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Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-11 20:42:59Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-11 20:12:56Z)

MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 112100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CRITICAL UPDATE: LOGISTICS INTERDICTION WINDOW NEARING ZERO HOUR (T-MINUS 01:00); SLOVYANSK AXIS EXPLOITATION CONFIRMED (LYSIVKA); ESCALATION OF RF HYBRID THREAT.


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (IPB Step 1)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational environment remains defined by the imminent threat to the Slovyansk-Kramatorsk defensive hub, now under direct pressure from the confirmed RF seizure of Siversk and heavy fighting within Konstantinovka.

  • Slovyansk Northern Axis (FACT/CRITICAL): Russian Federation (RF) forces are actively exploiting the breach following the confirmed loss of Siversk. Intelligence identifies Lysivka (northern sector) as the immediate combat zone on the P-79 exploitation axis (DeepState). The 123rd Separate Motorized Rifle Brigade (123-я огмбр) is confirmed to have spearheaded the Siversk assault (Colonelcassad), demonstrating RF commitment of regular, organized units for this breakthrough.
  • Rear Area (FACT/RISING RISK): Active UAF Air Force tracking confirms multiple Adversary Unmanned Aerial Systems (UAS) targeting rear infrastructure, specifically tracking a vector toward Pavlohrad, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast. This indicates a continued attempt to suppress UAF logistics and C2 resilience far behind the frontline, forcing the allocation of critical SHORAD resources away from the primary Donbas threat.
  • Huliaipole Direction (FACT/STABILIZATION): UAF forces (33rd Separate Assault Regiment) successfully repelled a confirmed RF breakthrough attempt near Dobropillya, maintaining tactical superiority in this secondary operational sector and preventing RF maneuver freedom.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Ground conditions remain stable, allowing for sustained mechanized maneuver and persistent UAS operations by both sides.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are defensively committed to securing the Konstantinovka urban area and establishing fallback lines west of Siversk. RF forces are concentrating materiel along the Siversk-Lysivka axis.

  • RF C-UAS Posture (FACT): The RF MoD claims the destruction of 17 UAF UAVs over Russian territory in a three-hour window (TASS), confirming a heightened and decentralized RF air defense reaction to UAF deep strikes (e.g., Caspian platform). This confirms the success of the UAF deep strike strategy in diverting RF defensive resources.

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (IPB Step 2)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

Capability (HIGH CONFIDENCE): RF maintains kinetic initiative and massed drone capability (DS 0.495052). RF forces possess the ability to rapidly saturate the Lysivka sector following the arrival of artillery reinforcement. Intention (Kinetic/Operational): Immediate intent is to fix UAF forces in the Konstantinovka/Lysivka defensive arc to facilitate the operational isolation of Kramatorsk. Intention (Strategic/IO): To project high readiness for long-term conflict ("We must be ready for the large-scale war...") and use aggressive rhetoric (Medvedev) to preemptively undermine international diplomatic solutions ahead of the Dec 13 meeting.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The RF focus on showcasing specialized units (snipers, Colonelcassad video) in the Krasno-Limansky direction suggests a strategy of low-signature, high-impact tactical pressure to support the broader mechanized thrust in the Siversk sector. The heightened defense over Bryansk demonstrates increased RF sensitivity to UAF Deep Battle operations.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status (CRITICAL)

The window for interdiction of the 260th GRAU munitions surge is expiring (NLT 120200Z DEC). If the strike is not executed within the next 60-90 minutes, the vast RF artillery reserves will disperse and reach forward positions, enabling the predicted saturation of Slovyansk/Kramatorsk NLT 121000Z DEC. The mission remains P1 (Priority One).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating complex urban/mechanized operations (evidenced by the detailed Siversk seizure reports). The IO domain is demonstrating a high degree of central coordination for strategic messaging (MoD briefings, Medvedev's highly visible aggression).

3. FRIENDLY FORCES (IPB Step 3)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Readiness is highly concentrated on containing the northern breach (Siversk-Lysivka) and maintaining the southern defense (Konstantinovka). Successful engagements (Dobropillya) validate localized tactical superiority in managing the overall defensive structure.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Success (Tactical): Successful kinetic defense by 33 OSHP near Dobropillya. Successful diversion of RF air defense assets via deep strikes. Setback (Information/Morale): Minor domestic morale setback due to negative sports results (FC Dynamo Kyiv loss), which, while non-military, contributes to the ambient sense of crisis.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  1. Time: The immediate execution window for the LRPF strike is closing.
  2. Air Defense: Immediate requirement to shift C-UAS/SHORAD assets to protect critical rear hubs (e.g., Pavlohrad) while maintaining cover over the Slovyansk defensive perimeter.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IPB Step 4)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

  • RF Escalation (FACT/JUDGEMENT): Dmitry Medvedev's highly aggressive rhetoric targeting the US and Ukrainian leadership (Medvedev: "Narcoführer just showed the White House the middle finger") is a strategic IO move designed to maximize friction between Kyiv and its international supporters, reinforcing the RF "DMZ Sovereignty" narrative.
  • RF Narrative Consistency (FACT): RF mil-bloggers (Fighterbomber) are generating long-war rhetoric, preparing the Russian domestic audience for high future commitment and mobilization efforts.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF StratCom must actively counter RF maximalist rhetoric and the narrative of strategic defeat (Siversk loss) by emphasizing tactical resilience (Dobropillya) and strategic financial success (EU asset freeze, previously reported).

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The heightened RF IO aggression (Medvedev) aims directly at the upcoming diplomatic meetings (Dec 13). UAF diplomatic channels must be urgently prepared to neutralize the "DMZ Sovereignty" argument and the narrative that Kyiv is intransigent or politically unreliable.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (IPB Step 5)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

  1. Northern Penetration (T+0 to T+12 HRS): RF forces will utilize the 123rd OMRB and supporting units to execute a heavy mechanized push along the P-79 highway axis, aiming to seize Lysivka and establish direct fire control over the northern approaches to Slovyansk.
  2. Artillery Dominance (T+6 to T+24 HRS): IF LRPF STRIKE FAILS, RF will begin positional deployment and massive saturation fires against Slovyansk/Kramatorsk NLT 121000Z DEC, utilizing the newly arrived 260th GRAU munitions to neutralize UAF fixed defenses and C2 nodes.
  3. Urban Fixation: Continued high-intensity urban combat in Konstantinovka to fix UAF 3rd Assault Brigade and prevent lateral movement of reserves.

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA) – (HIGH Confidence)

  1. OPERATIONAL CATASTROPHE (LRPF FAILURE): The immediate failure to interdict the GRAU convoy leads to overwhelming RF fire superiority, resulting in the collapse of the Lysivka defensive line and forcing a rapid, disorganized withdrawal of OC East forces to Kramatorsk, placing the city immediately under siege conditions.
  2. STRATEGIC IO VICTORY: RF successfully leverages kinetic breakthroughs (Siversk) and aggressive diplomatic messaging (Medvedev/DMZ Sovereignty) to convince major Western partners to enforce a cease-fire based on current battle lines, freezing the conflict in RF's favor.

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

EventEstimated TimelineDecision Point
Logistics Interdiction Window (260th GRAU)CRITICAL: NLT 120200Z DECEXECUTE STRIKE OR ACCEPT FAILURE: Final confirmation required for LRPF launch against highest probability railheads (Ilovaisk/Volnovakha) immediately.
Slovyansk Northern Defensive PostureNLT 120300Z DECConfirmation of engineering teams (counter-mobility/mining) deployed and integrated with maneuver units on the Lysivka perimeter.
Strategic IO ResponseNLT 120600Z DECRelease of Presidential/MFA statement definitively rejecting RF maximalist "DMZ Sovereignty" and condemning Medvedev’s rhetoric.

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

PriorityGap DescriptionCollection Requirement (CR)Confidence Assessment
P1 (LOGISTICS TARGETING - CRITICAL)Confirmation of the exact static staging location (Ilovaisk or Volnovakha) for the mobile 260th GRAU convoy before the strike deadline (T-90m).TECHINT/SAR/HUMINT: Continuous, high-resolution ISR focusing on thermal and mass signatures at rail choke points. NOTE: Failure to fulfill this CR must trigger a shift in defensive resource allocation.LOW (Unchanged)
P2 (ENEMY MANEUVER INTENT)Precise composition and depth of the RF force (3rd CAA/123rd OMRB) exploiting the Siversk-Lysivka axis.IMINT/UAV RECON: Persistent, high-tempo ISR sorties focused on the P-79 route to identify battalion tactical groups (BTGs) and their follow-on echelons.MEDIUM
P3 (REAR AREA THREAT)Origin and launch coordinates of the confirmed UAS vector toward Pavlohrad (Dnipropetrovsk).SIGINT/ELINT: Rapid triangulation and back-tracking of C2 signals associated with the UAS threat to identify forward launch teams/depots.MEDIUM

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

PriorityDomainActionCommander/Staff
1. KINETIC COUNTER-LOGISTICS (J3/J2)Deep Strike/TargetingLAUNCH STRIKE (IMMEDIATELY): If P1 targeting data is not secured, J3 must make a risk assessment and authorize the strike against the highest probability choke point (e.g., Ilovaisk rail yard) using probabilistic targeting, before the 120200Z DEC deadline. If strike fails, immediately transition to Recommendation 2.Joint Staff / Long Range Fire Command
2. MANEUVER DEFENSE (J3 OC East)Maneuver/EngineeringMAXIMIZE DEFENSE AT LYSIVKA: Prioritize deployment of anti-tank and anti-personnel minefields, combined with prepared demolition sites, along the primary and secondary routes approaching Slovyansk from Lysivka, utilizing the last hours of the pre-GRAU window.Operational Command East (OC East)
3. AIR DEFENSE (J3/Air Force)SHORAD/EWREAR AREA C-UAS PRIORITY: Divert one mobile C-UAS team immediately to protect the Pavlohrad infrastructure hub to mitigate confirmed incoming UAS threat, ensuring the safe operation of rear area logistics.Air Force Command / Operational Command Center
4. STRATCOM & DIPLOMACY (P7/NCA)IO/DiplomaticIMMEDIATE HARDLINE IO RESPONSE: Release a joint MFA/Presidential statement rejecting the RF "DMZ Sovereignty" claim and framing Medvedev's rhetoric as evidence of RF maximalist war aims, utilizing allied channels to brief against these escalations ahead of the Dec 13 meeting.NCA / Ministry of Foreign Affairs / StratCom Center
Previous (2025-12-11 20:12:56Z)

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