrial assets or logistics hubs in Central Ukraine.

Northeast Axis (Kupyansk)

Positional fighting persists near the Kupyansk Railway Station. While the sector was assessed as stabilized in the previous cycle, the continued proximity engagement indicates RF attempts to degrade UAF defensive posture and threaten the vital rail nexus for logistics feeding the Kharkiv-Donetsk axis.

Enemy activity / threat assessment

Threat Level: CRITICAL

  1. Imminent Kinetic Assault: The primary threat remains the impending synchronized initiation of the mechanized assault on the SKDH, covered by the 260th GRAU preparatory fires and the deployment of UAV remote mining systems to isolate key logistics routes (T0513, H20). (JUDGMENT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  2. AD Exhaustion Strategy: The simultaneous targeting of Odesa (S), Kryvyi Rih (C), and the KAB use in Kharkiv (N) confirms an overarching RF strategy to exhaust and geographically fix UAF IADS assets far from the Donetsk decisive sector.
  3. Threat Mitigation: While UAF AD achieved a tactical success against the immediate wave targeting Usatovo, the overall volume and persistence of the deep strike campaign pose a continuous operational challenge.

Friendly activity (UAF)

UAF AD commands demonstrated effective layered defense in the Odesa region, successfully defending critical infrastructure despite sustained pressure. UAF forces in the Kupyansk sector are actively engaged in maintaining control over the rail station area, ensuring operational stability in the North. UAF strategic response capability is asserted by the unconfirmed reports of deep strikes into RF territory (Saratov), which serves to distract RF AD/ISR assets.

Information environment / disinformation

RF state media is actively pursuing two primary cognitive objectives:

  1. Undermining Confidence in Support: TASS is amplifying statements by international figures (Trump) suggesting rapid "progress" in resolution, likely intending to inject uncertainty into UAF operational planning regarding future Western materiel deliveries. (22:34, TASS, HIGH)
  2. Discrediting Leadership: RF milbloggers are immediately attempting to discredit recent UAF command visits (e.g., Zelenskyy near Kupyansk) to erode unit morale and challenge the narrative of operational control. (22:35, Colonelcassad, HIGH)

Outlook (next 6-12h)

Time Horizon: 122300Z DEC 25 – 131100Z DEC 25 (Pre-Dawn to Morning)

The next 6 hours are assessed as the peak kinetic risk window. RF C2 has maintained synchronization, and all indicators point toward the initiation of the decisive fire phase on the SKDH.

Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

GRAU Saturation and GLOC Interdiction (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

  1. 0000Z-0100Z: Initiation of concentrated, maximum-volume artillery preparatory fires (using the 260th GRAU payload) across the Pokrovsk-Konstantinovka-Kramatorsk axis.
  2. 0100Z-0300Z: High-priority deployment of UAV remote mining systems across the T0513 and H20 main supply routes to deny UAF maneuverability and isolate the 3 OSHB rear guard actions.
  3. 0300Z onwards: Mechanized exploitation probe (RF 3rd Army) from Pokrovsk towards Kramatorsk, testing UAF secondary defensive lines under the cover of massed fire.

Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Isolation and Bypass (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF achieves complete isolation of the SKDH by successfully blocking key GLOCs with the new mining capability before UAF EOD teams can deploy. RF simultaneously leverages the pressure on Kryvyi Rih/Odesa to prevent UAF high-mobility AD assets from reinforcing the Donetsk corridors, enabling an unmolested deep penetration by mechanized units.

Intelligence gaps & collection requirements

The P1 (CRITICAL) requirements established in the previous Sitrep remain unchanged and are now more time-critical.

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Assessment
P1 (CRITICAL)Real-time coordinates of the 260th GRAU final staging area or specific grids targeted for maximum saturation fire.IMINT/SAR tasking remains essential on Ilovaisk/Volnovakha railheads and assembly points. Strike window is rapidly closing.MEDIUM
P1 (CRITICAL)Specific characteristics and effective deployment zones of the new UAV Remote Mining System near T0513 and H20.CRITICAL SIGINT/TECHINT targeting RF EW and UAV operational channels immediately adjacent to the primary logistics routes.MEDIUM
P2 (URGENT)Specific intent/target for the UAV tracked toward Kryvyi Rih.IMINT/UAV reconnaissance along the expected flight path to identify potential high-value industrial/logistical targets (e.g., steel production, power generation, major rail yards).MEDIUM

Actionable Recommendations (ACTION-REC)

  1. PRIORITY KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/OC EAST): COUNTER-MOBILITY & CB FIRE.

    • Action A (CRITICAL): Execute the full P1 Counter-Battery (CB) fire plan against suspected GRAU firing positions immediately NLT 130100Z DEC, anticipating the RF artillery initiation trigger.
    • Action B (IMMEDIATE COUNTER-MINING): Reaffirm and enforce Route Protocol RED for T0513 and H20. All maneuver elements must be advised of the extreme risk of route interdiction. Dedicated engineering/SSO EOD teams must begin immediate, high-risk, low-altitude UAV and ground scouting missions targeting the likely remote mine deployment zones (especially road shoulders, chokepoints, and underpasses).
    • Action C (KUPYANSK STABILITY): Commit localized, non-strategic reserves to reinforce defenses around the Kupyansk Railway Station to negate RF attempts to exploit localized gains and stabilize UAF logistics security in the Northeast.
  2. AIR DEFENSE (OC SOUTH/OC CENTRAL): ASSET DIVERSION MITIGATION.

    • Action: AD commands must treat the Kryvyi Rih UAV track as a deliberate feint to divert resources. Prioritize the protection of logistics nodes feeding the Donbas fight over peripheral industrial targets if munition stocks are constrained. Increase the readiness level of mobile SHORAD assets defending the H20/T0513 approach corridors against low-altitude threats (e.g., mining UAVs).
  3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS & DIPLOMACY (MFA/StratCom): COUNTER-NARRATIVE.

    • Action: Immediately counter the RF narrative concerning "progress" in diplomatic resolution. Publicly link the newly employed weapons of terror (UAV mining) and the continuing targeting of critical port infrastructure (Usatovo/Turkish vessel) directly to the urgency for sustained, long-term Allied military support.
Previous (2025-12-12 22:19:57Z)

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