Situation Report

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTREP)

TIME: 2025-12-06 12:00Z

SUBJECT: MLD THREAT IMMINENT // DEEP STRIKE SHIFT TO TACTICAL LOGISTICS AND ZNPP VULNERABILITY

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1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational picture is characterized by immediate, layered Russian Federation (RF) deep strikes targeting the resilience of the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) supply chain and critical national infrastructure, preceding the anticipated Main Land Drive (MLD) launch at Stepnohorsk.

• Strategic Logistics (Fastiv): Confirmed critical degradation of rail capacity remains the primary constraint on UAF operational reserve (BRAVO-BLOCK) movement. (Confirmed by RF IO footage, 11:25Z).
• Tactical Logistics (Dnipro): RF deep strike activity has expanded to target tactical and commercial logistics hubs near the front line. Confirmed successful strikes on a Nova Poshta warehouse, medical supply depots (Class VIII), and a tire storage facility in the Dnipro suburbs (11:09Z, 11:10Z). This strike vector reduces local/regional support capacity, compounding the Fastiv strategic failure.
• Critical Infrastructure (ZNPP): The Zaporizhzhia Nuclear Power Plant (ZNPP) is confirmed to have temporarily lost external electrical power supply (IAEA/RBC, 11:14Z). This creates a nuclear safety vulnerability concurrent with high-intensity combat operations build-up in the region.
• Main Land Drive (Stepnohorsk): All indicators suggest the 37th GMRB MLD remains imminent (NLT 2300Z 06 DEC).

B. Weather and Environmental Factors affecting Operations

Conditions are generally clear, facilitating RF long-range ISR and deep strike operations. The heavy smoke from the Dnipro logistics facility fires (11:16Z) may temporarily complicate low-altitude local ISR over the city.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

RF: RF deep strike assets continue high operational tempo, demonstrating C2 effectiveness by shifting targets from strategic rail (Fastiv) and utility infrastructure (Kryvyi Rih) to tactical logistics and infrastructure coercion (Dnipro, ZNPP grid). Drone activity reported over Sumy Oblast (Konotop towards Bakhmach/Chernihiv, 11:24Z) suggests persistent northern ISR/fixation efforts. UAF: UAF Southern forces report sustained high enemy attrition rates (359 personnel, 33 vehicles destroyed, 11:26Z), indicating effective localized defensive fires despite the strategic logistical setback. UAF AD remains challenged by multi-vector deep strikes.

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2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

A. Enemy Capabilities, Intentions, and Courses of Action

RF Intent: Immediate intent is to achieve maximum friction and paralysis within the UAF command structure (logistical, political, psychological) within the 12 hours preceding the MLD launch. The ZNPP power cut adds a coercive layer to this strategy.

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The shift of deep strike vector to Nova Poshta/medical warehouses indicates a prioritization of Class VIII (Medical) and Class IV (Construction/General) supplies, directly affecting sustainment for defending units and the wounded, amplifying pressure on the Southern front defenders who are already sustaining high attrition rates.

C. Logistics and Sustainment Status

RF fuel supply (Class III) may still face long-term constraints due to the Kairos tanker strike, but this is overshadowed by the immediate operational benefits derived from paralyzing UAF logistics. The confirmation of the Fastiv depot damage (11:25Z) reinforces the severity of the UAF Class V and reserve movement constraint.

D. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains highly effective, executing coordinated, multi-objective deep strike missions across vast distances (Kyiv Oblast, Cherkasy Oblast, Dnipropetrovsk Oblast) while maintaining focus on the MLD preparation in Zaporizhzhia. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

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3. FRIENDLY FORCES

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are under acute, multi-domain pressure. The primary focus is maintaining defensive cohesion at the Stepnohorsk axis while managing concurrent domestic crises (logistics repair, IO fallout, ZNPP safety protocol). Readiness remains high at the tactical level (as evidenced by Southern attrition success) but operational mobility is severely hampered by Fastiv.

B. Recent Tactical Successes or Setbacks

Setbacks:

1. Logistical: Loss of critical local supply capacity due to the Dnipro strikes, specifically impacting Class VIII (Medical) access in the region.
2. Infrastructure: Temporary loss of external power to ZNPP, necessitating immediate resource allocation for stabilization. Successes:
3. Defensive: UAF Southern Forces maintain high kinetic effectiveness, reporting significant enemy losses (11:26Z).
4. Diplomatic: High-level diplomatic engagement confirmed (Zelenskyy/Rutte, Trump team contacts) demonstrating commitment to securing future aid.

C. Resource Requirements and Constraints

CRITICAL CONSTRAINT: The operational timeline for the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve movement is directly tied to the Fastiv bypass capacity (still being established) and the speed of mine clearance along the Stepnohorsk AoAs (Mangas threat).

URGENT REQUIREMENTS: Immediate sourcing of mobile power generation assets and grid stabilization experts for the ZNPP region, and establishment of alternate medical logistics hubs for Dnipro.

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4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF IO FOCUS: The campaign is in the exploitation phase, designed to demoralize and distract. Key elements:

1. Damage Amplification: Dissemination of high-quality footage of the Fastiv destruction (11:25Z).
2. Mobilization Abuse: Amplification of videos showing alleged forced mobilization/detainment in Dnipro (11:33Z), feeding the Odesa TCC friction narrative.
3. Victory Narrative: Claiming major battlefield success (Pokrovsk/Krasnoarmiysk capture, 11:20Z) to project inevitability. UAF STRATCOM: Primarily focused on maintaining external political support (Rutte conversation) and utilizing national events (Armed Forces Day) for internal fundraising (11:13Z), but struggling to counter the localized psychological shock of the Dnipro strikes and mobilization narrative.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale is highly brittle. The visible destruction of civilian logistics (Nova Poshta) and residential areas in Dnipro (11:05Z) combined with footage of forced mobilization incidents creates deep public anxiety regarding the fairness of the mobilization process and the safety of the rear areas. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

C. International Support and Diplomatic Developments

Diplomatic channels remain active and focused on long-term support (Rutte/Trump team discussions). However, the complexity of securing future U.S. aid during a transition period (Trump team contact confirmed, 11:19Z) adds uncertainty to the resource planning for late Q4 2025/Q1 2026.

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5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

A. Most Likely Enemy Courses of Action (MLCOA)

(CRITICAL, HIGH CONFIDENCE) MLD Launch and Coordinated Paralysis. RF initiates the 37th GMRB MLD at Stepnohorsk within the next 8-12 hours (NLT 2300Z 06 DEC). The assault will be supported by continued deep fire interdiction against newly established Fastiv road/rail bypasses and high-intensity RF IO aimed at maximizing domestic political friction (mobilization/corruption) to delay the NCA decision on the BRAVO-BLOCK reserve commitment.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Courses of Action (MDCOA)

(CRITICAL DANGER, HIGH CONFIDENCE) Systemic Breakdown via Infrastructure Coercion. RF maintains deep strike pressure, resulting in prolonged ZNPP external power loss, forcing the UAF to redirect significant AD and National Guard assets to nuclear security protocol. Simultaneously, the MLD achieves a shallow breakthrough at Stepnohorsk, encountering a UAF counter-attack force (BRAVO-BLOCK) that is severely delayed by Mangas minefields and logistical failures stemming from the Fastiv/Dnipro interdictions.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

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6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

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7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

1. INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (J7/J3): STABILIZE ZNPP AND SECURE AD BOXES.

   • Action: Immediately task engineering and energy sector assets (DTEK, Energoatom) to restore and establish redundancy for ZNPP external power (CR P1). Simultaneously, increase Short Range Air Defense (SHORAD) density protecting the ZNPP power infrastructure corridors against repeat attacks.
   • Justification: Nuclear safety protocols must not be allowed to draw operational resources away from the Stepnohorsk defense. Securing the grid prevents the MDCOA of forced security redirection.

2. LOGISTICS REDUNDANCY (J4): EMERGENCY MEDICAL CROSS-DOCKING.

   • Action: Activate regional administrative plans to compensate for the loss of Dnipro medical/commercial logistics capacity. Establish three emergency, dispersed, and camouflaged cross-docking points in the immediate Dnipropetrovsk/Kryvyi Rih area, prioritizing the receipt and forwarding of Class VIII (Medical) supplies.
   • Justification: Rapid replacement of lost medical capacity is vital to sustaining high-attrition defensive operations in the South. Relying solely on strategic rail is now insufficient.

3. OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3): HIGH-SPEED MINE-CLEARANCE INFUSION.

   • Action: Reinforce the BRAVO-BLOCK movement order (Action 2 from previous report) with an additional Brigade-level Engineer Task Force (ETF) specializing in MCLC and explosive demining, focusing exclusively on the two highest-priority reserve AoAs (CR P3).
   • Justification: The confirmed use of the "Mangas" aerial mining system requires disproportionate demining assets to ensure the reserve can reach the front line on time, countering the RF "breach-and-block" strategy.

4. STRATEGIC COMMUNICATIONS (P7): COUNTER-MOBILIZATION NARRATIVE.

   • Action: Shift the IO focus from purely defensive fundraising to proactive transparency regarding mobilization. Immediately release standardized, video-based guidance on legal mobilization procedures and consequences of abuse, utilizing the "Wartime Accountability" frame established previously (Odesa TCC arrest).
   • Justification: Addressing the mobilization friction head-on is mandatory to restore domestic confidence and ensure sustained manpower flow. The MLD threat requires maximum social cohesion.

//END OF REPORT//