Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (SITREP) - DEEP STRIKE CONVERGENCE AND RESERVE VULNERABILITY

TIME: 070004Z DEC 25 SUBJECT: RF DEEP STRIKE ESCALATION // KREMENCHUK SATURATION STRIKE // CONTINUED LOGISTICAL SEVERANCE ATTEMPT

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW (Current Operational Picture)

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The Russian Federation (RF) has achieved full convergence of its deep strike assets (Hypersonic, Ballistic, UAS) against the Central Ukrainian logistical axis.

• Deep Battle Axis (Kremenchuk): Confirmed saturation strike utilizing Kh-47M2 Kinzhal (Hypersonic) and 9K720 Iskander (Ballistic) systems against the Kremenchuk logistical node. This confirms RF commitment to achieving catastrophic Battle Damage Assessment (BDA).
• Northern/Western Axis (New Threat Vectors): Fresh waves of Shahed UAVs are tracking toward Poltava region (reinforcing Kremenchuk pressure) and the Zhytomyr/Kyiv border area (seeking new high-value targets or exploiting AD dispersal). This forces the Ukrainian Air Force (UAF) to defend multiple, geographically distinct axes simultaneously.
• Eastern Axis (Sustained Pressure): Confirmed use of KAB Guided Bombs against targets in Kharkiv Oblast, indicating sustained kinetic pressure on the Northern Operational Zone to fix UAF forces away from the Southern MLD.
• Southern Axis (Pending MLD): The status of the RF 37th GMRB Main Effort Land Drive (MLD) at Stepnohorsk remains the primary tactical driver. The preceding deep strike is designed to maximize logistical paralysis prior to the ground assault.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors Affecting Operations

Severe frost continues. Skies remain clear enough for effective ISR/RECCE flights following ballistic impacts.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF deep strike command (C2) demonstrates successful coordination of multi-domain kinetic assets (UAS, Kinzhal, Iskander) to guarantee BDA at the highest priority target (Kremenchuk). RF intent is clearly to achieve logistical paralysis before the MLD fully commits. UAF: Air Defense is critically stressed. The lack of confirmation regarding the "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve movement status (as warned in the previous report) places this vital operational element in extreme jeopardy given the confirmed use of precise ballistic systems (Iskander) by the enemy in the immediate area.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS (Threat Assessment)

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent is confirmed as achieving immediate operational-level logistical severance concurrent with the MLD launch.

• Capability Escalation: RF is expending high-value, limited inventory assets (Kinzhal, Iskander) in concentrated strikes. This indicates that RF operational planning is highly time-sensitive, likely aiming to capitalize on the T+48h window before their own logistical strain (following the Ryazan/Uryupinsk strikes) becomes critical. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Tactical Targeting Shift: The confirmed threat of ballistic missile launches originating from Crimea suggests RF is targeting UAF rear logistical staging areas or high-value C2 nodes previously considered secure from shorter-range ballistic threats, further stressing the UAF AD envelope. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Synchronicity: The attacks on Kremenchuk and Kharkiv, combined with ongoing UAS saturation on the Kyiv axis, indicate a coordinated operational plan to fix UAF operational reserves and AD assets across three different military districts.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary adaptation is the convergence of high-speed systems (Kinzhal/Iskander) on a single, hardened target (Kremenchuk). This move is designed to overwhelm localized UAF AD saturation defenses and guarantee destruction of rail/refinery infrastructure.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF kinetic capacity is currently HIGH, leveraging strategic reserves for the deep strike campaign. Their operational tempo will likely decrease significantly in T+48 hours if UAF BDA on the RF fuel supply chain (Ryazan/Uryupinsk) is confirmed as severe. This fuels the urgency of the current RF kinetic effort.

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES (Blue Force Tracking)

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

AD Readiness is critical, operating at maximum capacity against a combined UAS/ballistic/hypersonic threat package. The operational decision space is severely compressed.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

• Setback (Deep Strike BDA): The extent of the BDA at Kremenchuk remains unknown (Gap P1), but the confirmed use of converging high-value assets suggests the functional capacity of the central logistical hub is likely nil.
• Critical Unknown (Maneuver): The status of the "BRAVO-BLOCK" reserve movement is now an operational liability. If the column has not moved or is stalled in assembly areas, it is now exposed to Iskander precision strike, aligning with the MDCOA.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CONSTRAINT: UAF AD must immediately prioritize Mobile Force Protection (MFP) for maneuver elements (BRAVO-BLOCK) over static site protection (Kremenchuk). REQUIREMENT: Immediate activation of the Western logistical hub contingency (Lviv-Zviahel) is mandatory, assuming 0% central axis throughput for the next T+96 hours.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT (Cognitive Domain)

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns (Hybrid Synchronization)

RF IO is leveraging the period of maximum kinetic escalation to reinforce key domestic and international narratives.

• Domestic Narrative: TASS reports regarding Putin's "Direct Line" (high volume of appeals) are designed to project stability and connection between the leadership and the populace during a period of massive kinetic commitment and domestic logistical strain (fuel shortages). (Confidence: HIGH)
• Strategic Disinformation (Atrocity Amplification): RF milbloggers (Colonelcassad) are amplifying coordinated narratives regarding alleged UAF 'neonazi' abuse of Russian servicemen. This is timed to distract from the massive military cost and humanitarian impact of the Kinzhal/Iskander strike on civilian infrastructure, aiming to reduce diplomatic empathy. (Confidence: HIGH)
• Diplomatic Counter-Narrative: The confirmed phone call between Macron and Zelensky occurred amidst the Kinzhal strike. This provides an opportunity to counter the previous "Peace Trap" narratives but requires rapid synchronization to leverage French diplomatic support against the RF escalation.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

National morale is being tested by the widespread air alert and the psychological impact of repeated hypersonic strikes. UAF must rapidly deploy counter-narratives that focus on AD successes (if any) or emphasize the strategic desperation of RF to use these expensive systems.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS (Future Operations)

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(HIGH CONFIDENCE) Phase I BDA at Kremenchuk is assessed as decisive structural damage to the primary rail bridge and adjacent fuel infrastructure. RF Deep Battle continues saturation strikes against secondary logistical nodes (Dnipro/Kropyvnytskyi) using UAS and cruise missiles (Kalibr/Kh-59). The RF 37th GMRB MLD launches NLT 070600Z DEC 25 at Stepnohorsk, encountering initial, supply-constrained UAF defense, leading to a shallow 5-7 km operational penetration.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL/EXISTENTIAL) The Kinzhal/Iskander strike package successfully achieves catastrophic BDA across multiple Kremenchuk targets (Bridge, Refinery, and/or surrounding C2/assembly areas). Concurrent intelligence (ISR/RECCE) detects the stalled or slowly moving BRAVO-BLOCK reserve column. RF launches subsequent waves of Iskander and/or Aviation (Su-34/Su-35) supported by the newly established Crimean ballistic threat, targeting the exposed reserve column, achieving >50% attrition and neutralizing the UAF operational counter-attack capability. This leads to the operational collapse of the Southern Front within T+72 hours.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The critical window for proactive decisions has closed; focus is now on immediate reaction and survival measures.

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

The multi-domain kinetic pressure requires immediate, decentralized execution of pre-planned crisis protocols, prioritizing the survival of the operational reserve.

1. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER & FIRES (J3/J6): PRIORITIZE RESERVE SURVIVAL ABOVE ALL ELSE.

   • Action A (Reserve Movement - IMMEDIATE/EXISTENTIAL): The Commander-in-Chief must now enforce a HARD CEASE on all static waiting/staging. BRAVO-BLOCK must execute immediate, dispersed movement along secondary/tertiary axes, utilizing maximum speed and dispersal protocols, regardless of immediate MCLC status. Maximize EW coverage (Bukovel-AD) during movement.
   • Action B (AD Allocation - CRITICAL): Divert all available mobile short/medium-range Air Defense systems (e.g., Gepard/OSA/Strela) to provide Mobile Force Protection (MFP) for the moving BRAVO-BLOCK column. The risk to the reserve outweighs the negligible benefit of defending the already-hit Kremenchuk hub.

2. LOGISTICS AND SUSTAINMENT (J4): IMPLEMENT LOGISTICAL SEVERANCE CONTINGENCY.

   • Action A (Red Route Activation): Formal declaration of the central logistical axis (Fastiv/Kremenchuk) as inoperable for heavy lift for T+96 hours. Activate full reliance on the Lviv-Zviahel-Dnipro Western corridor. Establish forward fuel/ammo depots outside known RF target envelopes (e.g., Poltava/Kropyvnytskyi regions).
   • Action B (C2 Redundancy): All forward J4/G2 elements must immediately execute C2 relocation/redundancy protocols, shifting operational nodes away from major city centers due to the confirmed Kinzhal/Iskander threat pattern.

3. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7/G2): COUNTER KINETIC TERROR AND ADVERSARY IO.

   • Action A (Kinetic Counter-Narrative - IMMEDIATE): UAF Spokesperson must immediately address the Kinzhal/Iskander convergence, framing the expenditure of such strategic assets as a sign of RF desperation and failure to achieve ground objectives. Emphasize the protection of personnel over infrastructure.
   • Action B (Diplomatic Leverage): Strategic Communications must immediately leverage the Macron/Zelensky contact to solicit enhanced, immediate delivery of long-range anti-ballistic AD systems (Patriot/SAMP/T) to protect the now-vulnerable Western logistical hubs.

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