Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (ISR)

TIME: 2025-12-10 1200Z SUBJECT: Operational Update and Western Flank Hybrid Threat Assessment

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (SITREP)

1.1. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains focused on the Donetsk Axis, specifically the Pokrovsk-Kostiantynivka corridor, where urban combat is confirmed inside the Pokrovsk Built-up Area (UBA). The RF Southern grouping continues flanking maneuvers in the Zaporizhzhia Sector (Stepnohorsk-Huliaipole axis).

A critical new vector of concern is the Western Flank (Transnistria). Multiple intelligence sources confirm increased RF activity in the breakaway region, presenting a high threat of cross-border infiltration and diversionary operations, requiring immediate resource diversion.

1.2. Weather and Environmental Factors

Weather conditions are conducive to continued kinetic operations, with seasonal cooling expected (HIGH CONFIDENCE). The strategic constraint imposed by the Pechenihy Dam strike (Kharkiv region, reported 2025-12-07) remains a key environmental vulnerability, potentially affecting logistics routes and defensive earthworks in the Northeast.

1.3. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

• Donetsk (Pokrovsk): UAF forces are engaged in reactive urban defense (CIO). RF sources claim logistical disruption in Myrnohrad, suggesting RF pressure is extending beyond Pokrovsk to key UAF rear areas.
• Deep Battle: UAF maintains strike tempo (GUR successful action in Zaporizhzhia, reported Moscow drone intercepts). RF continues long-range strikes (Kalibr claim on Dnipropetrovsk).
• Western Flank (NEW): UAF border protection elements are on high alert following multiple reports of enhanced RF mobilization and the confirmed establishment of UAV production facilities within Transnistria.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (RF)

2.1. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

RF Intentions have expanded to include operational distraction and internal security friction generation (HIGH CONFIDENCE).

• Kinetic Pressure: RF continues to mass firepower (KABs confirmed in Northern Kharkiv, 152mm artillery in Donetsk). Intent is to force UAF tactical withdrawals and prevent reinforcement.
• Hybrid Diversion: The primary new intention is to activate the Transnistria Axis for DRG infiltration and low-level sabotage operations, forcing UAF to divert high-value assets (TrO, dedicated maneuver battalions) away from the main defensive fronts (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• Internal Security Exploitation: RF IO is actively exploiting internal Ukrainian governance issues (NABU raids, previous Kuzmuk leak) to damage morale and public confidence in state integrity.

2.2. Recent Tactical Changes and Adaptations

1. Weaponized DRG Threat: RF is actively recruiting and mobilizing forces in Transnistria, coupled with localized UAV production. This suggests the intention to launch coordinated, sophisticated cross-border reconnaissance-strike group (RSG) operations against CNI and rear-area CPs along the western border (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
2. Sustained KAB Use: Continued reliance on guided aerial bombs, challenging UAF Forward Air Defense (FAD) capabilities, particularly in the Kharkiv sector.

2.3. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain robust enough to support high-tempo kinetic operations, but internal infrastructure resilience is strained (e.g., Angarsk TPP failure, confirmed drone intercepts over Moscow requiring frequent AD response). The temporary extension of the "Mir" card system indicates localized economic management required within the RF financial sector (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE).

2.4. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 is adapting to hybrid threats, evidenced by the coordinated focus on CNI destruction, main front pressure (Pokrovsk), and the initiation of the Transnistria vector. The public rewarding of compromised asset Andriy Derkach aligns with RF strategic messaging, prioritizing internal and external propaganda narratives over strict counter-intelligence standards. (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (UAF)

3.1. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are in a complex reactive posture. The GUR operational success in Zaporizhzhia validates the capability for precision strikes and local counter-exploitation. However, the operational tempo at Pokrovsk is exhausting local reserves.

3.2. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Successes: Confirmed successful GUR operations targeting RF equipment and personnel in Zaporizhzhia. Successful interception of RF deep strikes (implied by AD activity over Moscow).
• Setbacks: The Pokrovsk tactical perimeter breach and shift to urban combat represents a significant tactical setback. The unresolved structural integrity and flooding risk from the Pechenihy Dam strike continue to constrain maneuverability in the Kharkiv sector.

3.3. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate need is to allocate resources to mitigate the three primary threats:

1. Western Flank Security: Need for additional personnel and counter-DRG/counter-UAV assets along the Transnistrian border.
2. CI Mitigation: Resources dedicated to rapidly changing all compromised TrO operational plans (following the Kuzmuk leak).
3. AD Protection: Mobile SHORAD is required to counter high-volume KAB use in the Kharkiv/Donetsk sectors while protecting CNI and logistic hubs.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (IE)

4.1. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

• RF Narrative (Partition & Collapse): RF media is heavily pushing the narrative of a potential "Korean Scenario" (US-backed partition of Ukraine along current lines of contact). This is a highly effective cognitive warfare tool designed to generate despair, incite strategic disagreement between Kyiv and its allies, and paralyze national decision-making (HIGH CONFIDENCE).
• RF Narrative (Corruption & Moral Degradation): RF is weaponizing internal Ukrainian anti-corruption actions (NABU raids on DPS) and promoting claims of mass desertion to suggest systemic collapse of the Ukrainian state and military integrity.

4.2. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Internal UAF morale is likely under pressure due to the Pokrovsk fight and the constant threat of deep strikes. While the NABU raids demonstrate commitment to anti-corruption, the messaging must be carefully controlled to prevent RF IO from characterizing the actions as systemic failure or internal collapse.

4.3. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The surfacing of the "Korean Scenario" rumor in international media, regardless of its authenticity, signals a potential softening of diplomatic resolve among some Western partners, increasing pressure on Kyiv to consider unfavorable political solutions.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

5.1. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

MLCOA: Transnistrian Fixation and Pokrovsk Consolidation (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

RF will maximize the perceived threat from Transnistria by utilizing small DRG teams, sporadic mortar fire, and UAV reconnaissance sorties along the border (MOL/UKR). This low-intensity action will achieve the strategic goal of forcing UAF to allocate 2-3 Brigade Tactical Groups (BTGs) to the western defense lines. Simultaneously, RF reinforces the Pokrovsk UBA, leveraging the existing breach to establish consolidated defensive positions within the city limits and push logistical lines towards Myrnohrad.

• Timeline: NLT 72 hours (2025-12-13 1200Z).

5.2. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

MDCOA: Multi-Axis Operational Paralysis (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE)

RF initiates a large-scale, coordinated drone and missile strike package (Kalibr, Shahed-Jet variants) targeting newly identified TrO CPs (using intelligence from the Kuzmuk breach) and strategic targets near Kyiv and Lviv. Simultaneously, the 38th GMRB completes the Huliaipole flanking maneuver, isolating UAF forward units in Zaporizhzhia, while high-mobility RF DRG units (supported by Transnistrian UAV production) execute coordinated sabotage against western CNI (rail, power distribution) to interrupt immediate NATO/Western supply flow.

• Timeline: NLT 96 hours (2025-12-14 1200Z).

5.3. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. Western Border Security (IMMEDIATE - J3/J2):

   • ACTION: Establish a dedicated Joint Task Force (JTF) for the Transnistria border. Immediately deploy specialized Counter-DRG units and re-task aerial reconnaissance assets (e.g., Bayraktar) for continuous surveillance of the border zone.
   • OBJECTIVE: Prevent DRG/RSG infiltration and confirm/deny the scale of the UAV production threat.

2. Counter-Intelligence & Security (IMMEDIATE - J2/J6):

   • ACTION: Execute an emergency J6 protocol to change encryption keys and radio frequency plans for all Territorial Defense units nationwide. Assume 100% compromise of all pre-2025-12-07 CP locations and cache sites.
   • OBJECTIVE: Mitigate RF precision strike potential using compromised data.

3. Strategic Communications (IMMEDIATE - P7/NCA):

   • ACTION: National Command Authority (NCA) must immediately and unequivocally reject the "Korean Scenario" proposition in all public forums, clarifying that Ukraine's objective remains restoration of 1991 borders.
   • OBJECTIVE: Counter RF psychological operations designed to undermine political unity and international support.

4. Operational Maneuver (URGENT - J3):

   • ACTION: Shift the Pokrovsk defense strategy from perimeter defense to Defense-in-Depth within the urban terrain. Establish defined, mutually supporting strong points and authorize tactical reserves to execute limited counter-infiltration operations only. Conserve strategic reserves.
   • OBJECTIVE: Prevent complete RF seizure of Pokrovsk while maintaining force integrity for future counter-attack operations.