OPERATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (O-SITREP)
DTG: 121845Z DEC 25
SUBJECT: SKDH PHASE TRANSITION // GRAU INTERDICTION WINDOW CRITICALLY CLOSED
1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SIT-SUM)
1.1 Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain
The operational focus remains the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk Defensive Hub (SKDH). The tactical situation continues to degrade along the northern (Siversk) and southern (Pokrovsk) axes, confirming the prerequisites for RF operational isolation maneuvers.
- CRITICAL AXIS: RF Vostok Group mechanized exploitation is consolidating control around Pokrovsk (confirmed) and advancing toward Konstantinovka.
- SOUTHERN/ZAPORIZHZHIA: Increased frequency of RF Guided Aerial Bomb (KAB) usage targeting Zaporizhzhia Oblast (confirmed multiple launches 18:26Z, 18:44Z). This suggests RF is increasing deep fire suppression capability ahead of or during ground engagements around Huliaipole/Orihiv axis (confirmed heavy fighting reports).
- MARITIME/DEEP STRIKE: Persistent Shahed activity continues toward Odesa (UAV reported 18:37Z; explosions confirmed 18:42Z). This confirms RF intent to maintain pressure on critical energy infrastructure and maritime logistics following the commercial vessel strike.
1.2 Weather and Environmental Factors
The persistent threat of scheduled national power blackouts (NLT 13 DEC) remains the primary non-kinetic constraint on UAF C2 and logistical resilience across the operational area.
1.3 Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures
- RF Forces: Main effort is finalizing staging for the massive artillery preparation using the 260th GRAU shipment. RF milbloggers are aggressively claiming advances near Mirnohrad and into Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (JUDGMENT: Highly aspirational claims, but indicating the breadth of the planned operational thrust).
- UAF OC East/North: UAF 25th Separate Assault Regiment "Skela" and associated units have successfully cleared the Yuvileiny residential district in Kupyansk (confirmed video BDA 18:27Z), stabilizing the immediate northern flank which was previously under threat of encirclement.
2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREATCON)
2.1 Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action
- Intentions (Donbas Decisive Action): RF intent to initiate massed preparatory fire (260th GRAU) and subsequent mechanized exploitation toward Kramatorsk remains unchanged. Kinetic saturation is the operational precursor to maneuver. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Adaptations (Aviation/Fires): The increased, repeated deployment of KABs in the Zaporizhzhia sector (a shift from pure missile strikes) indicates a prioritization of highly destructive, stand-off fires to suppress UAF static defensive lines and preparation areas. (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
- Logistics Security: While the specific location of the NRTC "Courier" 2.0 UGV remains unknown (P2 Gap), the confirmed deployment suggests RF is seeking to enhance logistical resilience or reduce personnel exposure during the complex forward staging phase in Donbas.
2.2 Logistics and Sustainment Status
The kinetic window for the high-leverage interdiction of the 260th GRAU shipment must now be assessed as CRITICALLY CLOSED (NLT 122000Z DEC was the previous hard deadline). The payload is highly likely to be offloaded, dispersed, or currently protected in hardened firing positions, awaiting the NLT 130000Z DEC fire mission start.
- RF Internal Sustainment: Fundraising appeals by prominent pro-RF channels (Archangel Spetsnaz, 18:25Z) confirm the continued necessity of decentralized, public-funded support for specific fighting units, suggesting sustainment strains persist at the lower tactical level despite high-level strategic munitions surges. (CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM)
2.3 Command and Control Effectiveness
RF C2 is demonstrating highly effective synchronization of kinetic effort with informational response. Immediately following the confirmation of the EU asset freeze (a major strategic setback), RF milbloggers and state media escalated threats of retribution and focused IO narratives on justifying current operations by reviving historical grievances (Odesa 2014 narrative, 18:35Z). (CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE)
3.1 Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness
UAF forces are positioned for a critical defensive phase around Kramatorsk, while demonstrating localized offensive capability and high morale on stabilized sectors.
3.2 Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks
- Success (Kupyansk): UAF forces (3rd Assault Regiment "Skela") successfully executed urban clearing operations in Yuvileiny district, pushing RF forces out of critical built-up areas. This confirms the stabilization of the Kupyansk axis (as projected in the Daily Summary). (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
- Strategic Success (Economic): The indefinite freeze of Russian sovereign assets by the EU is a strategic victory, hardening long-term financial support and dramatically constraining RF resource availability outside the battlefield. (FACT/HIGH CONFIDENCE)
3.3 Resource Requirements and Constraints
The P1 requirement shifts from "targeting data for the convoy" to "real-time coordinates of 260th GRAU firing positions." The window for interdicting the rail movement is gone; the focus must now be on pre-empting the massed fires.
4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (INFOWAR)
4.1 Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns
- RF Escalation Narrative: The aggressive confirmation and amplification of the EU asset freeze by Russian milbloggers (18:43Z) led to immediate retaliatory threats, framing Europe as a direct belligerent and promising post-capitulation punitive action. This escalates the perceived geopolitical stakes of the current offensive.
- Domestic Diversion: Reports of widespread mobile internet outages in Leningrad Oblast and the VTB Arena bomb threat in Moscow (18:47Z) suggest internal friction, UAF deep psychological operations, or RF defensive security measures are impacting the domestic environment. (JUDGMENT: RF is managing multiple, simultaneous internal and external IO challenges).
4.2 Public Sentiment and Morale Factors
UAF morale is reinforced by confirmed tactical successes (Kupyansk) and the significant strategic victory concerning the EU asset freeze. RF domestic morale is being tested by internal disturbances and continued reliance on public fundraising for military equipment.
4.3 International Support and Diplomatic Developments
The indefinite EU freeze of Russian sovereign assets is confirmed as executed. This decision is strategically decisive and provides a foundation for long-term UAF sustainment planning, despite the immediate kinetic threat in Donbas.
5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (P-AN)
TIME HORIZON: Next 12 Hours (NLT 130600Z DEC 25)
5.1 Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)
Initiation of Massed Artillery Assault (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF Command will initiate the massive preparatory fire using the now-staged 260th GRAU munitions targeting the Kramatorsk-Konstantinovka defensive belts starting NLT 130000Z DEC.
- Fire Integration: Fires will be synchronized with increased KAB strikes in the wider theatre (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv) to prevent UAF force relocation.
- Mechanized Thrust: Following the softening of the defensive line, mechanized units (Vostok Group) will execute exploitation maneuvers from Pokrovsk (southwest) towards Kramatorsk, aiming for a rapid link-up with forces advancing west of Siversk.
5.2 Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)
Operational Breach and Strategic Distraction (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE):
- Breakthrough/Coercion: RF preparatory fires achieve unexpectedly high attrition rates on UAF C2 and fortified positions, enabling the mechanized assault to achieve a rapid operational breakthrough and threaten immediate encirclement of Kramatorsk before UAF General Staff can execute organized retrograde.
- IO Justification for Escalation: RF utilizes the newly deployed "Dirty Bomb" narrative (Daily Summary) to justify a subsequent tactical escalation (e.g., restricted-area chemical deployment) if the mechanized exploitation stalls under UAF counter-attacks.
5.3 Timeline Estimates and Decision Points
| Event | Estimated Timeline | Decision Point/Action Trigger |
|---|
| GRAU Munitions Deployment | NOW (121900Z - 130000Z DEC) | Action: Transition all P1 collection efforts from rail interdiction to identifying GRAU firing battery locations and hardened storage bunkers near the contact line. |
| Mass Artillery Initiation | NLT 130000Z DEC | Initiate pre-planned C2 dispersal procedures and immediately release counter-battery fire missions on high-value GRAU firing positions. |
| Kramatorsk Perimeter Breach Risk | NLT 131800Z DEC | Trigger deployment of Tactical Reserve units (e.g., 3 OSHB) for high-attrition, rear-guard fighting along the T0514/T0504 axes to prevent full operational isolation. |
6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS (CCIR)
| Priority | Gap Description | Collection Requirement (CR) |
|---|
| P1 (CRITICAL) | Precise location of the 260th GRAU heavy artillery firing positions and munition storage bunkers now that the convoy has dispersed/staged. | Highest-priority IMINT/SAR focusing on known artillery staging areas (e.g., near Volnovakha, Ilovaisk, Makiivka); High-speed ELINT sweeps for massed RF artillery C2 frequencies. |
| P2 (URGENT) | Specific tactical damage assessment of the recent RF KAB strikes in Zaporizhzhia (e.g., impact on force generation areas or critical infrastructure). | HUMINT/BDA teams dispatched to latest impact zones in Zaporizhzhia Oblast; Task UAS/ISR assets to monitor for follow-on RF ground movement in the Huliaipole sector. |
| P3 (URGENT) | Quantification of the security or psychological impact of the Moscow VTB Arena threat and Leningrad communication outages on RF internal C2 or stability. | HUMINT/OSINT monitoring of official RF statements and internal security reporting regarding internal disruptions. |
7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS (ACTION-REC)
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PRIORITY TARGETING (J2/J3): SHIFT TO COUNTER-BATTERY FOCUS.
- Action: Immediately confirm whether the NLT 122000Z DEC strike authorization against the Volnovakha/Ilovaisk rail switches was executed. Regardless of execution status, immediately terminate rail targeting CRs and shift all long-range strike assets (HIMARS, etc.) to fire missions against identified high-value GRAU firing positions. The defense of Kramatorsk now depends on pre-empting the mass fires.
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MANEUVER & FORCE PREPARATION (OC EAST): KRAMATORSK HARDENING.
- Action: Accelerate C2 dispersal plans and immediately pre-position Combat Engineering assets to construct secondary kill zones west of Konstantinovka and along the northern approaches (T0513 axis) now exposed by the Siversk loss. Focus on anti-tank ditching and deployment of massed, multi-layered minefields to disrupt the expected mechanized exploitation NLT 130600Z DEC.
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STRATCOM (J7): EXPLOIT EU ASSET FREEZE VICTORY.
- Action: Utilize the strategic confirmation of the EU asset freeze (18:34Z) to launch a high-impact Strategic Communications campaign domestically and internationally. Frame the EU decision as a permanent commitment and a crushing blow to Russia's long-term financial stability, directly counteracting RF IO attempting to project Western fatigue.
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OPERATIONAL RESPONSE (OC SOUTH): KAB/DRONE COUNTERMEASURES.
- Action: Task priority Air Defense assets (Shilkas/MANPADS) to mobile defense operations against low-flying KAB launch platforms and Shahed inbound routes in Zaporizhzhia and Odesa regions, respectively. Utilize the confirmed success in Kupyansk to rotate forces quickly to reinforce other defensive sectors (e.g., Zaporizhzhia) if the Kupyansk line holds.