Archived operational intelligence briefing
TIME: 251210Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL UPDATE AND MULTI-DOMAIN ASSESSMENT (72 HR LOOK-AHEAD) REFERENCE: DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY – 2025-12-07 15:00:59Z
The operational picture remains dominated by the two critical axes identified on 251207Z: the Pokrovsk Urban Built-up Area (UBA) in Donetsk Oblast, where tactical infiltration is confirmed, and the Stepnohorsk/Huliaipole sector in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where the threat of operational encirclement is materializing.
Currently, standard early-winter conditions prevail. Freezing temperatures and low visibility/ceiling conditions favor persistent, low-altitude drone operations (both FPV and surveillance). The damaged Pechenihy hydrological system introduces an environmental variable, where precipitation or temperature fluctuations could compound the breach effects, rapidly altering the terrain state.
UAF forces are primarily distributed in holding actions. The effectiveness of the recommended "RED PLAN" protocol (relocation of TrO assets following the Kuzmuk CI incident) cannot yet be confirmed but remains a critical control measure to mitigate rear-area compromise. RF forces are concentrating mechanized infantry and artillery support to exploit the Pokrovsk breach and maintain high velocity on the Huliaipole flank.
RF intent is a multi-domain operational paralysis:
Capabilities Assessment: RF continues to demonstrate localized tactical superiority through persistent FPV drone usage, confirmed by reports of successful strikes against UAF artillery positions.
The confirmed engagement at Huliaipole is not a change in COA but rather the successful execution of the pre-planned flanking maneuver predicted on 251207Z. RF is effectively leveraging the operational pause resulting from the hydro-strike and CI crisis to accelerate ground gains.
RF sustainment remains focused on resilient deep-battle capacity (confirmed strikes on Tver oil depot) and interdicting UAF main supply routes (Fastiv bypass). Internal messaging (AvtoVAZ complaints) suggests general economic strain and protectionism pressures within Russia, but no immediate or direct impact on frontline RF ammunition or fuel supply is assessed. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)
RF C2 remains robust across the axes of effort. The RF IO apparatus is highly effective and synchronized, immediately pivoting to capitalize on the Kuzmuk CI incident and leveraging broader geopolitical narratives (US-EU split) to undermine UAF morale.
Current UAF posture is characterized by decentralized, high-tempo counter-operations:
RF IO is executing a coordinated campaign centered on two pillars:
UAF morale is generally high due to resilience narratives, but two critical domestic stressors are identified:
RF utilizes its current tactical advantages to force a phased, disorderly withdrawal of UAF forward elements in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast while solidifying defensive lines around Pokrovsk.
(CONFIDENCE: HIGH)
A coordinated RF effort leverages the CI compromise to enable precision attacks that destroy UAF reserve capacity, leading to localized front collapse.
(CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Mitigation via "RED PLAN" is assumed, but not confirmed.)
| Timeline | Key Event/Decision Point (DP) | Rationale |
|---|---|---|
| NLT 251211Z (24 Hours) | DP 1 (Zaporizhzhia Withdrawal): Decision required on committing remaining local reserves to prevent the 38th GMRB link-up, or executing a controlled tactical withdrawal from Stepnohorsk salient. | Prevent isolation and potential mass capture. |
| NLT 251212Z (48 Hours) | DP 2 (Pokrovsk Reinforcement): Decision to deploy National Guard or specific Interior Ministry (MVD) assets to stabilize the urban CIO perimeter, freeing up regular mechanized units for counter-attack. | Current forces may be insufficient for prolonged CIO. |
| NLT 251213Z (72 Hours) | DP 3 (CI Assessment): Full assessment of the scope of the Kuzmuk leak and confirmation of the security status of all relocated TrO assets. | Essential for mitigating MDCOA. |
| Priority | Action | Unit/Command | Timeline | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| CRITICAL | Neutralize 38th GMRB Flank. Commit mobile artillery and immediate FPV drone assets to interdict the 38th GMRB supply line and slow its advance on Huliaipole. | J3 (Operations) / Local Joint Task Force | IMMEDIATE (NLT 251211Z 0600Z) | This is the most dangerous immediate tactical threat (encirclement). |
| HIGH | Damage Assessment (Pechenihy). Dedicate engineer teams with drone surveillance to acquire Priority 1 data (structural integrity, time-to-failure) to establish a firm hydrological risk matrix. | J2 (Intelligence) / J4 (Logistics/Engineers) | NLT 251211Z 1200Z | Stabilize northern logistics and predict future terrain state. |
| HIGH | Manpower IO Counter-Campaign. Launch an immediate StratCom effort to reassure "critical enterprise" workers regarding mobilization status and emphasize the strategic importance of their non-combat roles. | P7 (Strategic Communications) / Ministry of Economy | IMMEDIATE | Mitigate the domestic propaganda targeting manpower retention. |
| MEDIUM | Urban Defense Hardening. Prioritize anti-drone (C-UAS) and counter-battery fire (CBF) assets to cover established inner defense lines within the Pokrovsk UBA, reducing reliance on exposed outer perimeters. | J3 (Operations) / Local Command | NLT 251212Z | Mitigate attrition during urban CIO. |
| Priority | Intelligence Gap | Collection Requirements (IR) | Rationale |
|---|---|---|---|
| PRIORITY 1 (ENGINEERING) | Precise structural integrity and time-to-failure for Pechenihy Dam breach. | SAR/GEOINT (High-resolution imagery/thermal) focused on dam structure and downstream flow rate. | Critical for consequence management and logistics planning. |
| PRIORITY 2 (CI/SECURITY) | Confirmation of successful relocation/hardening of compromised TrO CPs. | HUMINT (Counter-Intelligence teams) and COMINT focused on unusual RF RFAS traffic correlation with former CP locations. | Determine if the MDCOA vulnerability still exists. |
| PRIORITY 3 (MANEUVER) | Current location, strength, and estimated time of link-up for the 38th GMRB elements near Huliaipole. | Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and EO/IR targeting along the Zaporizhzhia flank. | Essential for executing DP 1 (Stepnohorsk withdrawal/defense). |
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