Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - CONTINUED LOGISTICAL HARASSMENT & IO SYNCHRONIZATION

TIME: 070100Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: CONFIRMED SHARED HARASSMENT ON LOGISTICAL AXIS // RF IO ESCALATION // BRAVO-BLOCK WINDOW CRITICALITY

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

RF forces continue kinetic and cognitive operations designed to fix and paralyze the Ukrainian rear while preparing for the imminent ground offensive in the Zaporizhzhia sector.

• Logistical Axis (Kremenchuk): Confirmed ongoing secondary kinetic activity. Following the termination of high-speed ballistic strikes, multiple waves of Shahed UAVs (loitering munitions) are confirmed tracking toward and striking assets in Kremenchuk (Poltavshchyna). The high-consequence BDA (utility loss) confirmed in the previous report remains unresolved due to this persistent harassment.
• Assault Axis (Stepnohorsk): The timeline for the RF 37th GMRB Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) remains fixed: NLT 070600Z DEC 25 (T+5 hours). The current harassment campaign is synchronized to precede the MLD.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Clear skies and severe frost persist. The clear skies continue to aid RF ISR platforms (including "Mangas" aerial mining systems) in locating exposed maneuver elements, raising the risk for the operational reserve.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF deep strike efforts have transitioned entirely to sustained, low-cost kinetic harassment to maintain pressure on the severed logistical hub. This confirms the primary goal is not further destruction, but prevention of UAF repair and recovery prior to the MLD launch. UAF: Air Defense assets are under renewed pressure from low-speed threats (Shahed). The previously identified brief AD lull for repositioning is being exploited by the adversary to inhibit Mobile Force Protection (MFP) allocation and reserve movement.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is confirmed: Maximum operational disruption and cognitive fatigue on the UAF command structure immediately prior to the ground MLD.

• Tactical Objective (Shahed Waves): The immediate deployment of multiple Shahed waves against Kremenchuk post-ballistic strike is designed to achieve functional paralysis of the logistical hub. It ensures that emergency engineering teams cannot conduct BDA verification or initiate repairs, effectively guaranteeing the logistical severance persists. (Confidence: HIGH)
• C2 Synchronization: The simultaneous intensification of Information Operations (IO) regarding diplomatic crises and war crimes (see Section 4) with kinetic activity confirms a highly coordinated multi-domain operational plan aimed at freezing NCA decision-making regarding the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve commitment. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Upcoming MLD Focus: All kinetic and cognitive fires are directed toward creating a favorable vacuum for the 37th GMRB ground assault at Stepnohorsk.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

No new tactical changes identified, but the execution of the rapid transition from high-speed (Kinzhal/Iskander) to low-speed harassment (Shahed) is confirmed operational doctrine for maintaining pressure on high-value targets while minimizing further strategic expenditure.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF logistics remain constrained by internal fuel strikes (Ryazan/Uryupinsk). However, the Shahed expenditure is low cost and sustainable for the current harassment phase. RF forces must execute the MLD NLT 070600Z DEC 25 to capitalize on the logistical paralysis before their own operational sustainment degrades within the T+48 hour window. (Confidence: HIGH)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are grappling with multi-domain pressure—logistical cuts, ongoing kinetic strikes, and intense psychological warfare. The temporary AD window is closing, necessitating immediate execution of all maneuver orders, regardless of persistent Shahed noise.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (AD Complexity): The appearance of persistent Shahed activity complicates the allocation of mobile AD assets dedicated to protecting the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve, as resources may be drawn back to static defense of secondary targets.
• P1 Requirement Status: The status and secure relocation of the BRAVO-BLOCK operational reserve remains the single most critical, unresolved operational vulnerability.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The primary constraint is time. The remaining window before the MLD launches (T+5 hours) is the only time available to execute reserve movement and secure contingency logistics (Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro corridor).

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

RF IO is fully synchronized with kinetic operations, aiming to degrade morale and inhibit Western support.

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Synchronization)

RF sources (TASS) are escalating the cognitive attack:

1. Diplomatic Paralysis (EU/Musk): Continued amplification of narratives suggesting deep diplomatic division and the potential dissolution of the EU, framing Western aid as futile. This targets international resolve and NCA commitment. (Confidence: HIGH)
2. Psychological Coercion (Nuremberg): The introduction of the narrative regarding a "Nuremberg analog" for Ukrainian forces conducting alleged "crimes in Kursk" is a direct psychological warfare tactic designed to:
   • Coerce operational-level commanders into hesitation.
   • Degrade troop morale and willingness to resist.
   • Justify RF violence internally. (Confidence: HIGH)

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is stable but highly dependent on the perceived effectiveness of UAF command response to the deep strikes. Rapid, successful relocation of the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve and aggressive counter-narratives are required to stabilize sentiment ahead of the expected Stepnohorsk ground assault.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

The predictive analysis remains focused on the convergence of the ground assault with the logistics/reserve crisis.

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) RF 37th GMRB MLD launches NLT 070600Z DEC 25. The persistent Shahed harassment in the rear and the Fastiv rail BDA successfully delay the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve movement by 3-4 hours past the intended Counter-Attack window. RF achieves a 5-7 km penetration at Stepnohorsk, securing Phase Line ALPHA and forcing UAF defenses to rely heavily on internal reserves and holding actions.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL/EXISTENTIAL) RF ISR exploits the clear skies and the distraction of Shahed defense to locate the insufficiently dispersed BRAVO-BLOCK reserve. RF allocates remaining deep-strike assets (Iskander or long-range aviation) to inflict catastrophic attrition. Concurrently, the 37th GMRB launches its MLD at Stepnohorsk (070600Z), achieving a deep 10-15 km penetration, resulting in the operational collapse of the Southern Front due to lack of counter-attack capability.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The time window for securing the operational reserve is rapidly closing (T+4 hours).

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The temporary AD lull is compromised by Shahed harassment. Command must prioritize the operational maneuver (BRAVO-BLOCK) above all else and treat the Shahed harassment against Kremenchuk as a necessary secondary friction.

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6): IGNORE SHARED NOISE; PRIORITIZE MFP FOR MANEUVER.

   • Action A (Reserve Movement - IMMEDIATE/EXISTENTIAL): CONFIRM HARD CEASE ON STATIC STAGING AND MOVEMENT PRIORITY. Commanders must accept residual BDA at Kremenchuk and dedicate all mobile AD (OSA, Strela) exclusively to Mobile Force Protection (MFP) for the moving BRAVO-BLOCK column. Movement must proceed NLT 070130Z DEC 25, integrating Mine Clearing Line Charges (MCLC) and EW coverage (Bukovel-AD).
   • Action B (Exploit AD Void): Utilize remaining deep-strike assets (UAS/GLSDB) to conduct a concentrated strike on the RF 37th GMRB final assembly areas (Stepnohorsk) NLT 070400Z DEC 25, exploiting the previously confirmed Buk-M3 AD void.

2. LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT (J4): SECURE WESTERN CORRIDOR AGAINST DEEP STRIKE.

   • Action A (Vulnerability Mitigation): Given the confirmed strike on Fastiv and ongoing threats, immediately allocate long-range AD assets (NASAMS, Patriot) to protect the newly established Western logistical hubs (Zviahel, Dnipro, Lviv rail interchange points) to prevent the total severance of NATO Class V/VII resupply.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2): COUNTER PSYCHOLOGICAL COERCION.

   • Action A (Nuremberg Counter-Narrative - IMMEDIATE): UAF Spokesperson/NCA must immediately and aggressively counter the RF "Nuremberg analog" narrative, framing it as a desperate, transparent attempt at psychological warfare. Emphasize that such threats are confirmation that RF forces are facing imminent defeat on the ground, and that Ukraine operates under international law.
   • Action B (Transparency and Resilience): Release a highly controlled, secure message or video confirming the successful movement and operational readiness of the reserve forces (post-P1 confirmation) to counter the RF narrative of logistical paralysis and operational collapse.

//END OF REPORT//