Situation Report

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - OPERATIONAL UPDATE: POST-PHOENIX ASSESSMENT & DONETSK EXPLOITATION

TIME: 101230Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: STEPNOHORSK STABILIZATION, DONETSK SECTOR DETERIORATION, AND ASYMMETRIC RETALIATION

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The focus has shifted from the critical maneuver in the South to containing intensified Russian Federation (RF) efforts to exploit weaknesses in the Donetsk sector and managing the predicted asymmetrical retaliation for the Syzran NPZ strike.

1. Southern Operational Zone (Stepnohorsk Axis): The retrograde (Operation PHOENIX) expiration window (NLT 101200Z DEC) has passed. Confirmation of successful materiel retention and C2 integrity remains the Priority 1 Intelligence Gap.
2. Donetsk Operational Zone (Pokrovsk Axis): RF forces are actively engaging in offensive operations, with confirmation of forces storming Rodynske near Mirnohrad (0607Z). The operational pressure extends towards the Konstantinovka direction (0611Z), indicating RF intent to fully capitalize on the previously reported Pokrovsk breach (07 DEC).
3. Deep Battle and Rear Areas: Confirmed RF kinetic retaliation is underway in the operational depth. Reports confirm one civilian fatality and two injuries in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast (0544Z). Simultaneously, RF Air Defense (AD) downed a fourth drone approaching Moscow (0549Z), confirming continued UAF deep strike persistence.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Previous reports of fog in the Kyiv region (100532Z) may have facilitated the latest deep strike attempts. No new significant environmental updates.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF posture is transitioning units from the Southern Axis to stabilization and reconstitution areas. Immediate reinforcement and integrated fire support are urgently required in the Donetsk operational zone (Rodynske/Konstantinovka axis) to prevent a rapid collapse of forward defensive positions. RF forces are employing fixed-wing assets in the Kharkiv direction (0605Z, Vovchansk sector) indicating localized tactical air superiority efforts.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is currently three-pronged: Operational Exploitation (Donetsk), Strategic Denial (Deep Defense), and Asymmetrical Punishment (Kinetic Retaliation).

• Tactical Exploitation (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): RF forces are maximizing pressure on the Pokrovsk defensive line, with confirmed assaults on Rodynske. Intent is to isolate or overrun forward UAF elements before they can establish a coherent fallback position.
• Asymmetric Retaliation (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): The strike causing civilian casualties in Dnipropetrovsk validates the previous MLCOA prediction. This response targets civilian and logistical infrastructure within the immediate rear area to disrupt UAF reconstitution and command functions.
• Technological Adaptation (MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Judgment): RF state media and affiliated channels are actively promoting the recruitment of specialized technical/intel personnel ("YAKIM" detachment) and discussing the imminent fielding of drone swarms (by early 2026), indicating a proactive shift towards AI/drone warfare doctrine.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

The confirmed shutdown of the Syzran NPZ is publicly verified by UAF sources (0606Z) and remains a critical strategic effect, forcing RF C2 to re-route fuel supplies or draw upon strategic reserves. This provides a temporary but measurable degradation of RF fuel capacity.

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating both strategic defense (Moscow AD) and complex multi-axis offensives (Donetsk). However, the high-profile detention of a Deputy Head of Administration in Snizhne (occupied Donbas, 0601Z) for corruption suggests that governance and internal security challenges persist, potentially undermining civil-military cooperation in the occupied regions.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Units are maintaining a high operational tempo, successfully transitioning defensive operations in the South but facing heightened stress in the Donetsk sector. Readiness is dependent on rapid re-allocation of joint fire assets to the Rodynske defense line. The successful deep strike persistence provides a critical morale counterweight to the tactical pressure in the East.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Success (Deep Battle): Continued successful deep strike penetration attempts over Moscow (four confirmed shoot-downs), maintaining strategic initiative and pressuring RF AD assets.
• Success (Strategic Attrition): Full confirmation of Syzran NPZ shutdown by multiple sources.
• Setback (Kinetic Damage): Confirmed KIA and WIA in Dnipropetrovsk Oblast due to RF strikes.
• Setback (Maneuver): RF assault on Rodynske signals deterioration of the forward defensive perimeter near Pokrovsk.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most critical requirement is the immediate re-prioritization of counter-battery fire, reconnaissance, and available operational reserves (especially any residual "BRAVO-BLOCK" elements) to stabilize the Rodynske/Konstantinovka axis NLT 101600Z DEC. SHORAD assets must be deployed to protect CNI in the Dnipropetrovsk/Poltava sector against confirmed retaliation.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Information Warfare (IW) has amplified efforts aimed at undermining state legitimacy and internal stability:

1. Governance Corruption Narrative (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): TASS utilized an ex-SBU agent to push the narrative of systemic corruption hindering child evacuation, designed to strain international humanitarian cooperation.
2. Occupation Legalization (HIGH CONFIDENCE - Fact): RF legalized the "mass extraction of housing" in occupied territories (0550Z), directly supporting a strategy of displacement and coercive control, targeting civilian property rights and stability.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

UAF domestic sentiment is currently sensitive to speculation regarding international support. The rumor concerning a US 20-point peace plan (0608Z), which allegedly includes a ban on military fundraising ("rusoriz"), poses an immediate threat to domestic morale and financial sustainment efforts. This rumor requires urgent, authoritative counter-narrative messaging.

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The immediate diplomatic objective remains leveraging the Syzran strike BDA to secure further long-range strike capabilities. Simultaneously, the NCA must be prepared to formally address and deconstruct the alleged US peace plan to prevent panic or speculation regarding Western abandonment.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 90%): Consolidation of Donetsk Gains and Sustained Retaliation. RF forces will consolidate control over Rodynske and utilize fixed-wing KAB assets and heavy artillery to pressure UAF defensive positions directly east of Konstantinovka. Simultaneously, RF deep strikes (Shahed/missile) will continue targeting rail nodes and energy facilities in the Dnipropropetrovsk/Kharkiv operational depth until 102400Z DEC to mitigate the strategic effects of the Syzran NPZ shutdown. RF IW will leverage the new property seizure law to drive internal displacement.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(MEDIUM CONFIDENCE - Probability 55%): Breakthrough and Encirclement Threat in Donetsk. If UAF reserves fail to stabilize the Rodynske sector by late afternoon, RF mechanized elements (likely reinforced by 38th GMRB if the flanking maneuver at Huliaipole succeeds) will execute a rapid penetration past Konstantinovka, threatening to isolate forward UAF elements in the Mirnohrad area. Simultaneously, RF utilizes compromised TrO data (Kuzmuk breach) to launch precision strikes against a key UAF Divisional Command Post (CP) in the Poltava/Kryvyi Rih area NLT 101800Z DEC.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated Focus)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The primary collection focus has shifted from the Stepnohorsk retrograde to the stabilization of the Donetsk line and mitigation of RF retaliation.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The immediate objective is to reinforce the deteriorating Donetsk sector while simultaneously mitigating confirmed retaliatory strikes against the rear area.

1. KINETIC OPERATIONS & C2 MANAGEMENT (J3)

• Action A (Donetsk Stabilization - CRITICAL): Immediately reallocate 75% of available joint fires (MLRS, 155mm) from the Southern Operational Zone to provide concentrated fire support to the Rodynske defense line. Prioritize counter-battery against 152mm Giatsint-B positions to reduce high-explosive saturation.
• Action B (SHORAD Deployment - URGENT): J3/J4 must ensure mobile SHORAD assets (e.g., Gepard/Avenger/man-portable systems) are operational and deployed to maximum readiness level around the Dnipropetrovsk rail junction and Poltava energy grid NLT 101700Z DEC to counter expected missile/Shahed retaliation.
• Action C (Deep Strike Coordination - J2/J3): Utilize confirmed RF AD activity (Moscow/Bryansk) to identify persistent weaknesses in RF deep defense sequencing. Prepare follow-on deep strike missions (NLT 102400Z DEC) targeting secondary RF fuel depots identified in the Central Military District (CMD).

2. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION & COUNTER-IW (P7/MFA)

• Action A (Counter US Plan Rumor - CRITICAL/MFA): The National Command Authority (NCA) must issue a high-level, definitive statement within the next six hours, dismissing the STERNENKO rumor regarding a US 20-point plan as enemy disinformation aimed at fracturing internal support and morale. Stress the unwavering nature of Western aid.
• Action B (Hydro-Terrorism & Legalization Narrative - P7/MFA): Integrate the RF legalization of property seizure in occupied territories into the existing narrative of war crimes (following the Pechenihy Dam strike). Frame this as "state-sponsored looting and ethnic cleansing" to pressure international diplomatic bodies.
• Action C (Domestic Recruitment Counter-Measure - P7): Counter the RF specialized technical recruitment drive ("YAKIM") by launching parallel UAF messaging emphasizing the superiority and successful application of Ukrainian technology and FPV capabilities in the conflict (e.g., highlighting Syzran success).

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