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Historical Intelligence

Situation Report

Archived operational intelligence briefing

Report Time
2025-12-10 13:13:01Z
2 months ago
Previous (2025-12-10 12:12:58Z)

SITUATION REPORT (SITREP)

TIME: 251210Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: OPERATIONAL UPDATE AND MULTI-DOMAIN ASSESSMENT (72 HR LOOK-AHEAD) REFERENCE: DAILY INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY – 2025-12-07 15:00:59Z


1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture remains dominated by the two critical axes identified on 251207Z: the Pokrovsk Urban Built-up Area (UBA) in Donetsk Oblast, where tactical infiltration is confirmed, and the Stepnohorsk/Huliaipole sector in Zaporizhzhia Oblast, where the threat of operational encirclement is materializing.

  • POKROVSK AXIS: UAF forces are engaged in reactive Counter-Infiltration Operations (CIO) following the premature breach of the outer defensive perimeter. RF pressure maintains high intensity, utilizing heavy indirect fire (152mm).
  • ZAPORIZHZHIA AXIS: Confirmed combat activity in Huliaipole signals the successful execution, or near completion, of the RF flanking maneuver previously assigned to the 38th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (GMRB). This directly threatens the isolation of UAF forward defenses near Stepnohorsk and the dispersal of the delayed "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • KHARKIV AXIS (HYDRO-TERRAIN): The structural integrity of the Pechenihy Dam, following the RF strike, continues to pose a critical terrain risk, impacting UAF freedom of maneuver and rear-area logistics due to actual or anticipated flooding. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

Currently, standard early-winter conditions prevail. Freezing temperatures and low visibility/ceiling conditions favor persistent, low-altitude drone operations (both FPV and surveillance). The damaged Pechenihy hydrological system introduces an environmental variable, where precipitation or temperature fluctuations could compound the breach effects, rapidly altering the terrain state.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF forces are primarily distributed in holding actions. The effectiveness of the recommended "RED PLAN" protocol (relocation of TrO assets following the Kuzmuk CI incident) cannot yet be confirmed but remains a critical control measure to mitigate rear-area compromise. RF forces are concentrating mechanized infantry and artillery support to exploit the Pokrovsk breach and maintain high velocity on the Huliaipole flank.


2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (THREAT ASSESSMENT)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action (COA)

RF intent is a multi-domain operational paralysis:

  1. Force Tactical Capitulation: By threatening encirclement (38th GMRB at Huliaipole) and fixing forces (Pokrovsk CIO).
  2. Inflict Strategic Socio-Economic Damage: Through targeted hydro-weaponization (Pechenihy) and continued energy/logistical strikes (Slaviansk TPP, Fastiv rail).
  3. Exploit Manpower/Internal Divisions: Via Information Operations (IO) targeting UAF personnel retention and international support (see Section 4).

Capabilities Assessment: RF continues to demonstrate localized tactical superiority through persistent FPV drone usage, confirmed by reports of successful strikes against UAF artillery positions.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The confirmed engagement at Huliaipole is not a change in COA but rather the successful execution of the pre-planned flanking maneuver predicted on 251207Z. RF is effectively leveraging the operational pause resulting from the hydro-strike and CI crisis to accelerate ground gains.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains focused on resilient deep-battle capacity (confirmed strikes on Tver oil depot) and interdicting UAF main supply routes (Fastiv bypass). Internal messaging (AvtoVAZ complaints) suggests general economic strain and protectionism pressures within Russia, but no immediate or direct impact on frontline RF ammunition or fuel supply is assessed. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains robust across the axes of effort. The RF IO apparatus is highly effective and synchronized, immediately pivoting to capitalize on the Kuzmuk CI incident and leveraging broader geopolitical narratives (US-EU split) to undermine UAF morale.


3. FRIENDLY FORCES (BLUE FORCE TRACKING)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Current UAF posture is characterized by decentralized, high-tempo counter-operations:

  • Pokrovsk: UAF forces are engaged in critical urban stabilization efforts, shifting from linear defense to distributed defense within the UBA.
  • Zaporizhzhia: Forward units are under immense pressure to hold ground while the fragmented "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve attempts reconstitution under threat of the 38th GMRB advance.
  • Readiness: High, but strained. Manpower retention is a looming constraint, evidenced by internal discussions regarding the loss of "critical enterprise" status and resulting mobilization deferment for skilled labor.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

  • Successes: UAF units (e.g., STERNENKO reporting) continue to demonstrate proficiency in tactical drone warfare, achieving localized kinetic superiority and confirmed BDA against RF assets. Continued deep strike capacity demonstrated by the Tver depot hit.
  • Setbacks: The operational encirclement risk at Stepnohorsk is the most pressing tactical setback, forcing difficult decisions regarding withdrawal or commitment of scarce reserves. The CI compromise risk remains a potential catastrophic failure point.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

  • Priority Requirements: Immediate requirement for stabilized, maneuverable reserves (e.g., reconstituting BRAVO-BLOCK) to neutralize the 38th GMRB flank. Critical need for engineer assets to assess and stabilize the Pechenihy Dam.
  • Constraints: Manpower quality and quantity (critical labor deferments). Air superiority deficit necessitating reliance on mobile SHORAD, which is now fragmented to protect both the frontline and CNI routes.

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (COGNITIVE DOMAIN)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO is executing a coordinated campaign centered on two pillars:

  1. Narrative of Abandonment: Amplifying reports (NYT, Axios) suggesting EU strategy collapse and a potential "Cold War" between the US and EU, designed to demoralize UAF forces and fracture international support consensus.
  2. Narrative of Internal Strength and Control: Domestically, RF is emphasizing internal socio-political restructuring (lowering citizenship oath age to 14, targeting corruption), signaling stability and long-term consolidation of power, especially in occupied territories (D-S Belief Score 0.169 - HIGH).

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF morale is generally high due to resilience narratives, but two critical domestic stressors are identified:

  • The fate and welfare of POWs (confirmed focus of the Coordination Staff).
  • The anxiety surrounding manpower mobilization and the revocation of critical employee deferment status, threatening economic stability and operational effectiveness through loss of skilled labor.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

  • Positive: EU Ambassadors have agreed upon new sanctions against the RF and Belarus. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)
  • Negative/Uncertainty: The pervasive RF narrative of Western disunity may affect long-term political will and rapid resource provision from allies.

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (FUTURE OPERATIONS - N+72 HOURS)

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

RF utilizes its current tactical advantages to force a phased, disorderly withdrawal of UAF forward elements in the Zaporizhzhia Oblast while solidifying defensive lines around Pokrovsk.

  • Axis of Effort: The 38th GMRB maintains its high operational tempo along the Huliaipole flank, completing a functional operational encirclement (isolation, but not necessarily physical penetration) of the Stepnohorsk axis NLT 251213Z.
  • Infrastructure: Pechenihy Dam breach is managed by RF IO to maximize psychological effect but avoids a full catastrophic failure that would inhibit future RF operations.
  • Information Operations: RF IO will aggressively leverage the anticipated UAF manpower crunch (critical labor status changes) to encourage desertion and dissent.

(CONFIDENCE: HIGH)

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

A coordinated RF effort leverages the CI compromise to enable precision attacks that destroy UAF reserve capacity, leading to localized front collapse.

  • Axis of Effort: Based on intelligence gaps identified on 251207Z, RF launches simultaneous long-range precision strikes (LRPF) on three or more newly established TrO CPs and reserve reconstitution points, rendering the "BRAVO-BLOCK" non-functional.
  • Kinetic Effect: This decisive blow allows RF mechanized forces to break out from the Pokrovsk UBA breach and push rapidly toward the next major defensive line, while the 38th GMRB seals the Stepnohorsk pocket, leading to significant UAF equipment losses and mass prisoner capture events NLT 251212Z.

(CONFIDENCE: MEDIUM - Mitigation via "RED PLAN" is assumed, but not confirmed.)

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

TimelineKey Event/Decision Point (DP)Rationale
NLT 251211Z (24 Hours)DP 1 (Zaporizhzhia Withdrawal): Decision required on committing remaining local reserves to prevent the 38th GMRB link-up, or executing a controlled tactical withdrawal from Stepnohorsk salient.Prevent isolation and potential mass capture.
NLT 251212Z (48 Hours)DP 2 (Pokrovsk Reinforcement): Decision to deploy National Guard or specific Interior Ministry (MVD) assets to stabilize the urban CIO perimeter, freeing up regular mechanized units for counter-attack.Current forces may be insufficient for prolonged CIO.
NLT 251213Z (72 Hours)DP 3 (CI Assessment): Full assessment of the scope of the Kuzmuk leak and confirmation of the security status of all relocated TrO assets.Essential for mitigating MDCOA.

ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE GAPS

6.1. Actionable Recommendations

PriorityActionUnit/CommandTimelineRationale
CRITICALNeutralize 38th GMRB Flank. Commit mobile artillery and immediate FPV drone assets to interdict the 38th GMRB supply line and slow its advance on Huliaipole.J3 (Operations) / Local Joint Task ForceIMMEDIATE (NLT 251211Z 0600Z)This is the most dangerous immediate tactical threat (encirclement).
HIGHDamage Assessment (Pechenihy). Dedicate engineer teams with drone surveillance to acquire Priority 1 data (structural integrity, time-to-failure) to establish a firm hydrological risk matrix.J2 (Intelligence) / J4 (Logistics/Engineers)NLT 251211Z 1200ZStabilize northern logistics and predict future terrain state.
HIGHManpower IO Counter-Campaign. Launch an immediate StratCom effort to reassure "critical enterprise" workers regarding mobilization status and emphasize the strategic importance of their non-combat roles.P7 (Strategic Communications) / Ministry of EconomyIMMEDIATEMitigate the domestic propaganda targeting manpower retention.
MEDIUMUrban Defense Hardening. Prioritize anti-drone (C-UAS) and counter-battery fire (CBF) assets to cover established inner defense lines within the Pokrovsk UBA, reducing reliance on exposed outer perimeters.J3 (Operations) / Local CommandNLT 251212ZMitigate attrition during urban CIO.

6.2. Intelligence Gaps and Collection Requirements

PriorityIntelligence GapCollection Requirements (IR)Rationale
PRIORITY 1 (ENGINEERING)Precise structural integrity and time-to-failure for Pechenihy Dam breach.SAR/GEOINT (High-resolution imagery/thermal) focused on dam structure and downstream flow rate.Critical for consequence management and logistics planning.
PRIORITY 2 (CI/SECURITY)Confirmation of successful relocation/hardening of compromised TrO CPs.HUMINT (Counter-Intelligence teams) and COMINT focused on unusual RF RFAS traffic correlation with former CP locations.Determine if the MDCOA vulnerability still exists.
PRIORITY 3 (MANEUVER)Current location, strength, and estimated time of link-up for the 38th GMRB elements near Huliaipole.Moving Target Indicator (MTI) and EO/IR targeting along the Zaporizhzhia flank.Essential for executing DP 1 (Stepnohorsk withdrawal/defense).
Previous (2025-12-10 12:12:58Z)

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