Situation Report

SENIOR MILITARY INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - URGENT REVISION

TIME: 100230Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: REVISED: STEPNOHORSK/HULIAIPOLE FLANK PRESSURE INTENSIFIES // IO COUNTER-STRIKE WINDOW CLOSING

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational risk level remains CRITICAL. New RF claims of seizing Ostapivske (Dnipropetrovsk region) suggest an expansion of the RF flanking effort aimed at the Zaporizhzhia junction.

• Zaporizhzhia MLD (Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk): RF maneuver elements (likely 38th GMRB reinforcing the 37th GMRB) are broadening the attack axis, creating operational depth near the Dnipropetrovsk border junction (Ostapivske). This action directly threatens the northern shoulder of the Stepnohorsk defensive box.
• Pokrovsk Axis: RF drone strikes confirmed to be disrupting UAF rotation attempts (32nd Ombr), maintaining constant tactical pressure and inhibiting relief/resupply efforts.
• Weather: No change. Cold weather and reduced visibility continue to favor RF infiltration and mechanized maneuvering.

B. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

UAF Command Authority remains under extreme cognitive pressure. The primary kinetic risk (Huliaipole flank collapse) is now coupled with a secondary flanking risk (Ostapivske advance). UAF C2 is focused on obtaining positive BDA on the status of the Huliaipole reserve commitment, which remains the single most critical unknown variable.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent remains: Execute Strategic Paralysis (via IO) to facilitate Kinetic Breakthrough (Huliaipole/Stepnohorsk).

• Kinetic Synchronization (NEW DATA): The RF claim of seizing Ostapivske (Dnipropetrovsk) provides supporting evidence that the kinetic breakthrough effort is successful and broadening its scope. If confirmed, this 1km expansion near the Zaporizhzhia junction strengthens the RF position for an operational encirclement attempt of the Stepnohorsk salient. (Confidence: MEDIUM - Based on RF source claim, high operational relevance).
• Tactical Inhibition (POKROVSK): The confirmed use of UAVs by the "Ural" brigade to disrupt the rotation of UAF 32nd Ombr positions at Pokrovsk indicates RF maintains effective Intelligence-Reconnaissance-Strike (IRS) integration to prevent UAF force regeneration.
• IO Maintenance: RF maintains high-tempo information saturation (e.g., the trivial Trump incident coverage) to keep UAF and international decision-makers cognitively overloaded and distracted from the core kinetic threat.

B. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF sustainment remains focused on maximizing the operational window before UAF reserves can stabilize the front. The planned 100600Z DEC precision strike against UAF logistics remains the critical time-sensitive threat (Confidence: HIGH).

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 effectiveness remains HIGH, evidenced by the coordinated application of kinetic pressure (Ostapivske claim, Pokrovsk UAV strike) and continued IO synchronization.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

Posture remains reactive and defensive under extreme duress. The most critical failure remains the inability to confirm the status of the reserve commitment at Huliaipole, placing operational planning in a maximum-risk default mode.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

The successful execution of rotations at Pokrovsk (32nd Ombr) is now inhibited by confirmed RF drone strikes. If the RF claims regarding Ostapivske are validated, it represents a significant tactical setback by widening the RF penetration axis and further complicating the defense of Stepnohorsk.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The most acute constraint is time and C2 clarity. The decision window for stabilizing the Huliaipole flank is closing rapidly.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

The RF IO campaign is now operating simultaneously on strategic and tactical levels:

B. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

The sustained IO focus on US domestic politics confirms the RF strategy of targeting the perceived weakness of Kyiv's Western diplomatic lifeline. The urgent need for a UAF counter-narrative (NLT 100230Z DEC from previous SITREP) must be actioned immediately.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 90%): Flank Consolidation and Logistical Interdiction. RF assumes success in delaying the UAF reserve commitment. RF forces consolidate the newly claimed gains at Ostapivske NLT 100400Z DEC, effectively widening the breach area. The operational tempo at Pokrovsk is maintained via sustained UAV strikes to fix UAF forces. The key decision point remains the 100600Z DEC precision strike on UAF logistics caches (Ananyev corridor).

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE - Probability 70%): Operationally Decisive Encirclement. If the Huliaipole reserve commitment is confirmed as failed/withheld, the RF 35th Army utilizes the new operational depth provided by the Ostapivske advance to initiate rapid tactical encirclement maneuvers against Stepnohorsk NLT 100400Z DEC. The successful encirclement, combined with the successful 100600Z DEC precision strike, creates a regional collapse that forces a wider UAF withdrawal across the Southern front.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points (Updated for 100230Z DEC 25)

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

The expansion of the flanking maneuver necessitates immediate re-prioritization of ISR assets.

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The primary mission remains the kinetic stabilization of the Huliaipole flank and the immediate counter-strike in the Information Domain.

1. KINETIC OPERATIONS & MANEUVER (J3/J2)

• Action A (Huliaipole Stabilization - CRITICAL): Re-issue/Confirm the reserve commitment order NLT 100300Z DEC. Given the confirmed expansion of RF flanking maneuvers (Ostapivske), the commitment is now non-negotiable, even without BDA confirmation of the previous order.
• Action B (New Flank Defense): Dispatch a light reconnaissance element immediately toward the Ostapivske area to confirm RF presence and velocity (CR PRIORITY 2). Prepare local Territorial Defense (TrO) elements in Dnipropetrovsk to serve as temporary speed bumps, prioritizing mobility over holding static lines.
• Action C (Pokrovsk Defense): Immediately adjust UAF 32nd Ombr rotation procedures to utilize dispersed, irregular infiltration paths rather than predictable GLOCs. Allocate mobile EW assets to provide localized counter-UAV cover during rotation windows.

2. LOGISTICS AND COUNTER-INTELLIGENCE (J4/J2)

• Action A (Pre-Strike Mitigation): Assume Ananyev corridor is interdicted by 100600Z DEC. Immediately redirect 50% of inbound critical supplies (e.g., artillery shells) to the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro bypass.
• Action B (CI Alert): Increase electronic signature and communications security (COMSEC) in the Stepnohorsk C2 nodes. Assume RF is attempting to correlate tactical movement (reserves) with IO pressure.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION (P7 - COGNITIVE COUNTER-STRIKE)

• Action A (Counter-Abandonment Narrative - CRITICAL): ABSOLUTELY NO FURTHER DELAY. The NCA address countering the "inevitable defeat" narrative must be launched NLT 100300Z DEC. The message must directly address the domestic anxiety induced by both the US media reports and the perceived kinetic setbacks (Ostapivske, Pokrovsk).
• Action B (Refocus Narrative): Shift domestic messaging focus away from geopolitical macro-concerns toward validated tactical resilience and the effectiveness of immediate anti-corruption measures (Kuzmuk dismissal). Use the Pokrovsk drone strike video as evidence of RF desperation to stop successful UAF rotation, rather than RF strength.

//END OF REPORT//