Sitrep 2025-12-06 10:04:31

INTELLIGENCE SITUATION REPORT (INTREP)

TIME: 2025-12-06 10:04Z

1. SITUATION OVERVIEW

A. Battlefield Geometry and Key Terrain

The operational center of gravity remains the Stepnohorsk sector (Zaporizhzhia Front), where the Russian Federation (RF) 37th Guards Motorized Rifle Brigade (GMRB) Main Land Drive (MLD) is immediately imminent (NLT 2100Z 2025-12-05, per previous report). Deep Battle operations are highly active, targeting UAF logistics and command structure across the operational rear. Key terrain shifts focus from the immediate frontline to critical logistics nodes in Central Ukraine.

B. Weather and Environmental Factors

No explicit weather data, but large-scale combined missile and KAB operations confirm favorable conditions for high-altitude air strikes and reconnaissance operations. Visibility permits effective use of targeting UAS.

C. Current Force Dispositions and Control Measures

The RF effort is characterized by a synchronized multi-domain attack:

Ground: 37th GMRB in Forward Assembly Areas (FAA) near Stepnohorsk. VDV elements exploiting initial infiltration.
Air/EW: Confirmed ongoing combined CR/UAV strike wave. RF continues heavy deployment of KABs (Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia) and use of "Mangas" UAS for rear-area mining along UAF reinforcement corridors.
Logistics (UAF Counter): UAF confirmed successful deep strike against the Uryupinsk Oil Storage Facility (Volgograd Oblast, 0957Z). This complements the previous Temryuk strike, significantly increasing strain on RF Southern Group of Forces (SGF) fuel supply (Class III).

2. ENEMY ANALYSIS

A. Enemy Capabilities and Intentions

RF Intent remains achieving operational success at Stepnohorsk through a rapid mechanized drive supported by strategic paralysis of UAF logistics and C2.

Capability	Assessment	Confidence
Combined Strike Coordination	High complexity; successful launch of large combined cruise missile (CR) and UAV waves synchronized with ground operations.	HIGH
Counter-UAS/C2 Targeting	Demonstrated success in degrading UAF assets (destruction of UAF UAV C2 post in Kupyansk).	MEDIUM
Logistics Resilience	Ongoing civilian-military integration (e.g., "KIT-Our Territories" price reduction announcement) suggests RF attempts to rapidly stabilize and optimize supply chains in newly controlled areas, mitigating the immediate effect of UAF deep strikes.	MEDIUM
Retaliatory Intent	Kadyrov’s public threat ("severe military retaliation" following Grozny-City attack) signals potential deployment of high-ferocity Chechen elements or increased brutality in contact zones.	HIGH

B. Recent Tactical Changes or Adaptations

The primary operational change is the Shift in Deep Strike Vector.

Initial CR vectors targeting Kropyvnytskyi (threatening Zolotonosha) shifted West toward Vinnytsia Oblast (0943Z).
Judgment: This shift indicates either that Zolotonosha was a fixation/feint to draw AD, or the primary objective is now disrupting UAF long-distance reinforcement/staging logistics further west (e.g., rail lines connecting Western Ukraine/NATO supply corridors to the Central/Southern fronts).

C. Command and Control Effectiveness

RF C2 remains effective in coordinating multi-domain strikes and synchronized IO. The precision targeting capabilities (Kub UAV destroying UAF C2 post) indicate localized C2 effectiveness in the Kupyansk sector.

3. FRIENDLY FORCES

A. Ukrainian Force Posture and Readiness

UAF forces are on high alert for the Stepnohorsk MLD. Air Defense (AD) assets demonstrated effective engagement of incoming CRs over Kirovohrad/Vinnytsia axis ("minusa po raketam"). Readiness is tempered by confirmed tactical losses:

Confirmed successful RF drone strike against UAF logistics (Quad bike) west of Dobropillya.
Alleged UAF armor losses near the encircled Dimitrov area.

B. Resource Requirements and Constraints

The immediate constraint remains the integrity of the Bravo Block reserve movement corridors due to "Mangas" aerial mining, compounded by the ongoing logistical risk from RF deep strikes targeting rail infrastructure across Central Ukraine (Kropyvnytskyi/Vinnytsia axis).

4. INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

A. Propaganda and Disinformation Campaigns

RF Narrative	UAF Counter-Narrative	Assessment
Escalation/Revenge (Kadyrov threat)	Focus on National Unity/Strength (Armed Forces Day)	RF attempting to raise stakes and fear; UAF stabilizing domestic morale.
Logistical Sustainability (SVO support, KIT transport ads)	Financial Accountability/Resilience (Successful PrivatBank fundraising)	RF normalizing war economy; UAF demonstrating robust public support and financial capability.
Military Success (C2 destruction, armor losses)	Patriotic Mobilization (GS ZSU "We will fight for our land" video)	Standard tactical IO friction.

B. Public Sentiment and Morale Factors

Domestic morale received a planned and effective boost through the synchronized observance of Ukrainian Armed Forces Day (December 6th). Presidential decrees and highly patriotic media output (Zelenskyy, KMVA, GS ZSU) provide a strong counter to the internal friction points (Skorod corruption, Odesa mobilization incidents) planted by RF IO efforts. (HIGH CONFIDENCE)

5. PREDICTIVE ANALYSIS

A. Most Likely Enemy Course of Action (MLCOA)

(CRITICAL, HIGH CONFIDENCE) MLD Launch and Western Logistical Interdiction. RF launches the 37th GMRB MLD immediately. VDV secures the breach point while "Mangas" continues to mine counter-attack routes. Deep fires, utilizing the observed Western vector shift (Vinnytsia axis), concentrate on severing the primary UAF rail lines and staging areas feeding the Central and Southern fronts, preventing large-scale strategic reserve commitment rather than tactical disruption at Zolotonosha. RF aims for deep penetration before UAF reserves can de-mine and stage.

B. Most Dangerous Enemy Course of Action (MDCOA)

(HIGH DANGER, MEDIUM CONFIDENCE) Operational Breakout & Chechen Exploitation. Despite UAF deep strikes (Temryuk/Uryupinsk), RF pre-positioned fuel or decentralized logistics (e.g., civilian transport networks) prevents immediate SGF immobilization. The MLD achieves a rapid operational breakout at Stepnohorsk. Chechen forces, motivated by the retaliation narrative, are inserted to rapidly exploit the gap and fix UAF defenders, preventing orderly fallback to Phase Line BRAVO.

C. Timeline Estimates and Decision Points

The window for the 37th GMRB MLD is NOW (06 DECEMBER), based on the previous NLT 2100Z 05 DEC launch commitment and current C2 synchronization.

Decision Point	Event Trigger	Time Estimate
D+0/H+4 (Immediate Reserve Release)	Confirmation of 37th GMRB crossing Line of Departure (LOD).	NLT 1400Z 06 DEC
D+1 (Western AD Shift)	Confirmed structural damage to key rail junction in Vinnytsia/Khmelnytskyi area.	NLT 1000Z 07 DEC
D+2 (RF Fuel Crisis Impact)	Observed slowing of RF mechanized movement rates due to confirmed Class III scarcity.	NLT 1000Z 08 DEC

6. INTELLIGENCE GAPS AND COLLECTION REQUIREMENTS

Priority	Gap Description	Collection Requirement (CR)
PRIORITY 1 (MANEUVER):	Confirmation of 37th GMRB LOD Crossing and initial rate of advance.	High-resolution ISR (satellite/HALE drone) on FAA Stepnohorsk/line of contact. Human Intelligence (HUMINT) correlation of RF communications chatter.
PRIORITY 2 (TARGETING/AD):	Specific RF targeting priorities along the Vinnytsia/Western CR vector. (Rail bridges? HQs? Western staging areas?)	SIGINT/ELINT on CR guidance systems; increased AD patrols/radar coverage (SAR Score > 15) in the Vinnytsia region.
PRIORITY 3 (LOGISTICS/EW):	Confirmation of effective impact of Uryupinsk/Temryuk strikes on RF SGF fuel readiness (Class III).	ISR/COMMINT on RF fuel convoys between Rostov/Crimea/Southern Front. EW sweep for "Mangas" C2 Frequencies (CR remains critical).

7. ACTIONABLE RECOMMENDATIONS

OPERATIONAL MANEUVER (J3): EXECUTE BRAVO-BLOCK RESERVE MOVEMENT IMMEDIATELY, PRIORITIZING DE-MINING. The MLD is underway or hours away. Do not delay reserve commitment waiting for full de-mining clearance. Integrate MCLC/Roller assets into the main maneuver element and accept a reduced rate of advance (ROA) to preserve force integrity against the "Mangas" aerial mine threat.
AIR DEFENSE REDEPLOYMENT (J3/AD): PRIORITIZE WESTERN AXIS PROTECTION. Re-evaluate Zolotonosha threat level downward (from CRITICAL to HIGH). Shift mobile SHORAD assets (Gepard, Avenger, VADS) to protect critical rail infrastructure and logistics nodes in the Vinnytsia/Hayvoron corridor to counter the confirmed shift in CR trajectory.
ELECTRONIC WARFARE (J6): DEDICATE ASSETS TO COUNTER-MINE EW. Deploy dedicated high-power broad-spectrum EW platforms to saturate the identified "Bravo-Block" AoAs for extended periods (NLT 72 hours) to disrupt both "Mangas" aerial mining C2 and RF UAV reconnaissance of reserve movement.
LOGISTICS/FUEL (J4): EXPLOIT RF FUEL VULNERABILITY. Maintain tempo of deep strike operations against known RF fuel storage and transit points. Integrate intelligence from the Temryuk and Uryupinsk strikes to identify the secondary distribution network now critical to SGF sustainment.

//END OF REPORT//

Situation Report