Situation Report

OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (O-SITREP)

DTG: 122300Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: SKDH KINETIC PHASE ESCALATES // RF DEPLOYS UAV REMOTE MINING CAPABILITY // ALLIED DIPLOMACY FRACTURES

---

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)

The enemy has executed a synchronized escalation across multiple domains: kinetic saturation fires, enhanced deep strike targeting, and strategic diplomatic coercion. The initiation of the preparatory phase for the decisive assault on the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub (SKDH) is confirmed, complemented by KAB strikes targeting the Kharkiv supply corridor and a renewed massed UAV wave against Odesa.

1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

• SKDH Nexus (Donetsk): Confirmed use of Guided Aerial Bombs (KABs) signals the opening of the decisive kinetic phase. The immediate threat vector remains the Pokrovsk-Kramatorsk axis following the probable seizure of Pokrovsk.
• Northeast Axis (Kharkiv): RF confirmed launching KABs in Eastern Kharkiv region (21:30Z). This action likely targets critical logistics nodes or forces UAF Air Defense (AD) assets to extend coverage north, diverting them from the SKDH or Odesa sectors. (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Odesa/Black Sea: Multiple groups of RF Shahed UAVs confirmed moving toward Odesa city, specifically targeting the Usatove area (21:47Z). This represents a coordinated attempt to sustain pressure on port infrastructure and exhaust AD systems immediately following the strike on the Turkish vessel.

1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear conditions continue to favor RF operations, supporting the effective use of KABs in the East and enhanced range/targeting for UAVs in the South.

1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• RF Forces: RF is operating under a strategy of simultaneous saturation, leveraging air-delivered precision (KABs) for fire superiority in the East and massed, coordinated low-signature assets (UAVs) for economic/AD interdiction in the South. RF forces have also demonstrated the integration of a new UAV remote mining capability. (JUDGMENT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• UAF Forces: Forces are highly constrained by the requirement to defend critical rear-area infrastructure (Odesa energy/port) while maintaining counter-battery (CB) readiness against massed fires in Donetsk. Tactical reserves in the East are now on immediate commit status (Ready-5).

---

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

• Primary Kinetic Intention: Achieve decisive fire superiority and breach SKDH lines within the next 12 hours. KAB usage confirms RF intent to minimize exposure of manned aircraft while delivering heavy, accurate ordnance to soften UAF positions ahead of mechanized exploitation.
• Critical New Capability (Tactical Adaptation): RF forces have integrated remote mining technology into the Geran (Shahed) UAV platform (21:35Z).
  • Implication: This introduces a severe new threat to UAF operational mobility. RF can now interdict logistics routes (GLOCs) and isolate forward positions deep behind the contact line without deploying ground forces or risking manned aviation. This threatens UAF counter-attack and reserve movement timelines. (JUDGMENT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
• Strategic Coercion: RF continues to pressure the international coalition via both kinetic means (Turkish vessel strike) and informational/diplomatic means (Paris meeting cancellation IO).

2.2 Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

RF has achieved operational synchronization across three fronts:

1. KAB fires (Donetsk/Kharkiv)
2. Massed UAV strikes (Odesa/Mykolaiv)
3. Introduction of a high-impact, low-signature tactical capability (UAV remote mining).

2.3 Logistics and Sustainment Status

The kinetic phase is fully engaged. The priority remains locating and neutralizing the 260th GRAU payload, which is now likely in the final staging hours before deployment. The window for a mission-killing strike has closed to NLT 2-3 hours. Continued targeting of logistics corridors in Eastern Kharkiv with KABs signals RF awareness of UAF supply vulnerabilities.

2.4 Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is highly effective, demonstrating complex multi-domain coordination (KAB, UAV groups, IO).

---

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness level in the East is maximum (Defensive Posture P1). The marriage celebration of a battalion commander serves as a positive, albeit localized, morale indicator (21:21Z).

3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Operational Mobility): The confirmed introduction of UAV remote mining creates immediate uncertainty and risk for all UAF movement along critical supply routes (T0513, H20) feeding the Kramatorsk/Konstantinovka area.
• Setback (Diplomatic/Strategic): The cancellation of the Paris meeting and the EU accession assessment (2027 deemed "impossible") confirm significant diplomatic friction at a critical kinetic juncture.

3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints

Resource requirements remain acute, driven by the immediate need for advanced AD systems to mitigate KABs and the persistent need for basic supplies (confirmed by public fundraising). The new UAV mining threat places an immediate constraint on engineering and demining resources.

---

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• Allied Disunity (P1 Focus): RF official media (TASS) and military bloggers immediately leveraged the cancellation of the Paris meeting (21:25Z) and the EU accession timeline (21:24Z) to amplify the narrative that Western support is fracturing and that Ukraine is politically isolated. This directly supports RF objectives in the kinetic domain by lowering UAF morale and confidence in long-term resupply.
• CBRN Narrative: The previously assessed shift to the "Dirty Bomb" narrative remains the primary RF justification for potential strategic escalation (MDCOA).

4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Public morale is under strain due to the confirmed mass kinetic activity (KABs) and sustained targeting of Odesa. Domestic fundraising appeals underscore the public’s role in compensating for systemic logistical constraints.

4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The convergence of the Paris meeting cancellation and the EU accession setback (2027) indicates internal Western policy friction is rising. This requires immediate UAF diplomatic intervention to stabilize international support ahead of the anticipated RF ground assault.

---

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (P-AN)

TIME HORIZON: Next 6-12 Hours (NLT 131000Z DEC 25)

5.1 Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

Full Kinetic Assault & Deep Interdiction (HIGH CONFIDENCE):

1. SKDH Assault: RF forces escalate preparatory fires (KABs, massed artillery from GRAU payload) to maximum effect.
2. Mechanized Exploitation: Ground units (focusing on the Pokrovsk axis) attempt to exploit the fire saturation, aiming to seize critical nodes south of Kramatorsk (e.g., Myrnohrad).
3. Route Interdiction (CRITICAL ADDITION): RF deploys UAV remote mining systems against primary and secondary UAF logistics routes (T0513 and H20) leading into Konstantinovka and Kramatorsk, aiming to slow or halt the movement of UAF reserves (especially the 3 OSHB rear-guard elements).

5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

Strategic Retaliation via CBRN Pretext & Mining Blockade (HIGH CONFIDENCE IF TRIGGER PULSED):

1. MDCOA Trigger: Formal EU decision on asset expropriation (18-19 DEC) or a catastrophic failure of the SKDH defenses, prompting RF to cement gains and deter intervention.
2. RF Response: RF executes disproportionate strategic retaliation justified by the "Dirty Bomb" narrative. Simultaneously, RF uses the new UAV mining capability to completely isolate SKDH by remotely mining all exit and entry corridors, creating a localized operational blockade.

5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

---

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)

---

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-REC)

1. PRIORITY KINETIC RESPONSE (J3/OC EAST): COUNTER-BATTERY & ANTI-MINING.

   • Action A: IMMEDIATELY EXECUTE the planned deep strikes against the GRAU rail switches/IAAs, accepting the residual risk of not having 100% confirmation, as the saturation phase is fully initiated.
   • Action B (CRITICAL): Deploy specialized EOD teams and SSO reconnaissance assets along the T0513 and H20 logistics routes immediately. Develop and disseminate new operational protocols for counter-UAV mining detection and clearance. Prioritize UAV sweep missions over these routes.

2. AIR DEFENSE (OC SOUTH/NORTH): MANAGE AD DIVERGENCE.

   • Action: Given simultaneous KAB strikes (East/North) and massed UAV attacks (South), AD assets must strictly adhere to the established priority matrix. Sustain focus on Odesa port protection and energy crews, but re-task high-mobility AD units to provide rapid coverage for the exposed Kharkiv logistics corridor.

3. OPERATIONAL RESERVE (OC EAST): HARDEN DEFENSES.

   • Action: Immediate deployment of engineering assets to mine and harden the secondary defensive line southwest of Konstantinovka and Myrnohrad. Reserves must be prepared for FPV saturation attack missions to delay the RF mechanized push from Pokrovsk until NLT 130400Z DEC.

4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS & DIPLOMACY (MFA/StratCom): ADDRESS ALLIED FRICTION.

   • Action: Launch an immediate diplomatic offensive emphasizing the renewed kinetic saturation in Donbas and the strategic threat of RF mining civilian infrastructure via UAVs. Use this evidence to push for rapid re-scheduling of the high-level meeting and firm commitments on long-range fire support to mitigate the KAB threat.